To reveal the interaction and influence mechanism between emergency rescue entities, and to explore and optimize a cooperation mechanism of emergency rescue entities, a tripartite evolutionary game model of emergency rescue cooperation based on government rescue teams, social emergency organizations, and government support institutions was constructed. The stability of each game subject’s strategy choice was explored. Simulation analysis was applied to investigate the influence mechanism of key parameters on the evolution of the game subject’s strategy combination. The research results show that government rescue teams, social emergency organizations, and government support institutions have consistent political demands and rescue targets in emergency rescue cooperation. The game subjects are driving forces for each other to choose positive strategies. The game evolution process of the emergency cooperation model shows a “mobilization-coordination” feature. At the same time, the emergency capital stock formed based on trust relationships, information matching, and institutional norms between game subjects can promote the evolution of the game system toward (1,1,1). In addition, for government organizations with limited emergency resources, the average allocation of emergency resources is not the optimal solution for emergency rescue efficiency. However, it is easier to achieve the overall target of emergency rescue cooperation by investing limited emergency resources in key variables that match the on-site situation. On this basis, combined with the practice of emergency rescues in emergencies, countermeasures and solutions are proposed to optimize the mechanism and improve the efficiency of emergency rescue cooperation.

With the increase in types of fire risk and the expansion of fire management coverage, it is urgent to involve multiple subjects in fire management. Cross-sectoral joint fire management is a new fire management mode based on collaboration between the fire management sector and the industry management sector in China. Additionally, fire information from multiple sources plays a significant role in the formation of the cross-sectoral joint fire management mode. To explore the operating characteristics and influencing factors of the cross-sectoral joint fire management mode, this paper constructed a cross-sectoral joint fire management game model by focusing on the interactions and game relationships between multiple organizations. Through numerical simulation analysis, the mechanisms by which the sharing level, coverage range, and disclosure degree of fire information influence the evolution of the game system are investigated. The results show that with the improvement in the sharing level, the coverage range, and the disclosure degree of fire information, although the evolutionary paths of the game system and game subjects’ strategies are different, the cross-sectoral joint fire management game system can form a stable strategy combination of (1,1,1). This indicates that the sharing level, coverage range, and disclosure degree of fire information play positive driving roles in the formation of the cross-sectoral joint fire management mode. Furthermore, it is found that the fire management sector has a greater influence on the cross-sectoral joint fire management mode. Finally, the implications of improving the effectiveness of cross-sectoral joint fire management are proposed: enhancing institutional support, promoting information sharing, and expanding channels for information disclosure.

The new situations, problems, and challenges facing urban fire safety work are gradually increasing in China, so innovating urban fire safety governance modes is an urgent task. In the fire management practice of the Chinese government, the establishment of an urban fire safety co-management system is an important measure for aggregating fire safety management resources and improving the level of urban fire safety prevention, as well as control. In order to reveal and clarify the interacting relationships and influencing mechanisms among multiple subjects in an urban fire safety co-management system, we constructed an urban fire safety co-management game model comprising fire supervision departments, production management units, and the public based on evolutionary game theory. The stability of the urban fire safety co-management game system is explored from the perspective of game subjects. The influencing factors of strategy selection between game subjects in the game system were investigated using numerical simulation analysis. The research results show that elevating the informatization level of co-management, the risk perception level of the public, and the disclosure level of fire safety information are conducive to stimulating the public’s positivity to participate in co-management. Strengthening the accountability of the superior government is conducive to ensuring the supervision level of fire supervision departments. The above measures have positive value for optimizing China’s urban fire safety co-management systems, establishing urban fire safety management synergy, and ensuring the stability of social fire safety situations.

Vaccination is the key to interrupting the transmission of viruses, reducing public health losses, and improving the efficiency of public health emergency management. The implementation of vaccination requires communication between the government and the public, and the participation of multiple subjects. Strengthening the coordination of multiple subjects in the process of vaccination can improve the vaccination rate and broaden its scope. Therefore, from the perspective of inter-organizational interaction, a public health emergency vaccination game model based on health management departments, vaccinologists, and the public was constructed in this study. With the objective of improving the effectiveness of vaccination, the influential factors in a public health emergency vaccination game system and game subjects’ strategy selection were explored using a numerical simulation analysis. The research results showed that the range of vaccination, the diversification of vaccination information release, the level of emergency coordination between health management departments and vaccinologists, and the public’s awareness of emergency protection can all effectively promote vaccination. Among them, the effects of vaccination range (δ) and the diversification of vaccination information release (φ) on game subjects’ strategy selection fluctuated, but did not affect the overall trend. Both the level of emergency collaboration (θ) and public safety awareness (ε) can enhance the initiative of game subjects to participate in vaccination. When the stable strategy combination formed by the game system are positive promotion strategy, active guidance strategy and active vaccination strategy, the convergence rate of health management departments and vaccinologists to form a stable strategy is greater than that of the public. Further, the implications of promoting the effective implementation of vaccination are put forward via improving the vaccination strategy, strengthening vaccination collaboration, mobilizing the enthusiasm of vaccinologists, and enhancing the initiative of the public.

Emergency scientific research (ESR) is characterized by multidisciplinary integration, multidemand matching, and multiscenario application, which impose greater applicability requirements and tolerance for costs than conventional scientific research does. Analyzing the implementation law of ESR may serve as a reference to strengthen deployment and optimize the layout strategy of ESR. This study systematically compares the differences between the solicitation and approval of ESR projects by analyzing the projects deployed by the Chinese government during the COVID-19 outbreak. On the basis of 1,654 ESR project records collected from provincial-level governments across China (333 solicitations and 1,321 approvals), we apply descriptive statistical methods and structural metrics via social network analysis to construct “subject–research direction” 2-mode networks and association networks. The characteristics and rules of the ESR layout are systematically traced and classified from the perspectives of quantitative distribution, regional distribution, and resource distribution. The key directions of ESR for public health emergencies can be divided into three categories: urgent directions required in the initial stage of public health emergencies; sustained directions for multiphase response in different emergency stages; and expandable directions that have been proven effective in practice and can improve long-term governance. The clear divergence between the solicitation and approval phases illustrates the system’s dynamic adaptation to emerging needs and innovation uncertainties. This study also shows that ESR deployment is influenced by existing scientific research capabilities and regional advantages while requiring multipath exploration and resource synergy to achieve the optimal configuration. The effective deployment of ESR demands cross-regional coordination, real-time matching of needs and resources, and institutional feedback loops to ensure that research outputs are timely and actionable. By synthesizing layout rules in terms of quantity, regional coordination, and resource integration, this study contributes theoretical foundations and practical strategies for improving ESR system design in future public health emergencies.