In the past years, the automotive industry has experienced a technological revolution driven by the increasing demand of connectivity and data to develop driver-assistance systems and autonomous vehicles, and improve the mobility experience. To provide higher bandwidth in in-vehicle communication networks, carmakers are choosing Ethernet technology, which becomes Automotive Ethernet (AE) when applied in in-vehicle communication networks. However, with the rise of vehicle connectivity, the cybersecurity of vehicle systems has become a primary concern for the automotive industry. To address this issue, we conducted a systematic review, deeply analyzing the impact of AE on security and safety, and comparing it with the current in-vehicle communication solutions like Controller Area Network protocol. We retrieved the key security attacks and mitigations proposed in the current literature to highlight their significance, including a mapping between the regulation UNECE WP.29 R155 and the retrieved answers. We found that the industry has only implemented some automotive-dedicated Ethernet solutions to date. In the near future, the vehicle and road ecosystems may require more exclusive automotive solutions to meet specific constraints such as low latency. Our results can provide a comprehensive baseline, both for industry and academia, for the current and future development of AE.
1 March 2022 in IEEE Communications Standards Magazine
In recent years, the evolution of road vehicles has strongly required common rules to manage cybersecurity in the automotive industry. In this article, we summarize the ISO/SAE 21434 standard, focusing on the main requirements, work products, and innovations. We identify with an ego-network the possible correlation of ISO/SAE 21434 with the already existing automotive standards, reporting a strong correlation with the ISO 26262 safety standard. Following, we discuss the relationship between safety and security in the automotive field, and between ISO/SAE 21434 and regulation UNECE WP.29 R155. Then we focus on possible limits and implementations of the standard such as the introduction of application methods or specific thresholds for the required security risk analysis. Finally, we propose a structured list of documents that can be used as a landmark to achieve compliance with the cyber-security standard and an example of the application of ISO/SAE 21434 to an electric window power regulator system.
The rising connection of vehicles with the road infrastructure enables the creation of data-driven applications to offer drivers customized services. At the same time, these opportunities require innovative solutions to protect the drivers’ privacy in a complex environment like an Intelligent Transportation System (ITS). This need is even more relevant when data are used to retrieve personal behaviors or attitudes. In our work, we propose a privacy-preserving solution, called Private Driver DNA, which designs a possible architecture, allowing drivers of an ITS to receive customized services. The proposed solution is based on the concept of Driver DNA as characterization of driver’s driving style. To assure privacy, we perform the operations directly on sanitized data, using the Order Revealing Encryption (ORE) method. Besides, the proposed solution is integrated with ITS architecture defined in the European project E-Corridor. The result is an effective privacy-preserving architecture for ITS to offer customized products, which can be used to address drivers’ behaviors, for example, to environmental-friendly attitudes or a more safe driving style. We test Private Driver DNA using a synthetic dataset generated with the vehicle simulator CARLA. We compare ORE with another encryption method like Homomorphic Encryption (HE) and some other privacy-preserving schemas. Besides, we quantify privacy gain and data loss utility after the data sanitization process.
25 May 2022 in Journal of Computer Virology and Hacking Techniques
Modern vehicles resemble four-wheels computers connected to the Internet via their In-Vehicle Infotainment (IVI) systems. As with PCs in the past, cars, being connected to the Internet can be potentially vulnerable. The IVI system of a car is part of the intra-vehicle network and can be the entry-point of offensive cybersecurity attacks. The intra-vehicle network, based on the CAN protocol, is vulnerable by design: messages are exchanged in clear. Thus, the uncontrolled access to the CAN bus may have serious impact on the vehicle itself and its passengers. In this paper, we present a vulnerability assessment, through a reverse engineering process, of Kia vehicles IVI system. In particular, we focused on reverse engineer the Kia IVI system to discover vulnerabilities that may allow an attacker to compromise the IVI functionalities and inject CAN frames into the CAN bus to alter the behaviour of (part of) the vehicle. By reverse engineering the IVI, we identified four important vulnerabilities that affect all Kia vehicles that embed the studied IVI. Finally, we show how an attacker can easily control the IVI and inject CAN bus frames by means of a Metasploit module that we wrote.
17 June 2019 in IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing