Marco De Vincenzi

Marco De Vincenzi

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Marco De Vincenzi

Institute of Informatics and Telematics, Pisa, Italy

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

5Years (2022-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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22 January 2024 in ACM Computing Surveys
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
MVMarco De Vincenzi
Marco De Vincenzi
GCGianpiero Costantino
Gianpiero Costantino
IMIlaria Matteucci
Ilaria Matteucci
FFFlorian Fenzl
Florian Fenzl
CPChristian Plappert
Christian Plappert
DZDaniel Zelle
Daniel Zelle
In the past years, the automotive industry has experienced a technological revolution driven by the increasing demand of connectivity and data to develop driver-assistance systems and autonomous vehicles, and improve the mobility experience. To provide higher bandwidth in in-vehicle communication networks, carmakers are choosing Ethernet technology, which becomes Automotive Ethernet (AE) when applied in in-vehicle communication networks. However, with the rise of vehicle connectivity, the cybersecurity of vehicle systems has become a primary concern for the automotive industry. To address this issue, we conducted a systematic review, deeply analyzing the impact of AE on security and safety, and comparing it with the current in-vehicle communication solutions like Controller Area Network protocol. We retrieved the key security attacks and mitigations proposed in the current literature to highlight their significance, including a mapping between the regulation UNECE WP.29 R155 and the retrieved answers. We found that the industry has only implemented some automotive-dedicated Ethernet solutions to date. In the near future, the vehicle and road ecosystems may require more exclusive automotive solutions to meet specific constraints such as low latency. Our results can provide a comprehensive baseline, both for industry and academia, for the current and future development of AE.

1 March 2022 in IEEE Communications Standards Magazine
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
GCGianpiero Costantino
Gianpiero Costantino
MVMarco De Vincenzi
Marco De Vincenzi
IMIlaria Matteucci
Ilaria Matteucci
In recent years, the evolution of road vehicles has strongly required common rules to manage cybersecurity in the automotive industry. In this article, we summarize the ISO/SAE 21434 standard, focusing on the main requirements, work products, and innovations. We identify with an ego-network the possible correlation of ISO/SAE 21434 with the already existing automotive standards, reporting a strong correlation with the ISO 26262 safety standard. Following, we discuss the relationship between safety and security in the automotive field, and between ISO/SAE 21434 and regulation UNECE WP.29 R155. Then we focus on possible limits and implementations of the standard such as the introduction of application methods or specific thresholds for the required security risk analysis. Finally, we propose a structured list of documents that can be used as a landmark to achieve compliance with the cyber-security standard and an example of the application of ISO/SAE 21434 to an electric window power regulator system.

30 December 2024 in IEEE Open Journal of Vehicular Technology
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
MVMarco De Vincenzi
Marco De Vincenzi
JMJohn Moore
John Moore
BSBradley Smith
Bradley Smith
SSSanjay E. Sarma
Sanjay E. Sarma
IMIlaria Matteucci
Ilaria Matteucci
The evolution of Connected Vehicles (CVs) has introduced significant advancements in both in-vehicle and vehicle-edge platforms, creating a highly connected ecosystem. These advancements, however, have heightened exposure to cybersecurity risks. This work reviews emerging security challenges in the CV ecosystem from a new perspective, focusing on the integration of in-vehicle platforms such as the infotainment system and vehicle-edge platforms. By analyzing case studies such as Android Automotive, Message Queuing Telemetry Transport (MQTT), and the Robot Operating System (ROS), we identify the primary security threats, including malware attacks, data manipulation, and Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. The discussion extends to privacy concerns and the lack of trust-building mechanisms in CVs, highlighting how these gaps can be exploited. To mitigate these risks, we retrieve solutions drawn from the broader field of Internet of Things (IoT) security research, including Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) and trust-based systems. The proposed framework aims to increase the trustworthiness of devices within the CV ecosystem. Finally, we identify future research directions in adaptive mechanisms and cross-domain security.

10 November 2022 in IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
GCGianpiero Costantino
Gianpiero Costantino
MVMarco De Vincenzi
Marco De Vincenzi
FMFabio Martinelli
Fabio Martinelli
IMIlaria Matteucci
Ilaria Matteucci
The rising connection of vehicles with the road infrastructure enables the creation of data-driven applications to offer drivers customized services. At the same time, these opportunities require innovative solutions to protect the drivers’ privacy in a complex environment like an Intelligent Transportation System (ITS). This need is even more relevant when data are used to retrieve personal behaviors or attitudes. In our work, we propose a privacy-preserving solution, called Private Driver DNA, which designs a possible architecture, allowing drivers of an ITS to receive customized services. The proposed solution is based on the concept of Driver DNA as characterization of driver’s driving style. To assure privacy, we perform the operations directly on sanitized data, using the Order Revealing Encryption (ORE) method. Besides, the proposed solution is integrated with ITS architecture defined in the European project E-Corridor. The result is an effective privacy-preserving architecture for ITS to offer customized products, which can be used to address drivers’ behaviors, for example, to environmental-friendly attitudes or a more safe driving style. We test Private Driver DNA using a synthetic dataset generated with the vehicle simulator CARLA. We compare ORE with another encryption method like Homomorphic Encryption (HE) and some other privacy-preserving schemas. Besides, we quantify privacy gain and data loss utility after the data sanitization process.

8 May 2024 in Journal of Computer Virology and Hacking Techniques
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
GCGianpiero Costantino
Gianpiero Costantino
MVMarco De Vincenzi
Marco De Vincenzi
IMIlaria Matteucci
Ilaria Matteucci
In the last years, the increasing vehicular technology has led to a surge in cybersecurity attacks, particularly regarding connected vehicles and their vulnerable infotainment systems. This paper explores the vulnerabilities within an In-Vehicle Infotainment (IVI) system firmware, focusing on the Gen5W_L multimedia device utilized in Hyundai, Kia, and Genesis vehicles. Leveraging reverse engineering techniques, the study uncovers several security issues within the firmware, allowing for the creation and installation of custom firmware. The paper introduces Chimaera, a reverse engineering attack targeting the IVI system firmware, which exploits a vulnerability introduced by statically compiling the mbedtls library. After a reverse engineering analysis and injecting malicious assembly code directly in the IVI firmware, the attack enables the extraction of sensitive information from the firmware files like the cryptographic keys to install a customized firmware. The research shows that exploiting these vulnerabilities facilitates the installation of insecure firmware, granting attackers unauthorized access to vehicle functionalities. This includes the possibility to inject CAN bus messages, potentially compromising critical vehicle systems such as radio controls and safety features. The findings underscore the need for robust cybersecurity measures within automotive systems and highlight the significance of vulnerability assessment to mitigate security risks in connected vehicles.

5 August 2024 in International Journal on Software Tools for Technology Transfer
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
CBChiara Bodei
Chiara Bodei
MVMarco De Vincenzi
Marco De Vincenzi
IMIlaria Matteucci
Ilaria Matteucci
The widespread use of advanced driver assistance systems in modern vehicles, together with their integration with the Internet and other road nodes, has made vehicle more vulnerable to cyber-attacks. To address these risks, the automotive industry is increasingly focusing on the development of security solutions: formal methods and software verification techniques, which have been successfully applied to a number of safety-critical systems, could be a promising approach in the automotive area. In this work, we concentrate on in-vehicle communications, provided by many Electronic Control Units (ECUs) that work together thanks to serial protocols such as Controller Area Network (CAN). However, increasing connectivity exposes the internal network to a variety of cyber-risks. Our aim is to formally verify the AUTOSAR-based Basic Software module called CINNAMON, designed to ensure confidentiality, integrity, and authentication at the same time for traffic exchanged over CAN protocol. More precisely, it adds confidentiality guarantees to the Secure Onboard Communication (SecOC) module. We formally analyze CINNAMON with the verification tool Tamarin. Our analysis shows that CINNAMON could be an effective security solution, as it can ensure the desired properties, in particular, confidentiality in a send-receive scenario between two ECUs. Finally, we describe a potential application scenario.