Hanna Halaburda

Dr. Hanna Halaburda


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

13Years (2014-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

View All Publications
1 December 2020 in Management Science
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
YBYannis Bakos
Yannis Bakos
HHHanna Halaburda
Hanna Halaburda
A major result in the study of two-sided platforms is the strategic interdependence between the two sides of the same platform, leading to the implication that a platform can maximize its total profits by subsidizing one of its sides. We show that this result largely depends on assuming that at least one side of the market single-homes. As technology makes joining multiple platforms easier, we increasingly observe that participants on both sides of two-sided platforms multihome. The case of multihoming on both sides is mostly ignored in the literature on competition between two-sided platforms. We help to fill this gap by developing a model for platform competition in a differentiated setting (a Hotelling line), which is similar to other models in the literature but focuses on the case where at least some agents on each side multihome. We show that when both sides in a platform market multihome, the strategic interdependence between the two sides of the same platform will diminish or even disappear. Our analysis suggests that the common strategic advice to subsidize one side in order to maximize total profits may be limited or even incorrect when both sides multihome, which is an important caveat given the increasing prevalence of multihoming in platform markets. This paper was accepted by Joshua Gans, business strategy.

7 July 2016 in Games
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
NGNeil Gandal
Neil Gandal
HHHanna Halaburda
Hanna Halaburda
We analyze how network effects affect competition in the nascent cryptocurrency market. We do so by examining early dynamics of exchange rates among different cryptocurrencies. While Bitcoin essentially dominates this market, our data suggest no evidence of a winner-take-all effect early in the market. Indeed, for a relatively long period, a few other cryptocurrencies competing with Bitcoin (the early industry leader) appreciated much more quickly than Bitcoin. The data in this period are consistent with the use of cryptocurrencies as financial assets (popularized by Bitcoin), and not consistent with winner-take-all dynamics. Toward the end of our sample, however, things change dramatically. Bitcoin appreciates against the USD, while other currencies depreciate against the USD. The data in this period are consistent with strong network effects and winner-take-all dynamics. This trend continues at the time of writing.

1 September 2018 in Management Science
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
HHHanna Halaburda
Hanna Halaburda
MPMikołaj Jan Piskorski
Mikołaj Jan Piskorski
PYPınar Yıldırım
Pınar Yıldırım
We show that a two-sided matching platform can successfully compete by limiting the number of choices it offers to its customers, while charging higher prices than platforms with unrestricted choice. We develop a stylized model of online dating where agents with different outside options match based on how much they like each other. Starting from these microfoundations, we derive the strength and direction of indirect network effects and show that increasing the number of potential matches has a positive effect due to larger choice, but also a negative effect due to competition between agents on the same side. Agents resolve the trade-off between these competing effects differently, depending on their outside options. For agents with high outside options, the choice effect is stronger than the competition effect, leading them to prefer an unrestricted-choice platform. The opposite is the case for agents with low outside options, who then have higher willingness to pay for a platform restricting choice, as it also restricts the choice set of their potential matches. Moreover, since only agents with low outside options self-select into the restricted choice platform, the competition effect is mitigated further. This allows multiple platforms offering different number of choices to coexist without the market tipping. This paper was accepted by Bruno Cassiman, business strategy.

5 March 2020 in The RAND Journal of Economics
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
HHHanna Halaburda
Hanna Halaburda
BJBruno Jullien
Bruno Jullien
YYYaron Yehezkel
Yaron Yehezkel

4 April 2014 in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
RCRamon Casadesus‐Masanell
Ramon Casadesus‐Masanell
HHHanna Halaburda
Hanna Halaburda

4 March 2016 in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
HHHanna Halaburda
Hanna Halaburda
YYYaron Yehezkel
Yaron Yehezkel