Pinar Yildirim

Pinar Yildirim

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Pinar Yildirim

Marketing Department, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, USA

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

18Years (2009-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 September 2018 in Management Science
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
HHHanna Halaburda
Hanna Halaburda
MPMikołaj Jan Piskorski
Mikołaj Jan Piskorski
PYPınar Yıldırım
Pınar Yıldırım
We show that a two-sided matching platform can successfully compete by limiting the number of choices it offers to its customers, while charging higher prices than platforms with unrestricted choice. We develop a stylized model of online dating where agents with different outside options match based on how much they like each other. Starting from these microfoundations, we derive the strength and direction of indirect network effects and show that increasing the number of potential matches has a positive effect due to larger choice, but also a negative effect due to competition between agents on the same side. Agents resolve the trade-off between these competing effects differently, depending on their outside options. For agents with high outside options, the choice effect is stronger than the competition effect, leading them to prefer an unrestricted-choice platform. The opposite is the case for agents with low outside options, who then have higher willingness to pay for a platform restricting choice, as it also restricts the choice set of their potential matches. Moreover, since only agents with low outside options self-select into the restricted choice platform, the competition effect is mitigated further. This allows multiple platforms offering different number of choices to coexist without the market tipping. This paper was accepted by Bruno Cassiman, business strategy.

1 May 2021 in Management Science
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
MPMaria Petrova
Maria Petrova
ASAnanya Sen
Ananya Sen
PYPinar Yildirim
Pinar Yildirim
Political campaigns are among the most sophisticated marketing exercises in the United States. As part of their marketing communication strategy, an increasing number of politicians adopt social media to inform their constituencies. This study documents the returns from adopting a new technology, namely Twitter, for politicians running for Congress by focusing on the change in campaign contributions received. We compare weekly donations received just before and just after a politician opens a Twitter account in regions with high and low levels of Twitter penetration, controlling for politician-month fixed effects. Specifically, over the course of a political campaign, we estimate that the differential effect of opening a Twitter account in regions with high versus low levels of Twitter penetration amounts to an increase of 0.7%–2% in donations for all politicians and 1%–3.1% for new politicians who were never elected to Congress before. In contrast, the effect of joining Twitter for experienced politicians remains negligibly small. We find some evidence consistent with the explanation that the effect is driven by new information about the candidates; for example, the effect is primarily driven by new donors rather than past donors, by candidates without Facebook accounts, and by tweeting more informatively. Overall, our findings imply that social media can intensify political competition by lowering the costs of disseminating information for new entrants to their constituents and thus may reduce the barriers to enter politics. This paper was accepted by Eric Anderson, marketing.

1 July 2022 in Marketing Science
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
YLYi Liu
Yi Liu
PYPinar Yildirim
Pinar Yildirim
ZZZ. John Zhang
Z. John Zhang
This paper develops a theoretical model to study how the revenue model and technology of a social media platform affect its content-moderation strategy.

1 November 2024 in Management Science
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PYPinar Yildirim
Pinar Yildirim
ASAndrei Simonov
Andrei Simonov
MPMaria Petrova
Maria Petrova
RPRicardo Perez-Truglia
Ricardo Perez-Truglia
Using microdata from the American Red Cross (ARC) and the Federal Election Commission (FEC) in two natural experiments, we provide evidence that political giving and charitable giving are substitutes. In the first natural experiment, we estimate the effects of a positive shock to charitable donations to the ARC: foreign natural disaster events. We find that although charitable donations to ARC increase by 34.9% in the six weeks following a disaster, political donations decline by 18.8% in the same period. Put differently, each 1% increase in the charitable giving to ARC is accompanied by a 0.53% drop in political donations. At the average county-week–level donations, the implied effect of a $1 increase in charitable giving is a $0.42 decline in political donations. In the second natural experiment, we estimate the effects of a positive shock to political giving: advertisements for political campaigns. Exploiting geographic discontinuities in advertising markets, we find that political advertisements increase political giving, whereas they decrease charitable donations to ARC. Our estimates imply that each 1% increase in the political giving is accompanied by a 0.59% drop in charitable donations to ARC. At the average county-week–level donations, the implied effect of a $1 increase in political giving is a $0.33 decline in charitable donations. The crowding-out elasticities suggest that political giving and charitable giving are relatively close substitutes. We provide a number of robustness checks, and we discuss potential causal mechanisms. This paper was accepted by Eric Anderson, marketing. Funding: P. Yildirim thanks the Dean’s Research Fund and the Mack Institute at the Wharton School as well as the Wharton Behavioral Laboratory for their financial support. M. Petrova thanks financial support from the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (Barcelona School of Economics CEX2019-000915-S), funded by MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2021.00845 .

16 June 2015 in SSRN Electronic Journal
Verified
Preprint
Open access
PDF file
ASAnanya Sen
Ananya Sen
PYPinar Yildirim
Pinar Yildirim
Do clicks received by online news stories, independent of story quality, influence the way newspaper editors allocate journalistic resources to them, and if so, how? Combining a unique online news dataset obtained from a large Indian English daily newspaper and publicly available data about story characteristics, we provide evidence that editors respond to the clicks received by the first article of news stories by increasing the amount of follow-up coverage. We show that a standard deviation increase in clicks received by the first article of a story can expand the coverage of the story by three additional articles and its duration by three days. To establish causality, we use an instrumental variables strategy by exploiting ordinary power shortages and rainfall as exogenous shocks to readers' access to online news. An analysis of the content of stories demonstrates that editorial response to clicks is asymmetric for hard (i.e., economic, business events, world events) and soft (i.e., entertainment, sports) news stories. Additional coverage is only awarded to popular hard stories but not to the soft ones, suggesting that hard news may crowd out soft news stories, but not vice-versa. We discuss the implications of our findings for policy makers, managerial strategy, as well as the readers.

1 April 2023 in Management Science
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
GBGorkem Bostanci
Gorkem Bostanci
PYPinar Yildirim
Pinar Yildirim
KJKinshuk Jerath
Kinshuk Jerath
Negative advertising provides information about the weaknesses of a competitor’s product. We study negative advertising with a focus on how its regulation impacts product positioning for profit-maximizing firms. We build a model of informative advertising competition, where product positioning is endogenous, and consumers have rational expectations. We show that despite the informational benefits of negative advertising, permitting it (as the Federal Trade Commission in the United States does) may lead to reduced product differentiation and lower consumer welfare, even in markets where firms do not use negative advertising in equilibrium. We then extend our model to political competition, where a candidate’s objective is to obtain a larger share of votes than the competitor. We show that political competition supports higher positional differentiation, along with more negative advertising than product competition, in line with observed high use of negative advertising in political races and their rarer use in product competition. This paper was accepted by Dmitri Kuksov, marketing. Funding: P. Yildirim thanks Mack Institute and the Dean’s Research Funds of the Wharton School for their generous funding of this study. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4439 .