Md Kawser Bepary

Dr. Md Kawser Bepary

Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida, USA
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Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

5Years (2022-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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25 April 2022 in Applied Sciences
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
Md Kawser BeparyMd Kawser Bepary
Md Kawser Bepary
BTBashir Mohammad Sabquat Bahar Talukder
Bashir Mohammad Sabquat Bahar Talukder
MRMd Tauhidur Rahman
Md Tauhidur Rahman
The cells in dynamic random access memory (DRAM) degrade over time as a result of aging, leading to poor performance and potential security vulnerabilities. With a globalized horizontal supply chain, aged counterfeit DRAMs could end up on the market, posing a significant threat if employed in critical infrastructure. In this work, we look at the retention behavior of commercial DRAM chips from real-time silicon measurements and investigate how the reliability of DRAM cells degrade with accelerated aging. We analyze the retention-based errors at three different aging points to observe the design-induced variations, analyze the pattern dependency, and explore the impacts of accelerated aging for multiple DRAM vendors. We also investigate the DRAM chips’ statistical distribution to attribute the vital wear-out effects present in DRAM. We see a continuous increase in retention error as DRAM chips age and therefore infer that the aged retention signatures can be used to differentiate recycled DRAM chips in the supply chain. We also discuss the roles of device signature in DRAM aging and aging-related security implication on DRAM row-hammer error.

2 October 2024 in Chips
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
Md Kawser BeparyMd Kawser Bepary
Md Kawser Bepary
TZTao Zhang
Tao Zhang
FFFarimah Farahmandi
Farimah Farahmandi
MTMark Tehranipoor
Mark Tehranipoor
Physical side-channel attacks utilize power, electromagnetic (EM), or timing signatures from cryptographic implementations during operation to retrieve sensitive information from security-critical devices. This paper provides a comprehensive review of these potent attacks against cryptographic hardware implementations, with a particular emphasis on pre-silicon leakage assessment methodologies. We explore the intricacies of cryptographic algorithms, various side-channel attacks, and the latest mitigation techniques. Although leakage assessment techniques are widely adopted in the post-silicon phase, pre-silicon leakage assessment is an emerging field that addresses the inherent limitations of its post-silicon counterpart. We scrutinize established post-silicon techniques and provide a detailed comparative analysis of pre-silicon leakage assessment across different abstraction levels in the hardware design and verification flow. Furthermore, we categorize and discuss existing pre-silicon power and electromagnetic modeling techniques for leakage detection and mitigation that can be integrated with electronic design automation (EDA) tools to automate security assessments. Lastly, we offer insights into the future trajectory of physical side-channel leakage assessment techniques in the pre-silicon stages, highlighting the need for further research and development in this critical area of cybersecurity.

14 April 2023
Verified
Conference Paper
Closed access
TRTanvir Rahman
Tanvir Rahman
Md Kawser BeparyMd Kawser Bepary
Md Kawser Bepary
SHSaad Ul Haque
Saad Ul Haque
MTMark Tehranipoor
Mark Tehranipoor
FRFahim Rahman
Fahim Rahman
Cryptographic algorithms and associated hardware accelerators are ubiquitously used to preserve the confidentiality, integrity, and privacy of sensitive data on electronic devices used by consumers, governments, military forces, and spacecraft. The proliferation of cryptographic algorithms in modern devices has made it more difficult to orchestrate exhaustive attacks on sensitive data using classical cryptoanalysis. However, hardware implementations of such cryptosystems are often vulnerable to attacks such as timing and power side channels, fault injection, and reverse engineering. Furthermore, protecting assets and maintaining security requires different configurations and capabilities for different applications. In this paper, we outline conventional symmetric and asymmetric cryptocores along with cryptographic hash function. We also include existing security primitives to aid and ensure secure system operation. We discuss the mitigation of existing threats and vulnerabilities on each of these cryptographic and security primitive modules and provide design overheads and security assessments for each configuration to aid design space exploration.

4 March 2025 in Journal of Hardware and Systems Security
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
Md Kawser BeparyMd Kawser Bepary
Md Kawser Bepary
TZTao Zhang
Tao Zhang
JZJingbo Zhou
Jingbo Zhou
FRFahim Rahman
Fahim Rahman
FFFarimah Farahmandi
Farimah Farahmandi
MTMark Tehranipoor
Mark Tehranipoor

26 January 2025
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
Md Kawser BeparyMd Kawser Bepary
Md Kawser Bepary
Arunabho BasuArunabho Basu
Arunabho Basu
SMSajeed Mohammad
Sajeed Mohammad
RHRakibul Hassan
Rakibul Hassan
FFFarimah Farahmandi
Farimah Farahmandi
MTMark Tehranipoor
Mark Tehranipoor

17 April 2022 in arXiv
Verified
Preprint
Open access
PDF file
BABulbul Ahmed
Bulbul Ahmed
Md Kawser BeparyMd Kawser Bepary
Md Kawser Bepary
NPNitin Pundir
Nitin Pundir
MBMike Borza
Mike Borza
OROleg Raikhman
Oleg Raikhman
MTMark Tehranipoor
Mark Tehranipoor
Hardware vulnerabilities are generally considered more difficult to fix than software ones because they are persistent after fabrication. Thus, it is crucial to assess the security and fix the vulnerabilities at earlier design phases, such as Register Transfer Level (RTL) and gate level. The focus of the existing security assessment techniques is mainly twofold. First, they check the security of Intellectual Property (IP) blocks separately. Second, they aim to assess the security against individual threats considering the threats are orthogonal. We argue that IP-level security assessment is not sufficient. Eventually, the IPs are placed in a platform, such as a system-on-chip (SoC), where each IP is surrounded by other IPs connected through glue logic and shared/private buses. Hence, we must develop a methodology to assess the platform-level security by considering both the IP-level security and the impact of the additional parameters introduced during platform integration. Another important factor to consider is that the threats are not always orthogonal. Improving security against one threat may affect the security against other threats. Hence, to build a secure platform, we must first answer the following questions: What additional parameters are introduced during the platform integration? How do we define and characterize the impact of these parameters on security? How do the mitigation techniques of one threat impact others? This paper aims to answer these important questions and proposes techniques for quantifiable assurance by quantitatively estimating and measuring the security of a platform at the pre-silicon stages. We also touch upon the term security optimization and present the challenges for future research directions.