Big data is being implemented with success in the private sector and science. Yet the public sector seems to be falling behind, despite the potential value of big data for government. Government organizations do recognize the opportunities of big data but seem uncertain about whether they are ready for the introduction of big data, and if they are adequately equipped to use big data. This paper addresses those uncertainties. It presents an assessment framework for evaluating public organizations’ big data readiness. Doing so demystifies the concept of big data, as it is expressed in terms of specific and measureable organizational characteristics. The framework was tested by applying it to organizations in the Dutch public sector. The results suggest that organizations may be technically capable of using big data, but they will not significantly gain from these activities if the applications do not fit their organizations and main statutory tasks. The framework proved helpful in pointing out areas where public sector organizations could improve, providing guidance on how government can become more big data ready in the future.
As part of a major health care reform starting in 2005, the Netherlands introduced a Diagnosis-Related Group (DRG) system of hospital care reimbursement and performance measurement. The DRG system was applied to all hospital care, meaning that it affected the overwhelming majority of Dutch specialist medical professionals. To better understand the consequences of this new system, and the responses of medical professionals to its implementation, we conducted and analysed an original set of sixty-six semi-structured interviews focused on medical specialists’ perception and utilization of the system. Our findings indicate that these professionals’ behaviours can seldom be ascribed to financial motives alone. Many responses of medical professionals to the new system were attributed to value-based motivations, related to upholding professional ethos and accommodating the dynamics of the professional process. Even responses that might be characterized at first as financially driven could not be entirely understood as perverse effects of the performance management system, as they too usually had an ancillary aim of safeguarding the professional tenets of the medical establishment.
China has gone through a rapid process of urbanization, but this has come along with serious environmental problems. Therefore, it has started to develop various eco-cities, low-carbon cities, and other types of sustainable cities. The massive launch of these sustainable initiatives, as well as the higher cost of these projects, requires the Chinese government to invest large sums of money. What financial toolkits can be employed to fund this construction has become a critical issue. Against this backdrop, the authors have selected Sino-Singapore Tianjin Eco-city (SSTEC) and Shenzhen International Low-Carbon City (ILCC) and compared how they finance their construction. Both are thus far considered to be successful cases. The results show that the two cases differ from each other in two key aspects. First, ILCC has developed a model with less financial and other supports from the Chinese central government and foreign governments than SSTEC, and, hence, may be more valuable as a source of inspiration for other similar projects for which political support at the national level is not always available. Second, by issuing bonds in the international capital market, SSTEC singles itself out among various sustainable initiatives in China, while planning the village area as a whole and the metro plus property model are distinct practices in ILCC. In the end, the authors present a generic financing model that considers not only economic returns but also social and environmental impacts to facilitate future initiatives to finance in more structural ways.
The heart of this essay is a small study of four investigation reports, two from Holland and two from the United States. Based on this study we '11 present a fairly simple typology of approaches by investigators for interpreting the facts that they find. From the perspective of a manager that made a decision that proved to be disastrous we'll explain the strengths and weaknesses of these approaches for learning. From the perspective of the investigator we'll explain the logic of these approaches. Confronting both perspectives with each other explains why it is so hard for managers to learn from investigation reports.