Achilleas Anastasopoulos

Mr. Achilleas Anastasopoulos

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Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

24Years (2003-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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20 June 2019 in IEEE Transactions on Network Science and Engineering
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
NHNasimeh Heydaribeni
Nasimeh Heydaribeni
AAAchilleas Anastasopoulos
Achilleas Anastasopoulos
In the standard Mechanism Design framework, agents' messages are gathered at a central point and allocation/tax functions are calculated in a centralized manner, i.e., as functions of all network agents' messages. This requirement may cause communication and computation overhead and necessitates the design of mechanisms that alleviate this bottleneck. We consider a scenario where message transmission can only be performed locally so that the mechanism allocation/tax functions can be calculated in a decentralized manner. Each agent transmits messages to her local neighborhood, as defined by a given message-exchange network, and her allocation/tax functions are only functions of the available neighborhood messages. This scenario gives rise to a novel research problem that we call "Distributed Mechanism Design". In this paper, we propose two distributed mechanisms for network utility maximization problems that involve private and public goods with competition and cooperation between agents. As a concrete example we use the problems of rate allocation in networks with either unicast or multirate multicast transmission protocols. The proposed mechanism for each of the protocols fully implements the optimal allocation in Nash equilibria and its message space dimensionality scales linearly with respect to the number of agents in the network.

8 March 2017 in IEEE Transactions on Control of Network Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
ASAbhinav Sinha
Abhinav Sinha
AAAchilleas Anastasopoulos
Achilleas Anastasopoulos
We consider a network where strategic agents, who are contesting for allocation of resources, are divided into fixed groups. The network control protocol is such that within each group agents get to share the resource and across groups they contest for it. A prototypical example is the allocation of data rate on a network with the multicast/multirate architecture. Compared to the unicast architecture (which is a special case), the multicast/multirate architecture can result in substantial bandwidth savings. However, design of a market mechanism in such a scenario requires dealing with both private and public good problems as opposed to just private goods in unicast. The mechanism proposed in this paper ensures that social welfare maximizing allocation on such a network is realized at all Nash equilibria (NE), i.e., full implementation in NE. In addition it is individually rational, i.e., agents have an incentive to participate in the mechanism. The mechanism, which is constructed in a quasi-systematic way starting from the dual of the centralized problem, has a number of useful properties. Specifically, due to a novel allocation scheme, namely “radial projection,” the proposed mechanism results in feasible allocation even off equilibrium. This is a practical necessity for any realistic mechanism since agents have to “learn” the NE through a dynamic process. Finally, it is shown how strong budget balance at equilibrium can be achieved with a minimal increase in message space as an add-on to a weakly budget balanced mechanism.

9 September 2014 in IEEE Transactions on Communications
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
DVDeepanshu Vasal
Deepanshu Vasal
AAAchilleas Anastasopoulos
Achilleas Anastasopoulos
This paper studies node cooperation in a wireless network from the MAC layer perspective. A simple relay channel with a source, a relay, and a destination node is considered where the source can transmit a packet directly to the destination or transmit through the relay. The tradeoff between average energy and delay is studied by posing the problem as a stochastic dynamical optimization problem. The following two cases are considered: 1) nodes are cooperative and information is decentralized, and 2) nodes are strategic and information is centralized. With decentralized information and cooperative nodes, a structural result is proven that the optimal policy is the solution of a Bellman-type fixed-point equation over a time invariant state space. For specific cost functions reflecting transmission energy consumption and average delay, numerical results are presented showing that a policy found by solving this fixed-point equation outperforms conventionally used time-division multiple access (TDMA) and random access (RA) policies. When nodes are strategic and information is common knowledge, it is shown that cooperation can be induced by exchange of payments between the nodes, imposed by the network designer such that the socially optimal Markov policy corresponding to the centralized solution is the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the resulting dynamic game.

1 January 2003
Verified
Conference Paper
Closed access
RNR. Nuriyev
R. Nuriyev
AAAchilleas Anastasopoulos
Achilleas Anastasopoulos

6 April 2022 in IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
IBIlai Bistritz
Ilai Bistritz
NHNasimeh Heydaribeni
Nasimeh Heydaribeni
AAAchilleas Anastasopoulos
Achilleas Anastasopoulos
We consider an environmentwhere players need to decide whether to buy a certain product (or adopt a technology) or not. The product is either good or bad, but its true value is unknown to the players. Instead, each player has her own private information on its quality. Each player can observe the previous actions of other players and estimate the quality of the product. A classic result in the literature shows that in similar settings, informational cascades occur, where learning stops for the whole network and players repeat the actions of their predecessors. In contrast to this literature, in this paper, players get more than one opportunity to act. In each turn, a player is chosen uniformly at random from all the players and can decide to buy the product and leave the market or wait. Her utility is the total expected discounted reward, and thus, myopic strategies may not constitute equilibria. We provide a characterization of perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBEs) with forward-looking strategies through a fixed-point equation of dimensionality that grows only quadratically with the number of players. Using this tractable fixed-point equation, we show the existence of a PBE and characterize PBEs with threshold strategies. Based on this characterization, we study informational cascades in two regimes. First, we show that for a discount factor $\delta$ strictly smaller than 1, informational cascades happen with high probability as the number of players $N$ increases. Furthermore, only a small portion of the total information in the system is revealed before a cascade occurs. Second, and more surprisingly, we show that for a fixed $N$ , and for a sufficiently large $\delta < 1$ , when the product is bad, there exists an equilibrium where an informational cascade can happen only after at least half of the players revealed their private information, and consequently, the probability for a “bad cascade” where all the players buy the product vanishes exponentially with $N$ . Finally, when $\delta =1$ and the product is bad, there exists an equilibrium where informational cascades do not happen at all.

26 November 2019 in IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
ASAbhinav Sinha
Abhinav Sinha
AAAchilleas Anastasopoulos
Achilleas Anastasopoulos
Mechanism design for fully strategic agents typically assumes that agents broadcast their messages to a central authority that performs allocation and taxes/subsidizes agents. In addition, most of the designed mechanisms do not provide any guarantees that the Nash equilibrium (NE) will be reached asymptotically. Whenever such results are provided, they refer to convergence of specific predesigned learning dynamics and it is assumed that agents will follow such prescription. Both assumptions are an impediment in practical application of mechanism design in real-life allocation problems. In this article, we consider two common resource allocation problems: sharing $K$ infinitely divisible resources among strategic agents for their private consumption (private goods), and determining the level for an infinitely divisible public good with $P$ features, that is shared between strategic agents. For both cases, we present a distributed mechanism for a set of agents who communicate through a given network. In a distributed mechanism, agents’ messages are not broadcasted to all other agents as in the standard mechanism design framework, but are exchanged only in the local neighborhood of each agent. The presented mechanisms produce a unique NE, they fully implement the social welfare maximizing allocation, and are budget-balanced at NE. Subsequently, it is shown that the mechanisms induce a game with contractive best-response, leading to guaranteed convergence for all learning dynamics within the adaptive best-response dynamics class, including dynamics such as Cournot best-response, $k$ -period best-response, and Fictitious Play. While the abovementioned mechanisms have message dimensionality that grows quadratically with the number of agents, we show that if one is willing to forgo the strong convergence guarantees, it is possible to design a distributed mechanism with total message space dimensionality growing only linearly with the number of agents. Finally, we demonstrate the abovementioned results through a numerical study of convergence under repeated play, for various communication graphs and learning dynamics.