Nasimeh Heydaribeni

Dr. Nasimeh Heydaribeni

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Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

8Years (2019-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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30 May 2024 in Nature Machine Intelligence
Verified
Journal Article
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NHNasimeh Heydaribeni
Nasimeh Heydaribeni
XZXinrui Zhan
Xinrui Zhan
RZRuisi Zhang
Ruisi Zhang
TETina Eliassi-Rad
Tina Eliassi-Rad
FKFarinaz Koushanfar
Farinaz Koushanfar

20 June 2019 in IEEE Transactions on Network Science and Engineering
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
NHNasimeh Heydaribeni
Nasimeh Heydaribeni
AAAchilleas Anastasopoulos
Achilleas Anastasopoulos
In the standard Mechanism Design framework, agents' messages are gathered at a central point and allocation/tax functions are calculated in a centralized manner, i.e., as functions of all network agents' messages. This requirement may cause communication and computation overhead and necessitates the design of mechanisms that alleviate this bottleneck. We consider a scenario where message transmission can only be performed locally so that the mechanism allocation/tax functions can be calculated in a decentralized manner. Each agent transmits messages to her local neighborhood, as defined by a given message-exchange network, and her allocation/tax functions are only functions of the available neighborhood messages. This scenario gives rise to a novel research problem that we call "Distributed Mechanism Design". In this paper, we propose two distributed mechanisms for network utility maximization problems that involve private and public goods with competition and cooperation between agents. As a concrete example we use the problems of rate allocation in networks with either unicast or multirate multicast transmission protocols. The proposed mechanism for each of the protocols fully implements the optimal allocation in Nash equilibria and its message space dimensionality scales linearly with respect to the number of agents in the network.

6 April 2022 in IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control
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Journal Article
Closed access
IBIlai Bistritz
Ilai Bistritz
NHNasimeh Heydaribeni
Nasimeh Heydaribeni
AAAchilleas Anastasopoulos
Achilleas Anastasopoulos
We consider an environmentwhere players need to decide whether to buy a certain product (or adopt a technology) or not. The product is either good or bad, but its true value is unknown to the players. Instead, each player has her own private information on its quality. Each player can observe the previous actions of other players and estimate the quality of the product. A classic result in the literature shows that in similar settings, informational cascades occur, where learning stops for the whole network and players repeat the actions of their predecessors. In contrast to this literature, in this paper, players get more than one opportunity to act. In each turn, a player is chosen uniformly at random from all the players and can decide to buy the product and leave the market or wait. Her utility is the total expected discounted reward, and thus, myopic strategies may not constitute equilibria. We provide a characterization of perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBEs) with forward-looking strategies through a fixed-point equation of dimensionality that grows only quadratically with the number of players. Using this tractable fixed-point equation, we show the existence of a PBE and characterize PBEs with threshold strategies. Based on this characterization, we study informational cascades in two regimes. First, we show that for a discount factor $\delta$ strictly smaller than 1, informational cascades happen with high probability as the number of players $N$ increases. Furthermore, only a small portion of the total information in the system is revealed before a cascade occurs. Second, and more surprisingly, we show that for a fixed $N$ , and for a sufficiently large $\delta < 1$ , when the product is bad, there exists an equilibrium where an informational cascade can happen only after at least half of the players revealed their private information, and consequently, the probability for a “bad cascade” where all the players buy the product vanishes exponentially with $N$ . Finally, when $\delta =1$ and the product is bad, there exists an equilibrium where informational cascades do not happen at all.

28 November 2023 in Research Square
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NHNasimeh Heydaribeni
Nasimeh Heydaribeni
XZXinrui Zhan
Xinrui Zhan
RZRuisi Zhang
Ruisi Zhang
TETina Eliassi-Rad
Tina Eliassi-Rad
FKFarinaz Koushanfar
Farinaz Koushanfar
Scalable addressing of high dimensional constrained combinatorial optimization problems is a challenge that arises in several science and engineering disciplines. Recent work introduced novel application of graph neural networks for solving polynomial-cost unconstrained combinatorial optimization problems. This paper proposes a new framework, called HypOp, which greatly advances the state of the art for solving combinatorial optimization problems in several aspects: (i) it generalizes the prior results to constrained optimization problems with an arbitrary cost function; (ii) it broadens the application to higher dimensional problems by leveraging a hypergraph neural network structure; (iii) it enables scalability to much larger problems by introducing a new distributed and parallel architecture for hypergraph neural network training; (iv) it demonstrates generalizability to other problem formulations by knowledge transfer from the learned experience of addressing one set of cost/constraints to another set for the same hypergraph; (v) it significantly boosts the solution accuracy compared with the prior art by suggesting a fine-tuning step using simulated annealing; (vi) HypOp shows a remarkable progress on benchmark examples, with run times improved by up to fivefold using a combination of fine-tuning and distributed training techniques. The framework allows addressing a novel set of scientific problems including hypergraph MaxCut problem, satisfiability problems (3SAT), and resource allocation. We showcase the application of HypOp in scientific discovery by solving a hypergraph MaxCut problem on the NDC drug-substance hypergraph. Through extensive experimentation on a variety of combinatorial optimization problems, HypOp demonstrates superiority over existing unsupervised learning-based solvers and generic optimization methods.

1 September 2019
Verified
Conference Paper
Closed access
NHNasimeh Heydaribeni
Nasimeh Heydaribeni
IBIlai Bistritz
Ilai Bistritz
AAAchilleas Anastasopoulos
Achilleas Anastasopoulos

3 March 2025 in Games
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NHNasimeh Heydaribeni
Nasimeh Heydaribeni
AAAchilleas Anastasopoulos
Achilleas Anastasopoulos
We consider a dynamic game with asymmetric information where each player privately observes a noisy version of a (hidden) state of the world V, resulting in dependent private observations. We study the structured perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBEs) that use private beliefs in their strategies as sufficient statistics for summarizing their observation history. The main difficulty in finding the appropriate sufficient statistic (state) for the structured strategies arises from the fact that players need to construct (private) beliefs on other players’ private beliefs on V, which, in turn, would imply that one needs to construct an infinite hierarchy of beliefs, thus rendering the problem unsolvable. We show that this is not the case: each player’s belief on other players’ beliefs on V can be characterized by her own belief on V and some appropriately defined public belief. We then specialize this setting to the case of a Linear Quadratic Gaussian (LQG) non-zero-sum game, and we characterize structured PBEs with linear strategies that can be found through a backward/forward algorithm akin to dynamic programming for the standard LQG control problem. Unlike the standard LQG problem, however, some of the required quantities for the Kalman filter are observation-dependent and, thus, cannot be evaluated offline through a forward recursion.