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Governments create contests to allocate resources to stakeholders, e.g., grants, contracts. The actions of these stakeholders can generate a positive externality for themselves—the contest winner can attract additional outside funding and donations from third-parties who want to jump on the winner’s bandwagon. Herein we examine the externalities arising from these contests created by governance and their impact on a virtuous circle of governance contests. Among various conditions that make governance virtuous, we focus on the equilibrium expected payoffs of stakeholders, the difference in them, and the rent-dissipation rates. Our study shows that the impact of externalities on the efficiency of governance depends on two key factors: (i) the choice of governance contests, the player-externality and the winner-externality, and (ii) the relative efficiency of stakeholders’ efforts.
Sung-Hoon Park; Jason Shogren. A Virtuous Circle of Governance Contests with Externalities. Sustainability 2021, 13, 7766 .
AMA StyleSung-Hoon Park, Jason Shogren. A Virtuous Circle of Governance Contests with Externalities. Sustainability. 2021; 13 (14):7766.
Chicago/Turabian StyleSung-Hoon Park; Jason Shogren. 2021. "A Virtuous Circle of Governance Contests with Externalities." Sustainability 13, no. 14: 7766.
Ten states have created natural-resource-based Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWF) to allow a fraction of the wealth derived from the extraction of non-renewable resources to be available for future use. Minnesota does not have a SWF, even though companies have been mining in the state for over 100 years. Herein, we present backward and forward-looking scenarios to estimate the potential magnitude of a “what-if” extraction-based fund. A 1.5% of value tax is suggested as an SWF funding mechanism. Based on historical extraction, prices, and investment returns, a large SWF could already exist. In the forward-looking section, we begin by econometrically estimating the supply and demand of US iron ore production to better understand how an increase in mining taxes would likely effect mining output (i.e., the production effect). After accounting for an estimated 4% production loss, results suggest enough minerals could still be extracted to create a permanent fund with between $930 million (US) and $1.6 billion dollars (US) in direct contributions by 2050 (depending on price). Using reasonable assumptions of a 2% inflation rate and a 5% annual investment return, the fund size could range from $3 billion to $5 billion by 2050.
Christopher R. McIntosh; Neil A. Wilmot; Adrienne Dinneen; Jason F. Shogren. Minnesota—too late for a Sovereign Wealth Fund? Mineral Economics 2021, 1 -19.
AMA StyleChristopher R. McIntosh, Neil A. Wilmot, Adrienne Dinneen, Jason F. Shogren. Minnesota—too late for a Sovereign Wealth Fund? Mineral Economics. 2021; ():1-19.
Chicago/Turabian StyleChristopher R. McIntosh; Neil A. Wilmot; Adrienne Dinneen; Jason F. Shogren. 2021. "Minnesota—too late for a Sovereign Wealth Fund?" Mineral Economics , no. : 1-19.
Understanding the connection between ecological and economic uncertainty matters when calculating damage estimates used to inform environmental policy. Identifying the role uncertainty plays in market damage estimates is important for policy made using highly variable and stochastic projections on ecological losses. Herein we use the damages caused by invasive species as our motivating example to illustrate our point. We examine how a key economic assumption—the degree of substitutability across marketable goods—influences the importance of narrowing the uncertainty of ecological losses from invasive species. We use a computable general equilibrium model (CGE) capable of evaluating impacts from an invasive species under varying market structures. Focusing in on the emerald ash borer which is destroying ash trees throughout the contiguous United States, our results show why investing in narrowing natural science uncertainty is critical when the economy is constrained or when few economic substitutes exist. The key to understanding the value of natural science information on market damages is to understand how prices adjust given substitution possibilities and how people adapt to the newly invaded world. Mapping this ecological-economic relationship through relative prices has implications for a broader set of environmental issues like climate change and damage compensation given a damaged ecosystem.
Shana M. McDermott; David C. Finnoff; Jason F. Shogren; Chris J. Kennedy. When does natural science uncertainty translate into economic uncertainty? Ecological Economics 2021, 184, 106999 .
AMA StyleShana M. McDermott, David C. Finnoff, Jason F. Shogren, Chris J. Kennedy. When does natural science uncertainty translate into economic uncertainty? Ecological Economics. 2021; 184 ():106999.
Chicago/Turabian StyleShana M. McDermott; David C. Finnoff; Jason F. Shogren; Chris J. Kennedy. 2021. "When does natural science uncertainty translate into economic uncertainty?" Ecological Economics 184, no. : 106999.
We propose a structural econometric model that incorporates altruism towards other household members into the willingness to pay for a public good. The model distinguishes preferences for public good improvements for oneself from preferences for improvements for other household members. We test for three different types of altruism - ‘pure self-interest’, ‘pure altruism’ and ‘public-good-focused non-pure altruism’. Using French contingent valuation data regarding air quality improvements, we find positive and significant degrees of concern for children under the age of 18, which are explained by determinants related to health and subjective air quality assessment. All other forms of pure or air-quality-focused altruism within the family are insignificant, including for children over 18, siblings, spouses, and parents. This result suggests that benefit estimates that do not consider altruism could undervalue improvements in air quality in France.
Olivier Chanel; Stéphane Luchini; Jason F. Shogren. Does charity begin at home for air pollution reductions? Unraveling intra familial altruism. Journal of Choice Modelling 2021, 38, 100268 .
AMA StyleOlivier Chanel, Stéphane Luchini, Jason F. Shogren. Does charity begin at home for air pollution reductions? Unraveling intra familial altruism. Journal of Choice Modelling. 2021; 38 ():100268.
Chicago/Turabian StyleOlivier Chanel; Stéphane Luchini; Jason F. Shogren. 2021. "Does charity begin at home for air pollution reductions? Unraveling intra familial altruism." Journal of Choice Modelling 38, no. : 100268.
Will a major shock awaken the US citizens to the threat of catastrophic pandemic risk? Using a natural experiment administered both before and after the 2014 West African Ebola Outbreak, our evidence suggests “no.” Our results show that prior to the Ebola scare, the US citizens were relatively complacent and placed a low relative priority on public spending to prepare for a pandemic disease outbreak relative to an environmental disaster risk (e.g., Fukushima) or a terrorist attack (e.g., 9/11). After the Ebola scare, the average citizen did not over-react to the risk. This flat reaction was unexpected given the well-known availability heuristic—people tend to over-weigh judgments of events more heavily toward more recent information. In contrast, the average citizen continued to value pandemic risk less relative to terrorism or environmental risk.
Jamison Pike; Jason F. Shogren; David Aadland; W. Kip Viscusi; David Finnoff; Alexandre Skiba; Peter Daszak. Catastrophic Risk: Waking Up to the Reality of a Pandemic? EcoHealth 2020, 17, 217 -221.
AMA StyleJamison Pike, Jason F. Shogren, David Aadland, W. Kip Viscusi, David Finnoff, Alexandre Skiba, Peter Daszak. Catastrophic Risk: Waking Up to the Reality of a Pandemic? EcoHealth. 2020; 17 (2):217-221.
Chicago/Turabian StyleJamison Pike; Jason F. Shogren; David Aadland; W. Kip Viscusi; David Finnoff; Alexandre Skiba; Peter Daszak. 2020. "Catastrophic Risk: Waking Up to the Reality of a Pandemic?" EcoHealth 17, no. 2: 217-221.
We consider two aspects of the human enterprise that profoundly affect the global environment: population and consumption. We show that fertility and consumption behavior harbor a class of externalities that have not been much noted in the literature. Both are driven in part by attitudes and preferences that are not egoistic but socially embedded; that is, each household’s decisions are influenced by the decisions made by others. In a famous paper, Garrett Hardin [G. Hardin,Science162, 1243–1248 (1968)] drew attention to overpopulation and concluded that the solution lay in people “abandoning the freedom to breed.” That human attitudes and practices are socially embedded suggests that it is possible for people to reduce their fertility rates and consumption demands without experiencing a loss in wellbeing. We focus on fertility in sub-Saharan Africa and consumption in the rich world and argue that bottom-up social mechanisms rather than top-down government interventions are better placed to bring about those ecologically desirable changes.
Scott Barrett; Aisha Dasgupta; Partha Dasgupta; W. Neil Adger; John Anderies; Jeroen Van Den Bergh; Caroline Bledsoe; John Bongaarts; Stephen Carpenter; F. Stuart Chapin; Anne-Sophie Crépin; Gretchen Daily; Paul Ehrlich; Carl Folke; Nils Kautsky; Eric F. Lambin; Simon Levin; Karl-Göran Mäler; Rosamond Naylor; Karine Nyborg; Stephen Polasky; Marten Scheffer; Jason Shogren; Peter Søgaard Jørgensen; Brian Walker; James Wilen. Social dimensions of fertility behavior and consumption patterns in the Anthropocene. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 2020, 117, 6300 -6307.
AMA StyleScott Barrett, Aisha Dasgupta, Partha Dasgupta, W. Neil Adger, John Anderies, Jeroen Van Den Bergh, Caroline Bledsoe, John Bongaarts, Stephen Carpenter, F. Stuart Chapin, Anne-Sophie Crépin, Gretchen Daily, Paul Ehrlich, Carl Folke, Nils Kautsky, Eric F. Lambin, Simon Levin, Karl-Göran Mäler, Rosamond Naylor, Karine Nyborg, Stephen Polasky, Marten Scheffer, Jason Shogren, Peter Søgaard Jørgensen, Brian Walker, James Wilen. Social dimensions of fertility behavior and consumption patterns in the Anthropocene. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. 2020; 117 (12):6300-6307.
Chicago/Turabian StyleScott Barrett; Aisha Dasgupta; Partha Dasgupta; W. Neil Adger; John Anderies; Jeroen Van Den Bergh; Caroline Bledsoe; John Bongaarts; Stephen Carpenter; F. Stuart Chapin; Anne-Sophie Crépin; Gretchen Daily; Paul Ehrlich; Carl Folke; Nils Kautsky; Eric F. Lambin; Simon Levin; Karl-Göran Mäler; Rosamond Naylor; Karine Nyborg; Stephen Polasky; Marten Scheffer; Jason Shogren; Peter Søgaard Jørgensen; Brian Walker; James Wilen. 2020. "Social dimensions of fertility behavior and consumption patterns in the Anthropocene." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 117, no. 12: 6300-6307.
Using two earned income/tax declaration experimental designs we show that only partial liars are affected by a truth-telling oath, a non-price commitment device. Under oath, we see no change in the number of chronic liars and fewer partial liars. Rather than smoothly increasing their compliance, we also observe that partial liars who respond to the oath, respond by becoming fully honest under oath. Based on both response times data and the consistency of subjects when several compliance decisions are made in a row, we show that partial lying arises as the result of weak preferences towards profitable honesty. The oath only transforms people with weak preferences for lying into being committed to the truth.
N. Jacquemet; S. Luchini; A. Malézieux; J.F. Shogren. Who’ll stop lying under oath? Empirical evidence from tax evasion games. European Economic Review 2020, 124, 103369 .
AMA StyleN. Jacquemet, S. Luchini, A. Malézieux, J.F. Shogren. Who’ll stop lying under oath? Empirical evidence from tax evasion games. European Economic Review. 2020; 124 ():103369.
Chicago/Turabian StyleN. Jacquemet; S. Luchini; A. Malézieux; J.F. Shogren. 2020. "Who’ll stop lying under oath? Empirical evidence from tax evasion games." European Economic Review 124, no. : 103369.
Oath taking for senior executives has been promoted as a means to enhance honesty within and toward organizations. Herein we explore whether people who voluntarily sign a solemn truth-telling oath are more committed to sincere behavior when offered the chance to lie. We design an experiment to test how the oath affects truth telling in two contexts: a neutral context replicating the typical experiment in the literature, and a “loaded” context in which we remind subjects that “a lie is a lie.” We consider four payoff configurations, with differential monetary incentives to lie, implemented as within-subjects treatment variables. The results are reinforced by robustness investigations in which each subject made only one lying decision. Our results show that the oath reduces lying, especially in the loaded environment—falsehoods are reduced by 50%. The oath, however, has a weaker effect on lying in the neutral environment. The oath did affect decision times in all instances: the average person takes significantly more time deciding whether to lie under oath. This paper was accepted by Uri Gneezy, behavioral economics.
Nicolas Jacquemet; Stéphane Luchini; Julie Rosaz; Jason F. Shogren. Truth Telling Under Oath. Management Science 2019, 65, 426 -438.
AMA StyleNicolas Jacquemet, Stéphane Luchini, Julie Rosaz, Jason F. Shogren. Truth Telling Under Oath. Management Science. 2019; 65 (1):426-438.
Chicago/Turabian StyleNicolas Jacquemet; Stéphane Luchini; Julie Rosaz; Jason F. Shogren. 2019. "Truth Telling Under Oath." Management Science 65, no. 1: 426-438.
International efforts to protect biodiversity depend on transnational collaboration and on public support for transnational policies to be implemented. Yet, we know little about what may compel citizens to support such transnational conservation efforts. In this paper, we design a lab-in-the-field experiment to explore how different framings and information about support shared across borders affect a citizen's conservation donations. Using a dictator game, we ask for donations from individuals in Denmark, Spain, and Ghana for the protection of natural habitats of the migratory Montagu's Harrier (Circus pygargus). We focus on citizens from Denmark, Spain and Ghana since these countries lie along the harrier's migratory route. We found that information affects donation behavior, albeit differently in each country. Our Danish and Ghanaian participants contributed more when (1) pre-donation information stressed that transnational collaboration is needed, and (2) they were told that a measure of their group's donation would be forwarded to other participants. In contrast, our Spanish participants donated less overall and were insensitive to the information treatments. The results document large differences across countries in supporting behavior in such transnational conservation settings and could influence how international conservation organizations organize and shape fundraising for their work.
Mathias Vogdrup-Schmidt; Anna Lou Abatayo; Jason F. Shogren; Niels Strange; Bo Jellesmark Thorsen. Factors Affecting Support for Transnational Conservation Targeting Migratory Species. Ecological Economics 2018, 157, 156 -164.
AMA StyleMathias Vogdrup-Schmidt, Anna Lou Abatayo, Jason F. Shogren, Niels Strange, Bo Jellesmark Thorsen. Factors Affecting Support for Transnational Conservation Targeting Migratory Species. Ecological Economics. 2018; 157 ():156-164.
Chicago/Turabian StyleMathias Vogdrup-Schmidt; Anna Lou Abatayo; Jason F. Shogren; Niels Strange; Bo Jellesmark Thorsen. 2018. "Factors Affecting Support for Transnational Conservation Targeting Migratory Species." Ecological Economics 157, no. : 156-164.
Individual contributions to public good investments are subject to the problem of free riding. We investigate the possibility of overcoming the free-riding problem through creating social capital via communication. Using data from a public goods experiment, we empirically test the effectiveness of two commonly used types of communication interventions in various organizations – structured, goal-oriented communication and unstructured, free-form communication – in creating social capital. Although both types of communication are found to reduce free-riding, when players stay in the same groups before and after communication, unstructured communication brings voluntary contributions closer to the efficient level persistently; structured communication is less successful. In contrast, structured communication is more successful when players are allocated to different groups after communication; unstructured communication has a smaller impact on voluntary contributions in this case.
Rik Chakraborti; Matt Maloney; Gavin Roberts; Jason F. Shogren. Social capital and the voluntary provision of public goods. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics 2018, 77, 196 -208.
AMA StyleRik Chakraborti, Matt Maloney, Gavin Roberts, Jason F. Shogren. Social capital and the voluntary provision of public goods. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics. 2018; 77 ():196-208.
Chicago/Turabian StyleRik Chakraborti; Matt Maloney; Gavin Roberts; Jason F. Shogren. 2018. "Social capital and the voluntary provision of public goods." Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics 77, no. : 196-208.
The rapid urban spread of Ebola virus in West Africa in 2014 and consequent breakdown of control measures led to a significant economic impact as well as the burden on public health and wellbeing. The US government appropriated $5.4 Billion for FY2015 and WHO proposed a $100 Million emergency fund largely to curtail the threat of future outbreaks. Using epidemiological analyses and economic modeling, we propose that the best use of these and similar funds would be to serve as global insurance against the continued threat of emerging infectious diseases. An effective strategy would involve the initial investment in strengthening mobile and adaptable capacity to deal with the threat and reality of disease emergence, coupled with repeated investment to maintain what is effectively a ‘national guard’ for pandemic prevention and response. This investment would create a capital stock that could also provide access to safe treatment during and between crises in developing countries, lowering risk to developed countries.
Kevin Berry; Toph Allen; Richard D. Horan; Jason F. Shogren; David Finnoff; Peter Daszak. The Economic Case for a Pandemic Fund. EcoHealth 2018, 15, 244 -258.
AMA StyleKevin Berry, Toph Allen, Richard D. Horan, Jason F. Shogren, David Finnoff, Peter Daszak. The Economic Case for a Pandemic Fund. EcoHealth. 2018; 15 (2):244-258.
Chicago/Turabian StyleKevin Berry; Toph Allen; Richard D. Horan; Jason F. Shogren; David Finnoff; Peter Daszak. 2018. "The Economic Case for a Pandemic Fund." EcoHealth 15, no. 2: 244-258.
Most models designed to understand how to manage infected wildlife systems with bioeconomic multi-stability take the initial conditions as given, thereby treating pathogen invasion as unanticipated. We examine how ex ante management is an opportunity to influence the ex post conditions, which in turn affect the ex post optimal outcome. To capture these ex ante management choices, we extend the Poisson “collapse” model of Reed and Heras (Bull Math Biol 54:185–207, 1992) to allow for endogenous initial conditions and ex post multi-stability. We account for two uncertain processes: the introduction and establishment of the pathogen. Introduction is conditional on anthropogenic investments in prevention, and both random processes are conditional on how we manage the native population to provide natural prevention of invasion and natural insurance against establishment placing the system in an undesirable basin of attraction. We find that both multi-stability of the invaded system and these uncertainty processes can create economic non-convexities that yield multiple candidate solutions to the ex ante optimization problem. Additionally, we illustrate how the nature of natural protection against introduction and establishment risks can play an important role in the allocation of anthropogenic investments.
Richard D. Horan; David Finnoff; Kevin Berry; Carson Reeling; Jason F. Shogren. Managing Wildlife Faced with Pathogen Risks Involving Multi-Stable Outcomes. Environmental and Resource Economics 2018, 70, 713 -730.
AMA StyleRichard D. Horan, David Finnoff, Kevin Berry, Carson Reeling, Jason F. Shogren. Managing Wildlife Faced with Pathogen Risks Involving Multi-Stable Outcomes. Environmental and Resource Economics. 2018; 70 (3):713-730.
Chicago/Turabian StyleRichard D. Horan; David Finnoff; Kevin Berry; Carson Reeling; Jason F. Shogren. 2018. "Managing Wildlife Faced with Pathogen Risks Involving Multi-Stable Outcomes." Environmental and Resource Economics 70, no. 3: 713-730.
Pollinators provide critical ecosystems services vital to the production of numerous crops in the United States’ agricultural sector. However, the U.S. is witnessing a serious decline in the abundance and diversity of domestic and wild pollinators, which threatens U.S. food security. In response, the U.S. Department of Agriculture has created the Pollinator Habitat Initiative (CP-42) to induce landowners to create quality habitat for pollinators by planting beneficial crops and wildflowers on Conservation Reserve Program (CRP)-eligible land. Landowners’ potential conservation decisions under CP-42 and the resulting impact on land use decisions regarding crop production are not well-understood. We examine these issues by designing an economic experiment that simulates landowners’ decisions to enroll in CP-42. As our motivating example, we focus on how CP-42 might affect crop production patterns and the resulting returns in Goshen County, Wyoming. The results indicate that about 16% of CRP-eligible land would be enrolled. Based on the relatively low CP-42 payment, our subjects remove only lower value crops from production. Our results suggest that (1) all dry wheat and sunflower production and a portion of barley, corn, and dry beans could be taken out of production when transferred to pollinator habitat, and (2) that habitat fragmentation would likely occur, which would reduce the efficacy of pollination. Overall, our results suggest that there are significant limits to the overall effectiveness of the CP-42 policy.
Chian Jones Ritten; Christopher Bastian; Jason F. Shogren; Thadchaigeni Panchalingam; Mariah D. Ehmke; Gregory Parkhurst. Understanding Pollinator Habitat Conservation under Current Policy Using Economic Experiments. Land 2017, 6, 57 .
AMA StyleChian Jones Ritten, Christopher Bastian, Jason F. Shogren, Thadchaigeni Panchalingam, Mariah D. Ehmke, Gregory Parkhurst. Understanding Pollinator Habitat Conservation under Current Policy Using Economic Experiments. Land. 2017; 6 (3):57.
Chicago/Turabian StyleChian Jones Ritten; Christopher Bastian; Jason F. Shogren; Thadchaigeni Panchalingam; Mariah D. Ehmke; Gregory Parkhurst. 2017. "Understanding Pollinator Habitat Conservation under Current Policy Using Economic Experiments." Land 6, no. 3: 57.
We focus on the design of an institutional device aimed to foster coordination through communication. We explore whether the social psychology theory of commitment, implemented via a truth-telling oath, can reduce coordination failure. Using a classic coordination game, we ask all players to sign voluntarily a truth-telling oath before playing the game with cheap talk communication. Three results emerge with commitment under oath: (1) coordination increased by nearly 50%; (2) senders’ messages were significantly more truthful and actions more efficient, and (3) receivers’ trust of messages increased.
Nicolas Jacquemet; Stéphane Luchini; Jason F. Shogren; Adam Zylbersztejn. Coordination with communication under oath. Experimental Economics 2017, 21, 627 -649.
AMA StyleNicolas Jacquemet, Stéphane Luchini, Jason F. Shogren, Adam Zylbersztejn. Coordination with communication under oath. Experimental Economics. 2017; 21 (3):627-649.
Chicago/Turabian StyleNicolas Jacquemet; Stéphane Luchini; Jason F. Shogren; Adam Zylbersztejn. 2017. "Coordination with communication under oath." Experimental Economics 21, no. 3: 627-649.
Nicolas Jacquemet; Stéphane Luchini; Julie Rosaz; Jason F. Shogren. Truth-telling under Oath. 2017, 1 .
AMA StyleNicolas Jacquemet, Stéphane Luchini, Julie Rosaz, Jason F. Shogren. Truth-telling under Oath. . 2017; ():1.
Chicago/Turabian StyleNicolas Jacquemet; Stéphane Luchini; Julie Rosaz; Jason F. Shogren. 2017. "Truth-telling under Oath." , no. : 1.
Is tax evasion a personality trait?An empirical evaluation of psychological determinants of “tax morale”Despite an increasing interest in the non-monetary determinants of tax behaviors (also known as tax morale), the recent literature offers few empirical elements on the link between moral personality characters and tax evasion propensity. However, such measures are necessary to understand the transmission channels of policies targeted at fighting against tax evasion. To fill this gap, this paper reports a lab experiment allowing to observe participants’ behaviors of income declaration and psychological measures from the psychometric literature: norm-submission, affective empathy, cognitive empathy, propensity to feel guilt and shame. These measures are combined through a Principal Component Analysis to extract independent factors. Results show that the decision to evade as well as its intensity are very highly related to affective empathy, cognitive empathy and public dimension of morality (measured by norm submission and propensity to feel shame). The propensity to feel guiltiness is, however, without significant effects. More importantly, the explanatory power of these individual morality measures is rather weak. This result challenges the assumption of an intrinsical tax morale and highlights the importance of the institutional context to understand evasion behaviors.Classification JEL : C9, H26.
Nicolas Jacquemet; Stéphane Luchini; Antoine Malézieux; Jason F. Shogren. L’évasion fiscale est-elle un trait de personnalité ? Revue économique 2017, 68, 809 .
AMA StyleNicolas Jacquemet, Stéphane Luchini, Antoine Malézieux, Jason F. Shogren. L’évasion fiscale est-elle un trait de personnalité ? Revue économique. 2017; 68 (5):809.
Chicago/Turabian StyleNicolas Jacquemet; Stéphane Luchini; Antoine Malézieux; Jason F. Shogren. 2017. "L’évasion fiscale est-elle un trait de personnalité ?" Revue économique 68, no. 5: 809.
While becoming a parent is transformational as one focuses more on the future, the time constraints are more binding right now. Using a unique data set that allows us to compare CO2 emissions from Swedish two-adult households with and without children, we find becoming a Swedish parent causes a person to leave a larger carbon footprint—due to changes in transportation patterns and food consumption choices.
Jonas Nordström; Jason F. Shogren; Linda Thunström. Do parents leave a smaller carbon footprint? 2017, 1 .
AMA StyleJonas Nordström, Jason F. Shogren, Linda Thunström. Do parents leave a smaller carbon footprint? . 2017; ():1.
Chicago/Turabian StyleJonas Nordström; Jason F. Shogren; Linda Thunström. 2017. "Do parents leave a smaller carbon footprint?" , no. : 1.
Herein we explore whether a solemn oath can eliminate hypothetical bias in a voting referenda, a popular elicitation mechanism promoted in non-market valuation exercises for its incentive compatibility properties. First, we reject the null hypothesis that a hypothetical bias does not exist. Second, we observe that people who sign an oath are significantly less likely to vote for the public good in a hypothetical referenda. We complement this evidence with a self-reported measure of honesty which confirms that the oath increases truthfulness in answers. This result opens interesting avenues for improving the elicitation of preferences in the lab and beyond.
Nicolas Jacquemet; Alexander James; Stéphane Luchini; Jason F. Shogren. Referenda Under Oath. Environmental and Resource Economics 2016, 67, 479 -504.
AMA StyleNicolas Jacquemet, Alexander James, Stéphane Luchini, Jason F. Shogren. Referenda Under Oath. Environmental and Resource Economics. 2016; 67 (3):479-504.
Chicago/Turabian StyleNicolas Jacquemet; Alexander James; Stéphane Luchini; Jason F. Shogren. 2016. "Referenda Under Oath." Environmental and Resource Economics 67, no. 3: 479-504.
We examine consumer certainty of future preferences and overconfidence in predicting future preferences. We explore how preference certainty and overconfidence impact the option value to revise today’s decisions in the future. We design a laboratory experiment that creates a controlled choice environment, in which a subject’s choice set (over food snacks) is known and constant over time, and the time frame is short – subjects make choices for themselves today, and for one to two weeks ahead. Our results suggest that even for such a seemingly straightforward choice task, only 45% of subjects can predict future choices accurately, while stated certainty of future preferences (one and two weeks ahead) is around 80%. We define overconfidence in predicting future preferences as: the difference between actual accuracy at predicting future choices and stated certainty of future preferences. Our results suggest strong evidence of overconfidence. We find that overconfidence increases with the level of stated certainty of future preferences. Finally, we observe that the option value people attach to future choice flexibility decreases with overconfidence. Overconfidence in future preferences affects economic welfare because it says people have too much incentive to lock themselves into future suboptimal decisions.
Linda Thunstrom; Jonas Nordström; Jason F. Shogren. Certainty and overconfidence in future preferences for food. Journal of Economic Psychology 2015, 51, 101 -113.
AMA StyleLinda Thunstrom, Jonas Nordström, Jason F. Shogren. Certainty and overconfidence in future preferences for food. Journal of Economic Psychology. 2015; 51 ():101-113.
Chicago/Turabian StyleLinda Thunstrom; Jonas Nordström; Jason F. Shogren. 2015. "Certainty and overconfidence in future preferences for food." Journal of Economic Psychology 51, no. : 101-113.
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Matthew E. Oliver; Jason Ff. Shogren. Contests, Common Agency, and Corruption: Why the Green Candidate Seldom Wins. Strategic Behavior and the Environment 2015, 5, 87 -109.
AMA StyleMatthew E. Oliver, Jason Ff. Shogren. Contests, Common Agency, and Corruption: Why the Green Candidate Seldom Wins. Strategic Behavior and the Environment. 2015; 5 (2):87-109.
Chicago/Turabian StyleMatthew E. Oliver; Jason Ff. Shogren. 2015. "Contests, Common Agency, and Corruption: Why the Green Candidate Seldom Wins." Strategic Behavior and the Environment 5, no. 2: 87-109.