We define the mixed strategy form of the characteristic function of the biform games and build the Shapley allocation function (SAF) on each mixed strategy profile in the second stage of the biform games. SAF provides a more detailed and accurate picture of the fairness of the strategic contribution and reflects the degree of the players’ further choices of strategies. SAF can guarantee the existence of Nash equilibrium in the first stage of the non-cooperative games. The existence and uniqueness of SAF on each mixed strategy profile overcome the defect that the core may be an empty set and provide a fair allocation method when the core element is not unique. Moreover, SAF can be used as an important reference or substitute for the core with the confidence index.
In this paper, we try to study a class of biform games with the coalition function from the cooperation of players. For this purpose, we interpret the biform games as cooperative games by defining a characteristic function of minimax representation based on the coalition function and giving the core and Shapley value as cooperative solutions. The relations between the coalition function and the characteristic function are investigated in terms of additivity and convexity, and the properties associated with the characteristic function, such as individual rationalities and cores, are compared with the corresponding results. The relations among the solutions of the normal-form game, biform game, and cooperative game are discussed with several examples.