恩全 luo

Mr. 恩全 luo


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

4Years (2023-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

View All Publications
25 April 2024 in Heliyon
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
恩L恩全 luo
恩全 luo
SXShuwen Xiang
Shuwen Xiang
YYyanlong Yang
yanlong Yang
Narayan SethiNarayan Sethi
Narayan Sethi
Food safety is a pressing issue affecting public health, and strengthening food safety regulation has become a widespread consensus. This study addresses the three-party game involving food production enterprises, third-party testing agencies, and government regulatory authorities. Considering the influence of random disturbances and time delays on the strategy-choosing and behavioral evolution of game players, a three-party stochastic evolutionary game model for food safety regulation with time delays is established. The stability of the model is analyzed by using Lyapunov's method, and the strategy evolution of the game players is investigated while combining numerical simulations. The study shows that the net benefit of the players' expected strategies is key in determining whether the overall game system can reach the optimal equilibrium. The level of penalties imposed by the central government on local government regulators is key to food safety. The main factors influencing the strategy-choosing of game players are the level of penalties imposed by the local government regulators on third-party testing agencies, together with the supervision costs of the local government regulators. Random disturbances have a certain impact on strategy-choosing of the game players, with a greater impact on testing agencies, followed by food production enterprises, and a weaker impact on government regulatory authorities. The time delay factors exhibit a certain delay effect on the evolutionary path of strategy-choosing among the game players, which aligns with the actual situation. The findings of the study have implications for food safety regulation.

13 March 2023 in Axioms
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
CLChenwei Liu
Chenwei Liu
SXShuwen Xiang
Shuwen Xiang
YYYanlong Yang
Yanlong Yang
恩L恩全 luo
恩全 luo
In this paper, we try to study a class of biform games with the coalition function from the cooperation of players. For this purpose, we interpret the biform games as cooperative games by defining a characteristic function of minimax representation based on the coalition function and giving the core and Shapley value as cooperative solutions. The relations between the coalition function and the characteristic function are investigated in terms of additivity and convexity, and the properties associated with the characteristic function, such as individual rationalities and cores, are compared with the corresponding results. The relations among the solutions of the normal-form game, biform game, and cooperative game are discussed with several examples.

23 January 2024 in Sustainability
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
恩L恩全 luo
恩全 luo
ZHZuopeng Hu
Zuopeng Hu
SXShuwen Xiang
Shuwen Xiang
YYyanlong Yang
yanlong Yang
HZHu Zhijun
Hu Zhijun
Establishing a scientific ecological compensation mechanism for air pollution is crucial for air protection. This study models the ecological compensation mechanism of the Stackelberg differential game between the local regulator and an enterprise with a competitor by introducing the air quality index and the social welfare benefits of the local regulator. Using the Pontryagin maximum principle, this study obtains dynamic strategies for the local regulator and the enterprise while maximizing the benefits. The evolution of the shadow price is analyzed with the inverse differential equation method. Then, the effects of the shadow price on the optimal dynamic strategies are analyzed using numerical simulation, together with the effects of the introduction of social welfare benefits on the efforts of the local regulator to protect the air environment. The conclusions show that introducing social welfare benefits as an ecological compensation criterion for air pollution promotes air protection by the local regulator.

6 November 2025 in Axioms
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
恩L恩全 luo
恩全 luo
SXShuwen Xiang
Shuwen Xiang
YYYanlong Yang
Yanlong Yang
This study constructs a Stackelberg differential game model for green technology invest-ment in the food industry under a governmental coordination mechanism. The optimal dynamic strategies for local governments and enterprises are derived using Pontryagin’s maximum principle. The backward differential equation method is employed in this study. It is used to analyze the impact of shadow prices on the optimal decisions of both parties. Furthermore, the study examines how social welfare benefits influence the food quality levels within the jurisdiction of local governments. Based on these findings, optimal strategy pathways are proposed to achieve social welfare and enterprise profit maximization in the green transition process of both government and enterprises. The results indicate that a local government’s investment in food quality improvement significantly enhances the food quality levels within their jurisdictions—greater government investment leads to higher food quality. At the same time, food quality levels are positively correlated with the enterprises’ green technology capital investment. Additionally, consumer price sensitivity and sensitivity to price differences have a notable impact on product pricing. As consumers become more price-sensitive, product prices decrease accordingly, which, in turn, helps increase the market share of the enterprises’ products.