Hendrik Bruns

Dr. Hendrik Bruns

orcid

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

11Years (2016-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 April 2018 in Journal of Economic Psychology
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
HBHendrik Bruns
Hendrik Bruns
EKElena Kantorowicz-Reznichenko
Elena Kantorowicz-Reznichenko
KKKatharina Klement
Katharina Klement
MJMarijane Luistro Jonsson
Marijane Luistro Jonsson
BRBilel Rahali
Bilel Rahali

5 September 2024 in Scientific Reports
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
HBHendrik Bruns
Hendrik Bruns
FDFrançois J. Dessart
François J. Dessart
MKMichał Krawczyk
Michał Krawczyk
SLStephan Lewandowsky
Stephan Lewandowsky
MPMyrto Pantazi
Myrto Pantazi
LSLaura Smillie
Laura Smillie
Misinformation surrounding crises poses a significant challenge for public institutions. Understanding the relative effectiveness of different types of interventions to counter misinformation, and which segments of the population are most and least receptive to them, is crucial. We conducted a preregistered online experiment involving 5228 participants from Germany, Greece, Ireland, and Poland. Participants were exposed to misinformation on climate change or COVID-19. In addition, they were pre-emptively exposed to a prebunk, warning them of commonly used misleading strategies, before encountering the misinformation, or were exposed to a debunking intervention afterwards. The source of the intervention (i.e. the European Commission) was either revealed or not. The findings show that both interventions change four variables reflecting vulnerability to misinformation in the expected direction in almost all cases, with debunks being slightly more effective than prebunks. Revealing the source of the interventions did not significantly impact their overall effectiveness. One case of undesirable effect heterogeneity was observed: debunks with revealed sources were less effective in decreasing the credibility of misinformation for people with low levels of trust in the European Union (as elicited in a post-experimental questionnaire). While our results mostly suggest that the European Commission, and possibly other public institutions, can confidently debunk and prebunk misinformation regardless of the trust level of the recipients, further evidence on this is needed.

15 June 2023 in Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
HBHendrik Bruns
Hendrik Bruns
GPGrischa Perino
Grischa Perino

27 March 2021 in Economic Inquiry
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
HBHendrik Bruns
Hendrik Bruns
GPGrischa Perino
Grischa Perino
How decision makers respond to behavioral and traditional interventions might depend on their and the regulator's attributes. This online experiment investigates the effect of defaults, recommendations, and mandatory minimum contributions accompanied by regulator information on the private provision of climate protection, accounting for intrinsic motivation. Findings show that all interventions increase the propensity of individuals to choose the focal value. There is no evidence that recommendations and defaults change average contributions. We report a negative interaction of the default with intrinsic motivation. Expert or political regulator information decreases intervention effectiveness. The study improves our understanding of behavioral public policy instruments.

27 October 2016 in SSRN Electronic Journal
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Preprint
Open access
PDF file
HBHendrik Bruns
Hendrik Bruns
EKElena Kantorowicz-Reznichenko
Elena Kantorowicz-Reznichenko
KKKatharina Klement
Katharina Klement
MJMarijane Luistro Jonsson
Marijane Luistro Jonsson
BRBilel Rahali
Bilel Rahali
‘Nudges’ receive growing attention as an effective strategy to alter people's decisions without significantly changing economic incentives or limiting options. However, being often very subtle and covert, nudges are also criticized as unethical. By not being transparent about the intention to influence individual choice they might be perceived as limiting freedom of autonomous actions and decisions. So far, empirical research on this issue is scarce. In this study, we investigate whether nudges can be made transparent without limiting their effectiveness. For this purpose, we conduct a laboratory experiment where we ‘nudge’ contributions to carbon emission reduction by introducing a default value. We test how different types of transparency (i.e. knowledge of the potential influence of the default, its purpose, or both) influence the effect of the default. Our findings demonstrate that the default increases contributions, and information on the potential influence combined with the purpose of the default, or just its purpose, do not significantly affect contributions. Findings are somewhat inconclusive with respect to information on the potential behavioral influence. Furthermore, we do not find evidence that psychological reactance interrelates with the influence of transparency. Generally, our findings support the policy-relevant claim that nudges (in the form of defaults) can be transparent and yet effective.

17 February 2025 in Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
HBHendrik Bruns
Hendrik Bruns
AFAdrien Fillon
Adrien Fillon
ZMZacharias Maniadis
Zacharias Maniadis
YPYavor Paunov
Yavor Paunov