Adrien Alejandro Fillon

Adrien Alejandro Fillon

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Adrien Alejandro Fillon

Université Clermont Auvergne, CNRS, LAPSCO, 63000 Clermont-Ferrand, France

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

7Years (2020-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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21 February 2022 in Nature Human Behaviour
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Journal Article
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SPSam Parsons
Sam Parsons
FAFlávio Azevedo
Flávio Azevedo
MEMahmoud M. Elsherif
Mahmoud M. Elsherif
SGSamuel Guay
Samuel Guay
OSOwen N. Shahim
Owen N. Shahim
BABalazs Aczel
Balazs Aczel

26 November 2025 in Nature
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Journal Article
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NSNicolas Sommet
Nicolas Sommet
AFAdrien A. Fillon
Adrien A. Fillon
OROcyna Rudmann
Ocyna Rudmann
ACAlfredo Rossi Saldanha Cunha
Alfredo Rossi Saldanha Cunha
AEAnnahita Ehsan
Annahita Ehsan

11 September 2024 in Journal of Open Psychology Data
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Journal Article
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LRLukas Röseler
Lukas Röseler
LKLeonard Kaiser
Leonard Kaiser
CDChristopher Doetsch
Christopher Doetsch
NKNoah Klett
Noah Klett
CSChristian Seida
Christian Seida
YZYikang Zhang
Yikang Zhang
In psychological science, replicability—repeating a study with a new sample achieving consistent results (Parsons et al., 2022)—is critical for affirming the validity of scientific findings. Despite its importance, replication efforts are few and far between in psychological science with many attempts failing to corroborate past findings. This scarcity, compounded by the difficulty in accessing replication data, jeopardizes the efficient allocation of research resources and impedes scientific advancement. Addressing this crucial gap, we present the Replication Database (https://forrt-replications.shinyapps.io/fred_explorer), a novel platform hosting 1,239 original findings paired with replication findings. The infrastructure of this database allows researchers to submit, access, and engage with replication findings. The database makes replications visible, easily findable via a graphical user interface, and tracks replication rates across various factors, such as publication year or journal. This will facilitate future efforts to evaluate the robustness of psychological research.

17 February 2025 in Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
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Journal Article
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HBHendrik Bruns
Hendrik Bruns
AFAdrien Fillon
Adrien Fillon
ZMZacharias Maniadis
Zacharias Maniadis
YPYavor Paunov
Yavor Paunov

13 September 2020 in Cognition and Emotion
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Journal Article
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AFAdrien Fillon
Adrien Fillon
LKLucas Kutscher
Lucas Kutscher
GFGilad Feldman
Gilad Feldman
Exceptionality effect is the phenomenon that people associate stronger negative affect with a negative outcome when it is a result of an exception (abnormal behaviour) compared to when it is a result of routine (normal behaviour). In this pre-registered meta-analysis, we examined exceptionality effect in 48 studies (N = 4212). An analysis of 35 experimental studies (n = 3332) showed medium to strong effect (g = 0.60, 95% confidence intervals (CI) [0.41, 0.79]) for past behaviour across several measures (regret/affect: g = 0.66, counterfactual thought: g = 0.39, self-blame: g = 0.44, victim compensation: g = 0.39, offender punishment: g = 0.51). An analysis of 13 one-sample studies presenting a comparison of exceptional and routine behaviours simultaneously (n = 1217) revealed a very strong exceptionality effect (converted g = 1.98, CI [1.57, 2.38]). We tested several theoretical moderators: norm strength, event controllability, outcome rarity, action versus inaction, and status quo. We found that exceptionality effect was stronger when the routine was aligned with the status quo option and with action rather than for inaction. All materials are available on: https://osf.io/542c7/

24 May 2023 in Collabra: Psychology
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Journal Article
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AFAdrien A. Fillon
Adrien A. Fillon
LSLuna Strauch
Luna Strauch
GFGilad Feldman
Gilad Feldman
Research on action and inaction in judgement and decision making has shown that for choices in risky situations resulting in negative outcomes, people tend to prefer inaction over action and regret actions more than inactions. We built on this idea to test whether the established norm preference for inaction over action affects evaluations of decision-makers, and results in stronger preference for an agent who favors inaction over action in risky decisions resulting in negative outcomes. We conducted three pre-registered experiments via the Prolific platform, replicating and further extending the classic action-effect paradigm (overall N = 1138, 355 male, 746 female, 37 others, Mage= 36.98, SDage= 12.34) to examine perceptions of competence and trustworthiness of action versus inaction agents. First, we successfully replicated action-effect (d = 0.58 to 0.96). We then found that participants indeed tended to evaluate an inaction protagonist as more competent, trustworthy, and inline with social norms than an action protagonist (d = 0.05 to d = 0.61). Results concerning our extensions examining perceived social norms and joy attributions over positive outcomes were less clear. Finally, we found that normality moderated the preference-inaction effect into a preference-action effect: Negative prior outcomes led participants to prefer action actors to inaction actors and to find those to be more competent and normative. Overall, we found that, in the context of negative outcomes, inaction is perceived as more trustworthy than action. We concluded that action and inaction seem to extend to social evaluations of agents and that trustworthiness can be affected by action and inaction, context, and norms. All materials, data, and code are available on: https://osf.io/a8e4d/