This paper simulates a brute force attack of the passwords on EPCglobal's UHF class-1 generation-2 passive RFID tags. The objective is to simulate a brute force attack on the password accounting for the length of the password, the number of bits to be transferred, the data link bit rate from the reader to tag, the data link bit rate from the tag to reader, and the required number of messages for the protocol between the reader and tag. According to the simulation, the average time to perform a brute force attack on the passwords is approximately thirty days.

Ransomware is one of the most prevalent and unique threats to computer and information security today. Part of what distinguishes ransomware from other malware is the number of decisions made by both the attacker and the defender that are specific to ransomware attacks. Beyond choices about how best to prevent an attack, the defender must make decisions like whether or not to pay the ransom based on the likelihood the attacker will return the data if the ransom is paid. Game theory is used to model this exact type of decision making in order to predict how rational agents will behave given specific choices. Based on the possible outcomes available to each player and the payoffs associated with these outcomes, one can determine the best option at each stage in the game. In this work, our goal is to create a new game theoretical model of the interaction between ransomware attacker and defender that synthesizes and improves upon existing models. Our model takes into account useful assumptions in the existing literature like the presence of a threat of prosecution for the attacker, while adding new insights such as the possibility of the defender’s backup strategy being incomplete or failing. By incorporating these assumptions into our model, we create a framework that allows for the most realistic game theoretical analysis of ransomware to date.

RFID uses radio frequency signals to provide a no-contact and non-line-of-sight identification. In spite of its numerous advantages and implementations, it can also pose invasive new threats to rights, privacy of individuals, and security of organizations. A modified version of attack graph, a graph-based approach to network vulnerability analysis, is used in the threat modeling of an EPCglobal RFID system. The model can be used for the qualitative and quantitative assessment of the vulnerabilities and security attributes of the system.

Privacy concerns have been raised with current and forthcoming implementations of RFID tags. The two main concerns are tracking and inventorying. Cryptosystems are being developed in order to curtail these potential abuses. Conventional cryptosystems that permit re-encryption do so only for a player with the knowledge of the public key corresponding to a given ciphertext. This kind of approach does not scale and is not practical. However, universal re-encryption in a MIXNET can be implemented without the servers holding any knowledge of public keys. Using existing techniques to implement an asymmetric cryptosystem with universal re-encryption in a MIXNET, we examine the ramifications of building such a system and also simulate its behavior with a Java implementation.