Melina Gastelum Vargas

Prof. Melina Gastelum Vargas

UNAM Facultad de Filosofía y Letras

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

11Years (2016-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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30 March 2017
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Shaun GallagherShaun Gallagher
Shaun Gallagher
SMSergio F. Martínez
Sergio F. Martínez
MVMelina Gastelum Vargas
Melina Gastelum Vargas

16 June 2020 in Frontiers in Psychology
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MVMelina Gastelum Vargas
Melina Gastelum Vargas
In this paper I seek to unify enactive and ecological approaches to cognitive science by emphasizing the fact that both approaches view cognitive processes as being inherently temporally extended. My hypothesis is that characterizing the temporal scales in which perception of affordances occur, they can serve different purposes of explanation within the theories. Specifically, the paper brings together, on the one hand, Chemero’s (2009) dynamicist understanding of affordances, which he called affordances 2.0, with, on the other hand, a distinction originally made by Varela (1999), and later taken up by Shaun Gallagher (2011, 2017b), between three different timescales for understanding cognition: the elementary, the integrative, and the narrative. Varela’s three-fold distinction was originally intended as a way of identifying phenomenological events as being causally coupled to specific cellular events happening within the nervous system. The central claim of the present paper is that affordances, likewise, should be understood in terms of these three different timescales. I show that these temporal scales can be a useful toolkit for explaining the perception and learning of affordances and at the same time unifying enactivism and ecological psychology claiming that affordances serve a different explanatory role depending on which time scale you consider them at. If you are interested in explaining the embodied assemblies that form the always changing sensorimotor contingencies, then you see the elementary scale. If you’re interested in explaining perception at the integrative scale, then affordances are solicitations that get actualized and bear an umwelt at that same scale. The perception of affordances as such is constituted by the integration of these first two scales, and the experience of it can be characterized by the husserlian structure of experience with its intrinsic temporality. Finally, if you are interested in explaining change in the animal-environment system over developmental time, that is, learning, then affordances are roughly what Chemero proposed and they operate at the narrative scale. But it is important to say that the three scales are always intertwined because learning and perception are ongoing processes that in many senses are impossible to separate. Finally, I discuss the importance of scales from the macro to micro levels for understanding behavior through affordances, considering them as synergies, where abilities and aspects of the environment are understood as constraints on the potential trajectories of such systems.


8 July 2021 in Entropy
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ASAldo Solis
Aldo Solis
MVMelina Gastelum Vargas
Melina Gastelum Vargas
JHJorge G Hirsch
Jorge G Hirsch
Since the experimental observation of the violation of the Bell-CHSH inequalities, much has been said about the non-local and contextual character of the underlying system. However, the hypothesis from which Bell’s inequalities are derived differ according to the probability space used to write them. The violation of Bell’s inequalities can, alternatively, be explained by assuming that the hidden variables do not exist at all, that they exist but their values cannot be simultaneously assigned, that the values can be assigned but joint probabilities cannot be properly defined, or that averages taken in different contexts cannot be combined. All of the above are valid options, selected by different communities to provide support to their particular research program.

27 October 2022 in Resistances. Journal of the Philosophy of History
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IAItzel Cadena Alvear
Itzel Cadena Alvear
MVMelina Gastelum Vargas
Melina Gastelum Vargas
Autism Spectrum Disorders have been defined as a group of developmental conditions that affect the capacity to interact with the physical and social environment, among others. A core feature of autism is the presence of restricted and repetitive behaviors that vary in complexity, form, and frequency throughout life history. These core features have traditionally been defined as impairments that interfere with communication competence. From an embodied approach, however, these actions could be seen as characteristic ways of interacting with the world. In this sense, we take an enactive and embodied approach to cognition in which we conceive cognitive agents as sensorimotor systems whose perception-action occurs in terms of affordances. This framework provides an integrative view of autism considering affectivity, perception, action, exploration, and interaction within a complex and dynamic dimension. Following this, we propose different applications based on embodied, intercultural, and feminist epistemologies, to understand and participate with autistic and cognitively diverse populations. The change in theoretical and methodological paradigms within embodied cognitive science towards autism and other cognitive diversities and how they engage with the world can lead to more comprehensive, integrative, and bioethical approaches.