Sensorimotor incorporation is the most intimate form of environmental dependence; it transforms external objects into an integral part of ourselves, often changing our agency irreversibly. Existing accounts oscillate between excessively strong conceptions, which limit incorporation to body-part-like objects, and weaker views, which equate it with skillful tool use. Building on enactive ideas, we propose an operational definition of incorporation that avoids these extremes by emphasizing two key features: portability, the capacity to use the incorporated object across contexts, and irreversibility, the transformation of agency such that the object becomes central to the agent’s viability. An object is central when its loss renders the agent’s form of life unviable or requires significant adaptive effort to restore viability, in either case affecting her identity. We further argue that only concrete objects—those whose potentialities are actualized through interaction—can be incorporated. Incorporation, thus, forms an integrated agential system that is portable, versatile, and operationally dependent on the incorporated object. While the incorporated object becomes central for a given agent’s form of life, it can still be replaced by another particular object, provided it can be equivalently concretized. This account clarifies the nature and apparent paradoxes of incorporation and its role in shaping sensorimotor agency.
Behaviour settings are sociocultural places defined by three main ecological aspects: the affordances of material structures, typical patterns of skilful action and socially situated norms. These aspects explain the observed regularities of human behaviour associated with the material characteristics of places. However, the focus of ecological theories on how individual agents attune their actions to the pre-established order of behaviour settings neglects the agents' active role in sustaining or motivating transformations in this order. We therefore propose an alternative enactive approach to behaviour settings that accounts for the role of agents as active supporters and transformers of behaviour settings. Based on the enactive concepts of agency, normativity and dialectics, we argue that agents, as participants of behaviour settings, simultaneously respond to multiple normative dimensions (e.g. biological, sensorimotor and interactive). To sustain the order of behaviour settings, agents sometimes need to inhibit other normative responses of their bodies, which sometimes is detrimental to one or many aspects of their lives. Nonetheless, agents can collectively trigger the transformation of behaviour settings. This transformation can occur dialectically as tensions between two or more norms to which human bodies respond are resolved, even if new tensions arise and the process of changing behaviour setting continues. This article is part of the theme issue ‘People, places, things and communities: expanding behaviour settings theory in the twenty-first century’.