Ayan Mondal

Ayan Mondal


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

14Years (2013-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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22 May 2015 in IEEE Systems Journal
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
AMAyan Mondal
Ayan Mondal
SMSudip Misra
Sudip Misra
MOMohammad S. Obaidat
Mohammad S. Obaidat
In this paper, the problem of distributed home energy management system with storage (HoMeS) in a coalition, which consists of multiple microgrids and multiple customers, is studied using the multiple-leader-multiple-follower Stackelberg game theoretic model-a multistage and multilevel game. The microgrids, which act as the leaders, need to decide on the minimum amount of energy to be generated with the help of a central energy management unit and the optimum price per unit energy to maximize their profit. On the other hand, the customers, which act as the followers, need to decide on the optimum amount of energy to be consumed, including the energy to be requested for storage. Using the proposed distributed scheme, i.e., HoMeS, the earned profit of the grid improves up to 55%, and the customers consume almost 30.79% higher amount of energy, which, in turn, increases the utilization of the generated energy by the microgrids.

11 July 2014 in IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
SMSudip Misra
Sudip Misra
TOTamoghna Ojha
Tamoghna Ojha
AMAyan Mondal
Ayan Mondal
In this paper, we propose a localization scheme named Opportunistic Localization by Topology Control (OLTC), specifically for sparse Underwater Sensor Networks (UWSNs). In a UWSN, an unlocalized sensor node finds its location by utilizing the spatio-temporal relation with the reference nodes. Generally, UWSNs are sparsely deployed because of the high implementation cost, and unfortunately, the network topology experiences partitioning due to the effect of passive node mobility. Consequently, most of the underwater sensor nodes lack the required number of reference nodes for localization in underwater environments. The existing literature is deficient in addressing the problem of node localization in the above mentioned scenario. Antagonistically, however, we promote that even in such sparse UWSN context, it is possible to localize the nodes by exploiting their available opportunities. We formulate a game-theoretic model based on the Single-Leader-Multi-Follower Stackelberg game for topology control of the unlocalized and localized nodes. We also prove that both the players choose strategies to reach a socially optimal Stackelberg-Nash-Cournot Equilibrium. NS-3 based simulation results indicate that the localization coverage of the network increases upto 1.5 times compared to the existing state-of-the-art. The energy-efficiency of OLTC has also been established.

1 August 2013
Verified
Conference Paper
Closed access
SMSudip Misra
Sudip Misra
AMAyan Mondal
Ayan Mondal
SBShukla Banik
Shukla Banik
MKManas Khatua
Manas Khatua
SBSamaresh Bera
Samaresh Bera
MOMohammad S. Obaidat
Mohammad S. Obaidat
The deployment of advanced information and communication technologies has helped in the transformation of the traditional power grids into smart grids by introducing demand side management in residential area. The use of demand side management in the residential area can successfully reduce customer's energy consumption, and can also provide a well balanced energy demand throughout the day. Based on real-time pricing information, a customer can shift his/her energy demand to reduce the energy consumption cost. In this paper, we present a Markov Decision Process (MDP)-based scheduling mechanism for residential energy management (REM) in smart grid. The aim of the proposed work is to reduce the energy expenses of a customer. In this mechanism, the Home Energy Management Unit (HEMU) acts as one of the players, the Central Energy Management Unit (CEMU) acts as another player. The HEMU interacts with the CEMU to fulfill its energy request within its desired budget. The CEMU follows its own dynamic pricing mechanism to decide the price per unit energy for on-peak and off-peak hours. The proposed mechanism is able to reduce the energy expenses of the residential customers.

1 July 2015 in IET Networks
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
AMAyan Mondal
Ayan Mondal
SMSudip Misra
Sudip Misra
Existing works on energy trading consider different schemes for forming energy trading networks, which assume that each plug‐in hybrid electric vehicle (PHEV) is connected with a single micro‐grid. Consequently, in on‐peak hours, a PHEV obtains the requested energy during the allotted time slot by paying a higher price. Alternatively, the PHEV waits for a significant duration of time to get serviced until the on‐peak hour elapses. In this study, the authors propose that a PHEV may obtain energy from any of the available micro‐grids within a coalition instantaneously without paying higher price. In this work, the problem of energy trading network topology control (ENTRANT) for PHEVs is studied as a ‘multi‐leader multi‐follower Stackelberg game’. In this game, each PHEV acts as a leader, and decides the amount of energy to be requested to the selected micro‐grid. On the other hand, the micro‐grids act as followers, need to decide the price per unit energy. Using variational inequality, it is shown that the proposed scheme, ENTRANT, has generalised Nash equilibrium, which is also socially optimal. ENTRANT enables the PHEVs and the micro‐grids within a coalition to reach the equilibrium state, is evaluated theoretically, as well as through simulations.

11 April 2018 in IEEE Transactions on Communications
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
ILORA MAITYILORA MAITY
ILORA MAITY
AMAyan Mondal
Ayan Mondal
SMSudip Misra
Sudip Misra
CMChittaranjan Mandal
Chittaranjan Mandal
In this paper, we address the issue of rule duplication during network updates in Software Defined Networking (SDN). In SDN, network update involves the controller in sending update packets to desired set of switches, where the update rules are installed. To ensure update consistency, old flowrules are stored until the total update procedure is complete. Higher consumption of TCAMs during update increases the cost of network update and decreases the scalability of SDN. In this work, we propose an approach for consistent update with redundancy reduction, named CURE, that reduces TCAM usage during update. CURE prioritizes switches according to their usage pattern and schedules updates based on priority zones. The proposed approach guarantees that highly loaded switches are updated first. CURE also maintains packet-level consistency by implementing a multilevel queueing approach. In this framework, each switch in the current update region stores the incoming packets in individual device queues until the switch completes update. Therefore, after the initiation of an update, packets are processed according to new rules only. The results of performance evaluation depict that the average rule space utilization during update using CURE is 29.954% less than using the two-phase update proposed in the existing literature.

4 October 2018 in IEEE Transactions on Services Computing
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
ACAishwariya Chakraborty
Aishwariya Chakraborty
AMAyan Mondal
Ayan Mondal
ARArijit Roy
Arijit Roy
SMSudip Misra
Sudip Misra
In this paper, the problem of provisioning high quality of Sensors-as-a-Service (Se-aaS) in the presence of competitive sensor-owners, i.e., oligopolistic market, and heterogeneous sensor nodes in service-oriented sensor-cloud is studied. Oligopolistic sensor-owners adopt unfair means to degrade the quality of service provided by other sensor-owners in the sensor-cloud market. In order to address this problem, a dynamic pricing scheme, named DETER, is proposed in this work to enforce trust among the sensor-owners for maintaining the quality of Se-aaS provided by the Sensor-Cloud Service Provider (SCSP). Each sensor node calculates distributed trust opinion for other nodes, while the SCSP calculates centralized trust opinion for each sensor-owner. A Single-Leader-Multiple-Follower Stackelberg Game is formulated in which the SCSP acts as the leader and decides price to be paid to each sensor-owner, while ensuring maximum profit. On the other hand, the sensor-owners act as the followers and decide their strategies for earning maximum profit. Thereby, using DETER, SCSP enforces high trust among the sensor-owners. Additionally, using DETER, energy consumption of sensor nodes in sensor-cloud decreases by 4.69-11.56%, and network overhead decreases by 52.6-56.53%. The trade-off between price earned by the sensor-owners and profit of the SCSP in service-oriented sensor-cloud is also maintained using DETER.