George Shambaugh

Prof. Dr. George Shambaugh

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Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

37Years (1990-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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24 February 2021 in PLOS ONE
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Journal Article
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RDRaj Desai
Raj Desai
GSGeorge Shambaugh
George Shambaugh
Maritime piracy constitutes a major threat to global shipping and international trade. We argue that fishers turn to piracy to smooth expected income losses and to deter illegal foreign fishing fleets. Previous investigations have generally focused on cross-national determinants of the incidence of piracy in territorial waters. These investigations neglect piracy in international waters and ignore its spatial dependence, whereby pirate attacks cluster in certain locations due to neighborhood and spillover effects. We conduct a geographically disaggregated analysis using geo-referenced data of piracy and its covariates between 2005 and 2014. We demonstrate that the incidence of piracy in a particular location is associated with higher catch volumes from high-bycatch and habitat-destroying fishing, even when controlling for conditions in proximate coastal areas. We find, additionally, that illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing exerts an especially pronounced effect on piracy. These findings highlight the need for anti-piracy solutions beyond enforcement to include the policing of fishing practices that are illegal or are perceived by local fishers in vulnerable coastal areas to be harmful to small-scale fishing economies.

1 December 2018 in European Journal of Political Economy
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
GSGeorge Shambaugh
George Shambaugh
ESElaine B. Shen
Elaine B. Shen

1 December 2005 in International Studies Review
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Journal Article
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RMRichard Matthew
Richard Matthew
GSGeorge Shambaugh
George Shambaugh

1 June 1998 in Security Dialogue
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Journal Article
Closed access
RMRichard A Matthew
Richard A Matthew
GSGeorge Shambaugh
George Shambaugh

16 November 2005 in Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy
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Journal Article
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RMRichard Matthew
Richard Matthew
GSGeorge Shambaugh
George Shambaugh

1 January 2002 in Review of International Studies
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Journal Article
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JLJoseph Lepgold
Joseph Lepgold
GSGeorge Shambaugh
George Shambaugh
It is often said that reciprocityÑreturning good behaviour for good behaviour and bad for badÑstabilizes co-operation by making nonco-operative behaviour unprofitable. Nevertheless, our understanding of how reciprocity works in international politics is unnecessarily limited. Only two patterns are now well recognized. In one of these, both actors in a relationship insist that the value of their concessions must be equivalent and that each must be made highly conditional on the other. The polar opposite pattern is one in which the actors consider both the value and timing of individual concessions to be irrelevant. What is not well understood is that there are two other exchange patterns that actors may also see as mutually satisfactory. In these situations, even though the value and timing of individual concessions both clearly matter to the actors, the pattern of exchange on oneÑthough not bothÑof them is clearly ‘unbalanced’. We lack a way to make sense of such partially unbalanced relationships. This article develops a typology that specifies four types of reciprocity, analyses the conditions under which they are likely to evolve, and draws out the implications of each pattern for actors' strategic choices and bargaining behaviour. The utility of this typology is demonstrated through an analysis of the shifting patterns of reciprocity in Russian-American relations from 1947 through to 1997.