Raj Desai

Raj Desai

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Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

37Years (1990-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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24 February 2009 in Economics & Politics
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Journal Article
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RDRaj Desai
Raj Desai
AOAnders Olofsgård
Anders Olofsgård
TYTarik M. Yousef
Tarik M. Yousef

7 September 2013 in The World Bank Economic Review
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Journal Article
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RDRaj Desai
Raj Desai
SJShareen Joshi
Shareen Joshi
In response to the problems of high coordination costs among the poor, efforts are underway in many countries to organize the poor through “self-help groups” (SHGs)—membership-based organizations that aim to promote social cohesion through a mixture of education, access to finance, and linkages to wider development programs. We randomly selected villages in one of the poorest districts in rural India in which to establish SHGs for women. Two years of exposure to these programs increased women's participation in group savings programs as well as the non-agricultural labor force. Compared to women in control villages, treated women were also more likely to participate in household decisions and engage in civic activities. We find no evidence however, that participation increased income or had a disproportionate impact on women's socio-economic status. These results are important in light of the recent effort to expand official support to SHGs under India's National Rural Livelihood Mission.

1 December 2005 in Journal of Comparative Economics
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Journal Article
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RDRaj Desai
Raj Desai
LFLev Freinkman
Lev Freinkman
IGItzhak Goldberg
Itzhak Goldberg

1 May 2012
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Book
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MAMagdi Amin
Magdi Amin
RARagui Assaad
Ragui Assaad
NANazar Al-Baharna
Nazar Al-Baharna
KDKemal Dervis
Kemal Dervis
RDRaj Desai
Raj Desai
DKDaniel Kaufmann
Daniel Kaufmann
The Arab Spring constitutes perhaps the most far-reaching political and economic transition since the end of communism in Europe. For too long, the economic aspirations of the people in the region, especially young people, have been ignored by leaders in Arab countries and abroad. Competing views as to how best to meet these aspirations are now being debated in the region. The outcome will shape Arab societies for generations to come. This book argues that significant economic reforms must accompany the major political transitions that are underway. Although each country has a different economic structure and history and must make its own way forward, there are spill-overs from trade and investment linkages, the contagion of news cycles, interaction of people and sharing of expectations that are too great to ignore. Some common foundation of the new Arab economies is needed. Towards that end, this volume addresses four central challenges of economic reform in the Arab world. First, with two-thirds of the population under the age of thirty, the disproportionate burdens of unemployment and poor education can no longer be heaped on youth. Second, while some government policies may have improved the living standards of Arab citizens in the past, they have also entrenched cronies, enriched a small elite, and become unaffordable. Third, if Arab economies are to compete in the 21st century they cannot depend solely on oil and gas money, remittances, and tourism, but will require active, independent private sectors. And finally, the relative isolation of Arab economies—both from each other and from the world—must end. Rather than providing specific lists of recommendations, this book sets forth a set of guidelines and priorities for reformers who will begin creating new opportunities for youth, rebuilding the institutions of the state, diversifying the private sector, and cooperating with each other and integrating with the world economy.

1 August 2011 in Quarterly Journal of Political Science
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RDRaj Desai
Raj Desai
AOAnders Olofsgård
Anders Olofsgård
Arrangements by which politically connected firms receive economic favors are a common feature around the world, but little is known of the form or effects of influence in business-government relationships. We present a simple model in which influence requires firms to provide goods of political value in exchange for economic privileges. We argue that political influence improves the business environment for selected firms, but restricts their ability to fire workers. Under these conditions, if political influence primarily lowers fixed costs over variable costs, then favored firms will be less likely to invest and their productivity will suffer, even if they earn higher profits than non-influential firms. We rely on the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys of approximately 8000 firms in 40 developing countries, and control for a number of biases present in the data. We find that influential firms benefit from lower administrative and regulatory barriers (including bribe taxes), greater pricing power, and easier access to credit. But these firms also provide politically valuable benefits to incumbents through bloated payrolls and greater tax payments. Finally, these firms are worse-performing than their non-influential counterparts. Our results highlight a potential channel by which cronyism leads to persistent underdevelopment.

24 February 2021 in PLOS ONE
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RDRaj Desai
Raj Desai
GSGeorge Shambaugh
George Shambaugh
Maritime piracy constitutes a major threat to global shipping and international trade. We argue that fishers turn to piracy to smooth expected income losses and to deter illegal foreign fishing fleets. Previous investigations have generally focused on cross-national determinants of the incidence of piracy in territorial waters. These investigations neglect piracy in international waters and ignore its spatial dependence, whereby pirate attacks cluster in certain locations due to neighborhood and spillover effects. We conduct a geographically disaggregated analysis using geo-referenced data of piracy and its covariates between 2005 and 2014. We demonstrate that the incidence of piracy in a particular location is associated with higher catch volumes from high-bycatch and habitat-destroying fishing, even when controlling for conditions in proximate coastal areas. We find, additionally, that illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing exerts an especially pronounced effect on piracy. These findings highlight the need for anti-piracy solutions beyond enforcement to include the policing of fishing practices that are illegal or are perceived by local fishers in vulnerable coastal areas to be harmful to small-scale fishing economies.