Business actors from the global South have traditionally been marginalized in global private governance. But this may be changing. A growing number of business actors in China have become involved in global governance, with some showing an ambition to act as rule makers. What have motivated these Chinese companies? How do they go about promoting their initiatives? What is their relationship with the Chinese government in this endeavor? We explore these questions by empirically investigating two cases—the Electronic World Trade Platform (eWTP) initiated by the Alibaba Group and the Global Energy Interconnection Development and Cooperation Organization (GEIDCO) supported by the State Grid Corporation of China. We identify several areas where the Chinese experience can enrich the literature on global private governance, which has been primarily derived from studies of actors from the global North.
Dual-use biotechnology faces the risks of availability, novel biological agents, knowledge, normative, and other dual-use risks. If left unchecked, these may destroy human living conditions and social order. Despite the benefits of dual-use technology, good governance is needed to mitigate its risks. The predicaments facing all governments in managing the dual-use risks of biotechnology deserve special attention. On the one hand, the information asymmetry risk of dual-use biotechnology prevents the traditional self-governance model in the field of biotechnology from playing its role. On the other hand, top-down public regulation often lags behind technological iteration due to the difficulty of predicting the human-made risks of dual-use biotechnology. Therefore, we argue that governance of the dual-use risks of biotechnology should avoid the traditional bottom-up or top-down modes. We suggest the governance for dual-use biotechnology could be improved if the four-stage experimentalist governance model is followed. The first stage is to achieve consensus on a broad governance framework with open-ended principles. The second stage is for countries to take action based on local conditions and the open-ended framework. The third stage is to establish a dynamic consultation mechanism for transnational information sharing and action review. The fourth and final stage is to evaluate and revise the global governance framework.
The Paris Agreement design follows the Global Experimental Governance mode, which once achieved success in ozone protection. However, the implementation of the Paris Agreement encountered difficulties, as it inherited the traditional dichotomy country classification established at the 1992 Rio Summit. Still, over time, the capability and motivation in Annex I and non-Annex I countries developed so differently that incentive and constraint policies do not encourage more ambitious mitigation commitments using the previous classification. For this reason, according to a country’s capability and motivation, this research divided these countries into four categories: Leader, Reserve Force, Waverer, and Obscurity, and proposed a potential climate action roadmap for different types of countries to mobilize their internal forces by dynamically classifying a country’s character and to improve overall global climate governance.
Background: COVID-19 vaccines are in short supply worldwide. China was among the first countries to pledge supplies of the COVID-19 vaccine as a global public product, and to date, the country has provided more than 600 million vaccines to more than 200 countries and regions with low COVID-19 vaccination rates. Understanding the public’s attitude in China toward the global distribution of COVID-19 vaccines could inform global and national decisions, policies, and debates. Objective: The aim of this study was to determine the attitudes of adults living in China regarding the global allocation of COVID-19 vaccines developed in China and how these attitudes vary across provinces and by sociodemographic characteristics. Methods: We conducted a cross-sectional online survey among adults registered with the survey company KuRunData. The survey asked participants 31 questions about their attitudes regarding the global allocation of COVID-19 vaccines developed in China. We disaggregated responses by province and sociodemographic characteristics. All analyses used survey sampling weights. Results: A total of 10,000 participants completed the questionnaire. Participants generally favored providing COVID-19 vaccines to foreign countries before fulfilling domestic needs (75.6%, 95% CI 74.6%-76.5%). Women (3778/4921, 76.8%; odds ratio 1.18, 95% CI 1.07-1.32; P=.002) and those living in rural areas (3123/4065, 76.8%; odds ratio 1.13, 95% CI 1.01-1.27; P=.03) were especially likely to hold this opinion. Most respondents preferred providing financial support through international platforms rather than directly offering support to individual countries (72.1%, 95% CI 71%-73.1%), while for vaccine products they preferred direct provision to relevant countries instead of via a delivery platform such as COVAX (77.3%, 95% CI 76.3%-78.2%). Conclusions: Among our survey sample, we found that adults are generally supportive of the international distribution of COVID-19 vaccines, which may encourage policy makers to support and implement the distribution of COVID-19 vaccines developed in China worldwide. Conducting similar surveys in other countries could help align policy makers’ actions on COVID-19 vaccine distribution with the preferences of their constituencies.
More and more Chinese high- and new-technology companies have entered the global market in the recent years. While their business success has attracted widespread attention, their engagement in governance innovation has been largely ignored by previous studies. This special issue explores the governance challenges and opportunities for Chinese high- and new-technology companies at multiple levels. The empirical case studies of prominent Chinese companies, such as Alibaba, Huawei, the China Railway Corporation, and the State Grid Corporation of China, show a variety of experiences and approaches regarding governance innovation. We hope these studies will encourage more scholars to explore wider patterns of business actor engagement in governance innovation, paying special attention to the new actors from the Global South.