Yang Xue

Prof. Dr. Yang Xue

Center for Biosafety Research and Strategy of Tianjin University, Tianjin, China
+1
orcid

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

6Years (2021-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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19 April 2024 in Computational and Structural Biotechnology Journal
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
YHYiping Han
Yiping Han
LFLindsay L. Fan
Lindsay L. Fan
Yang XueYang Xue
Yang Xue
Medical biotechnology is at the forefront of scientific progress, with humanity facing a critical juncture during the pandemic. However, to maximize these benefits, governments face the complex challenge of reconciling innovation and risk. A sustainable balance is critical, as extreme measures such as blanket bans on biotechnology research could hamper progress, while unfettered research could pose an existential threat. The need for effective regulation has become apparent in the context of recent controversies surrounding pharmaceutical biotechnology. Governments face the challenge of reconciling precaution with innovation, necessitating a dual strategy fostering both principles. This paper explores the delicate dynamics of innovation and risk in pharmaceutical biotechnology, focusing on the evolving landscape in Europe, the U.S., and, notably, China. At the same time, we delve into the regulatory landscape and examine the role of the “right to science” in shaping Chinese policy. This paper further applies the right to science that has received the interests of medical biotechnology regulatory policymakers: understanding the role of scientific claims in regulating emerging technologies and analyzing the impact of major regulations on the ability to sustainably balance innovation and risk. We believe that a comprehensive global effort is needed to harmonize these two principles, highlighting the imperative of responsible governance in steering the trajectory of this powerful scientific frontier. The insights gained from the Chinese experience offer valuable implications for global policymakers facing similar challenges.

4 July 2022 in Frontiers in Bioengineering and Biotechnology
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
Yang XueYang Xue
Yang Xue
LSLijun Shang
Lijun Shang
In this paper, we systematically investigated and assessed China’s evolving medical biotechnology legislative and regulatory regime. 89 laws, rules, measures, guidelines, and views from 1985 to 2022 were systematically analogized and 28 were found to be involved in medical biotechnology legislation, including the recently passed Biosecurity Law. We classified the legislations and performed a comparative analysis for their legal binding based on the legal subject and extent of application, then further analyzes some of the legislative challenges in governing medical biotechnology risks in the context of China’s upgrading its regulatory and legal regime in the last 3 years. We concluded that policymakers in China have now incorporated medical biotechnology-related biosafety and biosecurity into the national strategic goals of a “People-Centered” approach to establish and foster an ecological civilization, particularly in the aftermath of the “He Jiankui affair.” Instead of relying on a patchwork of existing regulations and measures relating to the emerging field of medical biotechnology, China is attempting to integrate a patchwork of existing regulations and measures into a comprehensive legal framework, such as the constitution, National Security Law, Biosecurity Law, administrative regulations, departmental and local rules, and has begun to use the Civil Code and Criminal Law to explicitly identify actions relating to medical biotechnology. In general, China follows the “precautionary principle” as it thinks that uncertainty in science and technology should not be used to justify delaying the adoption of measures to prevent injuries or dangers, stating that whoever advances biotechnology must face the burden of proof of no harm. There would be a need to impose oversight for prevention and precaution if any biotechnology breakthrough that carries risks on which no scientific consensus has been reached. We argued that the “top-down” formulation of general objectives by the active political leadership and “bottom-up” innovation in the implementation are the keys to achieving these goals. Given the rapid advancements in medical biotechnology, countries all over the world must examine the governance landscape around biosafety and biosecurity and quickly consider options for their own comprehensive, credible, and long-lasting regulatory frameworks and experiences learned from China’s governance will help chart a scalable future roadmap.

Yang XueYang Xue
Yang Xue
LSLijun Shang
Lijun Shang
To date, the controversy surrounding the unknown risks and consequences of heritable genome editing has grown, with such work raising biosafety and ethical concerns for future generations. However, the current guideline of global governance is limited. In the context of the new framework for the governance of human genome editing developed by the World Health Organization (WHO) committee, this paper presents further analysis by highlighting predicaments of governance on germline engineering that merit the most attention: (1) building a scientific culture informed by a broader set of values and considerations in the internal scientific community at large, such as codes of ethics, and education, in addition to awareness-raising measures; and (2) reflecting on and institutionalizing policies in grassroots practice according to local conditions in external governance, such as the experimentalist governance, which is a multi-layered model of governance that establishes an open-ended framework from the top and offers stakeholders the freedom of discussion. The key to achieving these goals is more democratic deliberation between the public and the inclusive engagement of the global scientific community, which has been extensively used in the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). On a global scale, we believe that practicing heritable human genome editing in accordance with the WHO and BTWC appears to be a good choice.

20 December 2021 in Sustainability
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
Yang XueYang Xue
Yang Xue
HYHanzhi Yu
Hanzhi Yu
Geng QinGeng Qin
Geng Qin
Dual-use biotechnology faces the risks of availability, novel biological agents, knowledge, normative, and other dual-use risks. If left unchecked, these may destroy human living conditions and social order. Despite the benefits of dual-use technology, good governance is needed to mitigate its risks. The predicaments facing all governments in managing the dual-use risks of biotechnology deserve special attention. On the one hand, the information asymmetry risk of dual-use biotechnology prevents the traditional self-governance model in the field of biotechnology from playing its role. On the other hand, top-down public regulation often lags behind technological iteration due to the difficulty of predicting the human-made risks of dual-use biotechnology. Therefore, we argue that governance of the dual-use risks of biotechnology should avoid the traditional bottom-up or top-down modes. We suggest the governance for dual-use biotechnology could be improved if the four-stage experimentalist governance model is followed. The first stage is to achieve consensus on a broad governance framework with open-ended principles. The second stage is for countries to take action based on local conditions and the open-ended framework. The third stage is to establish a dynamic consultation mechanism for transnational information sharing and action review. The fourth and final stage is to evaluate and revise the global governance framework.

15 October 2021 in Journal of Biosafety and Biosecurity
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
Yang XueYang Xue
Yang Xue
LSLijun Shang
Lijun Shang
WZWeiwen Zhang
Weiwen Zhang
The recent global COVID-19 pandemic has had profound economic and social impacts on the world. It has highlighted an urgent need to strengthen existing international biosecurity governance mechanisms to prevent the misuse and malicious abuse of life science research and maintain international biological arms control norms. Biologists are at the front line of biotechnology development and are key to maintaining biosecurity awareness and moral self-discipline. As an important first step, biologists need to actively participate in the formulation and implementation of relevant biosecurity policies and measures to ensure their effectiveness and sustainability. Furthermore, efforts should be made to advocate for and promote the establishment of an ethical code of conduct for biologists to share safety responsibilities for global biosecurity. To maximize the impact of this ethical code of conduct, an effective approach to implementing codes of conduct for biologists at both national and international levels should be established under the framework of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC).

10 October 2022 in Trends in Microbiology
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
GGGigi Kwik Gronvall
Gigi Kwik Gronvall
LWLeifan Wang
Leifan Wang
PMPeter F. McGrath
Peter F. McGrath
ACAnita J. Cicero
Anita J. Cicero
YYYingjin Yuan
Yingjin Yuan
MTMarc Trotochaud
Marc Trotochaud
The Tianjin Biosecurity Guidelines for Codes of Conduct for Scientists are a set of ten principles designed to promote responsible science and strengthen biosecurity governance. They should be broadly adopted, including being endorsed by the Biological Weapons Convention at its 9th Review Conference in November 2022.