Uniwersytet Warszawski

Prof. Uniwersytet Warszawski


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

18Years (2009-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

View All Publications
7 August 2014 in Journal of the European Economic Association
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
FVFerdinand M. Vieider
Ferdinand M. Vieider
MLMathieu Lefebvre
Mathieu Lefebvre
RBRanoua Bouchouicha
Ranoua Bouchouicha
TCThorsten Chmura
Thorsten Chmura
RHRustamdjan Hakimov
Rustamdjan Hakimov
PMPeter Martinsson
Peter Martinsson

1 February 2010 in Journal of Public Economics
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
UWUniwersytet Warszawski
Uniwersytet Warszawski

1 December 2010 in Experimental Economics
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
UWUniwersytet Warszawski
Uniwersytet Warszawski
FLFabrice Le Lec
Fabrice Le Lec
This paper reports the results of a ‘probabilistic dictator game’ experiment in which subjects were given an option to share chances to win a prize with a dummy player. Using a within-subject design we manipulated two aspects of the decision, the relative cost of sharing and the nature of the lottery: the draws were either independent for the two players (‘noncompetitive’ condition) or one's success meant other's failure (‘competitive’ condition). We also asked for decisions in a standard, non-probabilistic, setting. The main results can be summarized as follows: first, a substantial fraction of subjects do share chances to win, also in the competitive treatments, thus showing concern for the other player that cannot be explained by outcome-based models. Second, subjects share less in the competitive treatment than in other treatments, indicating that procedural fairness alone cannot explain the data. Overall, these results suggest that models aiming at generalizing social concerns to risky environments will have to rely on a mix of distributive and procedural fairness.

25 December 2009 in Theory and Decision
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
UWUniwersytet Warszawski
Uniwersytet Warszawski

1 May 2012 in Accountability in Research
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
UWUniwersytet Warszawski
Uniwersytet Warszawski
ERErnesto Reuben
Ernesto Reuben
This article reports results of a field experiment in which two hundred e-mails were sent to authors of recent articles in economics that had promised to send the interested reader supplementary material, such as alternative econometric specifications, “upon request.” The e-mails were sent either by a researcher affiliated at Columbia University, New York or the University of Warsaw, Poland; furthermore, the authors' position (assistant professor) was specified in half the e-mails only. Overall, 64% of the approached authors responded to our message, of which two thirds (44% of the entire sample) delivered the requested materials. The frequency and speed of responding and delivering were very weakly affected by the position and affiliation of the sender. Gender or affiliation of the author, number of citations or journal impact factor or the type of object in question seemed to make no difference. However, authors of published articles were much more likely to share than authors of working papers.

1 November 2016 in European Economic Review
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
UWUniwersytet Warszawski
Uniwersytet Warszawski
MSMagdalena Smyk
Magdalena Smyk