Julie Yew Li Chow

Dr. Julie Yew Li Chow

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Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

8Years (2019-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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28 January 2019 in Cognitive Research: Principles and Implications
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Journal Article
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JCJulie Yew Li Chow
Julie Yew Li Chow
BCBen Colagiuri
Ben Colagiuri
ELEvan Livesey
Evan Livesey
Illusory causation refers to a consistent error in human learning in which the learner develops a false belief that two unrelated events are causally associated. Laboratory studies usually demonstrate illusory causation by presenting two events—a cue (e.g., drug treatment) and a discrete outcome (e.g., patient has recovered from illness)—probabilistically across many trials such that the presence of the cue does not alter the probability of the outcome. Illusory causation in these studies is further augmented when the base rate of the outcome is high, a characteristic known as the outcome density effect. Illusory causation and the outcome density effect provide laboratory models of false beliefs that emerge in everyday life. However, unlike laboratory research, the real-world beliefs to which illusory causation is most applicable (e.g., ineffective health therapies) often involve consequences that are not readily classified in a discrete or binary manner. This study used a causal learning task framed as a medical trial to investigate whether similar outcome density effects emerged when using continuous outcomes. Across two experiments, participants observed outcomes that were either likely to be relatively low (low outcome density) or likely to be relatively high (high outcome density) along a numerical scale from 0 (no health improvement) to 100 (full recovery). In Experiment 1, a bimodal distribution of outcome magnitudes, incorporating variance around a high and low modal value, produced illusory causation and outcome density effects equivalent to a condition with two fixed outcome values. In Experiment 2, the outcome density effect was evident when using unimodal skewed distributions of outcomes that contained more ambiguous values around the midpoint of the scale. Together, these findings provide empirical support for the relevance of the outcome density bias to real-world situations in which outcomes are not binary but occur to differing degrees. This has implications for the way in which we apply our understanding of causal illusions in the laboratory to the development of false beliefs in everyday life.

4 May 2023 in Nutrients
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MKMichael D Kendig
Michael D Kendig
JCJulie Yew Li Chow
Julie Yew Li Chow
SMSarah I. Martire
Sarah I. Martire
Kieron RooneyKieron Rooney
Kieron Rooney
RBRobert Boakes
Robert Boakes
Background: Consumption of sugar-sweetened beverages (SSBs) forms the primary source of added sugar intake and can increase the risk of metabolic disease. Evidence from studies in humans and rodents also indicates that consumption of SSBs can impair performance on cognitive tests, but that removing SSB access can ameliorate these effects. Methods: The present study used an unblinded 3-group parallel design to assess the effects of a 12-week intervention in which young healthy adults (mean age = 22.85, SD = 3.89; mean BMI: 23.2, SD = 3.6) who regularly consumed SSBs were instructed to replace SSB intake with artificially-sweetened beverages (n = 28) or water (n = 25), or (c) to continue SSB intake (n = 27). Results: No significant group differences were observed in short-term verbal memory on the Logical Memory test or the ratio of waist circumference to height (primary outcomes), nor in secondary measures of effect, impulsivity, adiposity, or glucose tolerance. One notable change was a significant reduction in liking for strong sucrose solutions in participants who switched to water. Switching from SSBs to ‘diet’ drinks or water had no detectable impact on cognitive or metabolic health over the relatively short time frame studied here. This study was prospectively registered with the Australian New Zealand Clinical Trials Registry (ACTRN12615001004550; Universal Trial Number: U1111-1170-4543).

JCJulie Yew Li Chow
Julie Yew Li Chow
BCBen Colagiuri
Ben Colagiuri
BRBenjamin M. Rottman
Benjamin M. Rottman
MGMicah Goldwater
Micah Goldwater
ELEvan Livesey
Evan Livesey
Beliefs about cause and effect, including health beliefs, are thought to be related to the frequency of the target outcome (e.g., health recovery) occurring when the putative cause is present and when it is absent (treatment administered vs. no treatment); this is known as contingency learning. However, it is unclear whether unvalidated health beliefs, where there is no evidence of cause–effect contingency, are also influenced by the subjective perception of a meaningful contingency between events. In a survey, respondents were asked to judge a range of health beliefs and estimate the probability of the target outcome occurring with and without the putative cause present. Overall, we found evidence that causal beliefs are related to perceived cause–effect contingency. Interestingly, beliefs that were not predicted by perceived contingency were meaningfully related to scores on the paranormal belief scale. These findings suggest heterogeneity in pseudoscientific health beliefs and the need to tailor intervention strategies according to underlying causes.

1 July 2024 in Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition
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Closed access
JCJulie Yew Li Chow
Julie Yew Li Chow
JLJessica C. Lee
Jessica C. Lee
PLPeter F. Lovibond
Peter F. Lovibond
People often rely on the covariation between events to infer causality. However, covariation between cues and outcomes may change over time. In the associative learning literature, extinction provides a model to study updating of causal beliefs when a previously established relationship no longer holds. Prediction error theories can explain both extinction and protection from extinction when an inhibitory (preventive) cue is present during extinction. In three experiments using the allergist causal learning task, we found that protection could also be achieved by a hidden cause that was inferred but not physically present, so long as that cause was a plausible preventer of the outcome. We additionally showed complete protection by a physically presented cue that was neutral rather than inhibitory at the outset of extinction. Both findings are difficult to reconcile with dominant prediction error theories. However, they are compatible with the idea of theory protection, where the learner attributes the absence of the outcome to the added cue (when present) or to a hidden cause, and therefore does not need to revise causal beliefs about A. Our results suggest that prediction error encourages changes in causal beliefs, but the nature of the change is determined by reasoning processes that incorporate existing knowledge of causal mechanisms and may be biased toward preservation of existing beliefs. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

10 May 2024 in Open Mind
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JCJulie Yew Li Chow
Julie Yew Li Chow
MGMicah B. Goldwater
Micah B. Goldwater
BCBen Colagiuri
Ben Colagiuri
ELEvan J. Livesey
Evan J. Livesey
People tend to overestimate the efficacy of an ineffective treatment when they experience the treatment and its supposed outcome co-occurring frequently. This is referred to as the outcome density effect. Here, we attempted to improve the accuracy of participants’ assessments of an ineffective treatment by instructing them about the scientific practice of comparing treatment effects against a relevant base-rate, i.e., when no treatment is delivered. The effect of these instructions was assessed in both a trial-by-trial contingency learning task, where cue administration was either decided by the participant (Experiments 1 & 2) or pre-determined by the experimenter (Experiment 3), as well as in summary format where all information was presented on a single screen (Experiment 4). Overall, we found two means by which base-rate instructions influence efficacy ratings for the ineffective treatment: 1) When information was presented sequentially, the benefit of base-rate instructions on illusory belief was mediated by reduced sampling of cue-present trials, and 2) When information was presented in summary format, we found a direct effect of base-rate instruction on reducing causal illusion. Together, these findings suggest that simple instructions on the scientific method were able to decrease participants’ (over-)weighting of cue-outcome coincidences when making causal judgements, as well as decrease their tendency to over-sample cue-present events. However, the effect of base-rate instructions on correcting illusory beliefs was incomplete, and participants still showed illusory causal judgements when the probability of the outcome occurring was high. Thus, simple textual information about assessing causal relationships is partially effective in influencing people’s judgements of treatment efficacy, suggesting an important role of scientific instruction in debiasing cognitive errors.

6 January 2023 in Journal of Cognition
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JCJulie Yew Li Chow
Julie Yew Li Chow
JLJessica C. Lee
Jessica C. Lee
PLPeter F. Lovibond
Peter F. Lovibond
Influential models of causal learning assume that learning about generative and preventive relationships are symmetrical to each other. That is, a preventive cue directly prevents an outcome from occurring (i.e., "direct" prevention) in the same way a generative cue directly causes an outcome to occur. However, previous studies from our lab have shown that many participants do not infer a direct prevention causal structure after feature-negative discrimination (A+/AB-) with a unidirectional outcome (Lee & Lovibond, 2021). Melchers et al. (2006) suggested that the use of a bidirectional outcome that can either increase or decrease from baseline, encourages direct prevention learning. Here we test an alternative possibility that a bidirectional outcome encourages encoding of a generative relationship in the opposite direction, where B directly causes a decrease in the outcome. Thus, previous evidence of direct prevention learning using bidirectional outcomes may instead be explained by some participants inferring an "Opposite Causal" structure. In two experiments, participants did indeed report an opposite causal structure. In Experiment 1, these participants showed the lowest outcome predictions when B was combined with a novel cause in a summation test, and lowest outcome predictions when B was presented alone. In Experiment 2, B successfully blocked learning to a novel cue that was directly paired with a reduction in the outcome, and this effect was strongest among participants who endorsed an Opposite Causal structure. We conclude that previous evidence of direct prevention learning using bidirectional outcomes may be a product of excitatory rather than inhibitory learning.