Evan Livesey

Prof. Evan Livesey

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Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

20Years (2007-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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28 January 2019 in Cognitive Research: Principles and Implications
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Journal Article
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JCJulie Yew Li Chow
Julie Yew Li Chow
BCBen Colagiuri
Ben Colagiuri
ELEvan Livesey
Evan Livesey
Illusory causation refers to a consistent error in human learning in which the learner develops a false belief that two unrelated events are causally associated. Laboratory studies usually demonstrate illusory causation by presenting two events—a cue (e.g., drug treatment) and a discrete outcome (e.g., patient has recovered from illness)—probabilistically across many trials such that the presence of the cue does not alter the probability of the outcome. Illusory causation in these studies is further augmented when the base rate of the outcome is high, a characteristic known as the outcome density effect. Illusory causation and the outcome density effect provide laboratory models of false beliefs that emerge in everyday life. However, unlike laboratory research, the real-world beliefs to which illusory causation is most applicable (e.g., ineffective health therapies) often involve consequences that are not readily classified in a discrete or binary manner. This study used a causal learning task framed as a medical trial to investigate whether similar outcome density effects emerged when using continuous outcomes. Across two experiments, participants observed outcomes that were either likely to be relatively low (low outcome density) or likely to be relatively high (high outcome density) along a numerical scale from 0 (no health improvement) to 100 (full recovery). In Experiment 1, a bimodal distribution of outcome magnitudes, incorporating variance around a high and low modal value, produced illusory causation and outcome density effects equivalent to a condition with two fixed outcome values. In Experiment 2, the outcome density effect was evident when using unimodal skewed distributions of outcomes that contained more ambiguous values around the midpoint of the scale. Together, these findings provide empirical support for the relevance of the outcome density bias to real-world situations in which outcomes are not binary but occur to differing degrees. This has implications for the way in which we apply our understanding of causal illusions in the laboratory to the development of false beliefs in everyday life.

1 February 2021 in NeuroImage
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Journal Article
Open access
DTDominic M.D. Tran
Dominic M.D. Tran
NMNicolas A. McNair
Nicolas A. McNair
JHJustin A. Harris
Justin A. Harris
ELEvan Livesey
Evan Livesey
The brain's response to sensory input is modulated by prediction. For example, sounds that are produced by one's own actions, or those that are strongly predicted by environmental cues, elicit an attenuated N1 component in the auditory evoked potential. It has been suggested that this form of sensory attenuation to stimulation produced by one's own actions is the reason we are unable to tickle ourselves. Here we examined whether the neural response to direct stimulation of the brain is attenuated by prediction in a similar manner. Transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) applied over primary motor cortex can be used to gauge the excitability of the motor system. Motor-evoked potentials (MEPs), elicited by TMS and measured in peripheral muscles, are larger when actions are being prepared and smaller when actions are voluntarily suppressed. We tested whether the amplitude of MEPs was attenuated under circumstances where the TMS pulse can be reliably predicted, even though control of the relevant motor effector was never required. Self-initiation of the TMS pulse and reliable cuing of the TMS pulse both produced attenuated MEP amplitudes, compared to those generated programmatically in an unpredictable manner. These results suggest that predictive coding may be governed by domain-general mechanisms responsible for all forms predictive learning. The findings also have important methodological implications for designing TMS experiments that control for the predictability of TMS pulses.

13 July 2011 in Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics
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ELEvan Livesey
Evan Livesey
IHIrina M. Harris
Irina M. Harris

1 April 2014 in Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology
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Open access
ELEvan Livesey
Evan Livesey
DCDaniel S. J. Costa
Daniel S. J. Costa
The Perruchet effect refers to a dissociation between conscious expectation of an event and the strength or speed of the response elicited by that event, which is revealed through sequential analyses of consecutive trials. For instance in a cued go/no-go task, over a run of consecutive go responses, participants perform the go task with increasing speed but display decreasing expectancy of the go response when asked to rate the likelihood of its occurrence, in line with a gambler's fallacy. The effect has conventionally been shown in procedures that measure expectancy and responding in separate blocks of trials (separate measurement) or measure both on the same trial (concurrent measurement). Here we directly compared the trends produced in separate and concurrent measurement procedures, using single response and two-choice response procedures. While the single response showed the same trends regardless of measurement style, the Perruchet dissociation disappeared when concurrent measurement was used with the choice response task. Furthermore, in the concurrent measurement versions of both tasks, those participants who produced a consistent gambler's fallacy did not show the standard effects of positive recency that underpin the Perruchet effect in response time. The results suggest that explicit expectation of events and facilitation based on recent trial history have dissociable but competing effects on response performance.

1 July 2021 in The Journal of Pain
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Journal Article
Closed access
BCB. Colagiuri
B. Colagiuri
JPJ. Park
J. Park
KBKirsten Barnes
Kirsten Barnes
LSL. Sharpe
L. Sharpe
RBR.A. Boakes
R.A. Boakes
ELEvan Livesey
Evan Livesey

3 August 2018 in eLife
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
SOSean R O'BRyan
Sean R O'BRyan
DWDarrell A Worthy
Darrell A Worthy
ELEvan Livesey
Evan Livesey
TDTyler Davis
Tyler Davis
Extensive evidence suggests that people use base rate information inconsistently in decision making. A classic example is the inverse base rate effect (IBRE), whereby participants classify ambiguous stimuli sharing features of both common and rare categories as members of the rare category. Computational models of the IBRE have either posited that it arises from associative similarity-based mechanisms or dissimilarity-based processes that may depend upon higher-level inference. Here we develop a hybrid model, which posits that similarity- and dissimilarity-based evidence both contribute to the IBRE, and test it using functional magnetic resonance imaging data collected from human subjects completing an IBRE task. Consistent with our model, multivoxel pattern analysis reveals that activation patterns on ambiguous test trials contain information consistent with dissimilarity-based processing. Further, trial-by-trial activation in left rostrolateral prefrontal cortex tracks model-based predictions for dissimilarity-based processing, consistent with theories positing a role for higher-level symbolic processing in the IBRE.