In this paper, we adopt the bibliometric analysis software CiteSpace to analyze the research status quo and evolution trend of pickup and delivery problem (PDP), an important real-world issue occurring in logistics and transportation. We obtain 819 documents with the topic of PDP that were published in the Web of Science core collection during the period 1995–2021, and acquire their basic situation of posting trend and category distribution. Next, we employ CiteSpace to draw scientific knowledge maps and perform the corresponding visualization analysis, which mainly include the following aspects: (a) collaboration analysis of author, country, and institution; (b) co-citation analysis of author, journal, and reference; (c) citation burst detection of keyword; (d) co-citation clustering analysis of reference. The results show that PDP research has gradually become interdisciplinary and highly comprehensive, and the evolution trend of hot topics also reflects that the research directions involve multiple academic disciplines and professional areas ranging from algorithm design to logistics management. The changing knowledge components reveal the fact that the development of PDP research is highly related to the diversity and uncertainty of realistic logistics industry contexts. Study in this paper provides comprehensive understandings of PDP research for scholars and logistics practitioners, inspiring its further investigation.

The formal recycling of waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE) has long faced collection difficulties owing to the inadequate recycling system and insufficient collection capacity under China’s fund-based recycling model. The government has introduced the recycling Target Responsibility System (TRS) to motivate producers to develop and share recycling systems, yet without clear incentive mechanisms. In this study, we provide a “1 + N” shared recycling model referring to the theory of the sharing economy, and we propose a credit mechanism with a deposit system and a penalty mechanism for dishonesty to constrain the opportunistic behavior of sharing. In addition, according to the TRS, we design a “reduction-penalty-subsidy” fund policy to incentivize producers and recyclers to achieve recycling targets. On this basis, we apply evolutionary game theory and system dynamics approach to analyze the collaborative mechanism of shared recycling and the incentive effect of the funding policy. Game analysis yields the evolution of shared recycling from the developing stage to the mature stage. The system simulation results indicate that the government’s “penalty” and “subsidy” strategies provide evident incentives for producers and recyclers, respectively, in the developing stage, whereas endogenous dynamics derived from economies of scale under market mechanisms promote the multi-agent collaborative implementation of shared recycling in the mature stage.

This paper mainly aims at investigating the governments’ take-back policy of penalty or subsidy that motivates eco-design or remanufacturing. For this purpose, we consider a two-stage Stackelberg game between a government and a manufacturer. The government first decides to impose a take-back penalty or offer a take-back subsidy, and then the manufacturer selects to remanufacture or invest in eco-design as a response to the take-back policy. Upon analyzing and comparing game equilibrium, we find that the government prefers to offer a subsidy policy for eco-design and to impose a penalty policy for remanufacturing. The manufacturer will decide on investing in eco-design when the monetary value of the environmental impact of landfill and eco-design coefficient is medium. However, if the eco-design coefficient is high, the manufacturer practices remanufacturing instead of eco-design whether penalized and subsidized. The present study provides a set of guidelines in practical managerial recommendations for governments and manufacturers.

Governments of various countries have formulated relevant EPR environmental regulations for environmental pollution caused by electrical and electronic products, and enterprises mainly respond to this regulation through product ecodesign strategies. In view of this, this paper takes a three-stage supply chain system composed of a manufacturer, a retailer and a third-party recycler as the research object, and develops a demand-oriented product ecodesign strategy for five scenarios under different environmental regulations, including eco-input subsidy, sales subsidy, consumption subsidy and recycling subsidy. This study finds that the manufacturer does not actively engage in product ecodesign if the government does not implement subsidy policies; when the government implements subsidy policies such as eco-input subsidy, sales subsidy, or consumption subsidy, the manufacturer will design a high-level ecological product. However, under the recycling subsidy policy, the manufacturer will design a low-level ecological product. These results suggest that different subsidy policies may lead to different eco-product strategies of the manufacturer. In particular, the recycling subsidy policy can encourage a recycler to recycle actively, thus reducing the environmental pollution cost of a manufacturer, but the manufacturer is reluctant to improve the ecological level of the finished product.

Many companies make some stakeholders pleased but others cannot. To help understand why, it is very important to study the coexistence of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and corporate social irresponsibility (CSI). This paper considers a manufacturer with irresponsibility risk in a centralized and decentralized socially responsible supply chain, and uses a Stackelberg game to investigate the optimal policies on price and CSR investment level. This paper also examines the influence of consumer responsibility awareness and CSR investment efficiency on the decision behaviors of the manufacturer and retailer. Moreover, we developed a new mechanism to coordinate the decentralized supply chain system, which consists of the retailer participating in CSR and revenue sharing. Our results indicate that the manufacturer’s and retailer’s optimal decisions may not be significantly influenced by consumer responsibility awareness, but the effect of CSR investment efficiency is significant. Our results also show that if the degree of retailer participation and the proportion of revenue sharing are of moderate size, then not only can the contract mechanism coordinate the decentralized socially responsible supply chain, but it can ensure that a win–win situation can be achieved by the supply chain members.

In this paper, we employ a target-oriented approach to analyze the multi-attribute route choice decision of travelers in the stochastic tolled traffic network, considering the influence of three attributes, which are (stochastic) travel time, (stochastic) late arrival penalty, and (deterministic) travel cost. We introduce a target-oriented multi-attribute travel utility model for this analysis, where each attribute is assigned a target by travelers, and travelers’ objective is to maximize their travel utility that is determined by the achieved targets. Moreover, the interaction between targets is interpreted as complementarity relationship between them, which can further affect their travel utility. In addition, based on this travel utility model, a target-oriented multi-attribute user equilibrium model is proposed, which is formulated as a variational inequality problem and solved with the method of successive average. Target for travel time is determined via travelers’ on-time arrival probability, while targets for late arrival penalty and travel cost are given exogenously. Lastly, we apply the proposed model on the Braess and Nguyen–Dupuis traffic networks, and conduct sensitivity analysis of the parameters, including these three targets and the target interaction between them. The study in this paper can provide a new perspective for travelers’ multi-attribute route choice decision, which can further show some implications for the policy design.