This paper mainly aims at investigating the governments’ take-back policy of penalty or subsidy that motivates eco-design or remanufacturing. For this purpose, we consider a two-stage Stackelberg game between a government and a manufacturer. The government first decides to impose a take-back penalty or offer a take-back subsidy, and then the manufacturer selects to remanufacture or invest in eco-design as a response to the take-back policy. Upon analyzing and comparing game equilibrium, we find that the government prefers to offer a subsidy policy for eco-design and to impose a penalty policy for remanufacturing. The manufacturer will decide on investing in eco-design when the monetary value of the environmental impact of landfill and eco-design coefficient is medium. However, if the eco-design coefficient is high, the manufacturer practices remanufacturing instead of eco-design whether penalized and subsidized. The present study provides a set of guidelines in practical managerial recommendations for governments and manufacturers.

We extend the mental accounting perspective to build models on product quality matching strategy, which is effective in resolving the conflict between traditional and online channels. We consider that perceived values of high-quality and low-quality products belong to different mental accounts, and construct three product quality matching strategies for a dual-channel supply chain. Comparing the profit of each member, we find that (1) the strategy where the traditional channel distributes premium products, while the e-tailer sells low-quality products, is most conducive to the manufacturer; (2) the profit elasticity of the e-tailer is larger than that of the traditional retailer; (3) traditional retailers should sell more price elastic products, and e-tailers should sell the product with lower price elasticity; and (4) the manufacturer has more monopoly power if consumers have a higher degree of acceptance for the online channel that distributes premium products.

Using CiteSpace software and various statistical methods, this study analyzed 1000 pieces of literature from the Web of Science database spanning from 2012 to 2022. Through a visual econometric analysis of the existing research results, this study aimed to discern the research hotspots and development trends related to food banks. A visual map was constructed to highlight aspects, such as geographical distribution, author distribution, research fields, emerging words, and keyword clustering. The findings indicate that “food bank” is a burgeoning research direction within the realm of food loss and waste. Since 2012, there has been a consistent annual increase in the research output. Notably, there exists a collaborative dynamic among the authors, leading to the formation of a distinct core group. However, these collaborations tend to be localized, resulting in an overall low degree of cooperation. The prevailing research trends in this domain revolve around the challenges and synergies between food scarcity and food safety in food banks, strategies to ensure sustainable development of food banks, and methodologies to effectively evaluate their operational performance.

Many companies make some stakeholders pleased but others cannot. To help understand why, it is very important to study the coexistence of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and corporate social irresponsibility (CSI). This paper considers a manufacturer with irresponsibility risk in a centralized and decentralized socially responsible supply chain, and uses a Stackelberg game to investigate the optimal policies on price and CSR investment level. This paper also examines the influence of consumer responsibility awareness and CSR investment efficiency on the decision behaviors of the manufacturer and retailer. Moreover, we developed a new mechanism to coordinate the decentralized supply chain system, which consists of the retailer participating in CSR and revenue sharing. Our results indicate that the manufacturer’s and retailer’s optimal decisions may not be significantly influenced by consumer responsibility awareness, but the effect of CSR investment efficiency is significant. Our results also show that if the degree of retailer participation and the proportion of revenue sharing are of moderate size, then not only can the contract mechanism coordinate the decentralized socially responsible supply chain, but it can ensure that a win–win situation can be achieved by the supply chain members.