Background: Non-communicable diseases (NCDs) kill 41 million people a year. The products and services of unhealthy commodity industries (UCIs) such as tobacco, alcohol, ultra-processed foods and beverages and gambling are responsible for much of this health burden. While effective public health policies are available to address this, UCIs have consistently sought to stop governments and global organisations adopting such policies through what is known as corporate political activity (CPA). We aimed to contribute to the study of CPA and development of effective counter-measures by formulating a model and evidence-informed taxonomies of UCI political activity. Methods: We used five complementary methods: critical interpretive synthesis of the conceptual CPA literature; brief interviews; expert co-author knowledge; stakeholder workshops; testing against the literature. Results: We found 11 original conceptualisations of CPA; four had been used by other researchers and reported in 24 additional review papers. Combining an interpretive synthesis of all these papers and feedback from users, we developed two taxonomies – one on framing strategies and one on action strategies. The former identified three frames (policy actors, problem, and solutions) and the latter six strategies (access and influence policy-making, use the law, manufacture support for industry, shape evidence to manufacture doubt, displace, and usurp public health, manage reputations to industry’s advantage). We also offer an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of UCI strategies and a model that situates industry CPA in the wider social, political, and economic context. Conclusion: Our work confirms the similarity of CPA across UCIs and demonstrates its extensive and multi-faceted nature, the disproportionate power of corporations in policy spaces and the unacceptable conflicts of interest that characterise their engagement with policy-making. We suggest that industry CPA is recognised as a corruption of democracy, not an element of participatory democracy. Our taxonomies and model provide a starting point for developing effective solutions.

During the 1990s, states embraced legalised gambling as a means of supplementing state revenue. But gaming machines (EGMs, pokies, VLTs, Slots) have become increasingly controversial in countries such as Australia, Canada and New Zealand, which experienced unprecedented roll-out of gaming machines in casino and community settings; alongside revenue windfalls for both governments and the gambling industry. Governments have recognised that gambling results in a range of social and economic harms and, similar to tobacco and alcohol, have introduced public policies predicated on harm minimisation. Yet despite these, gaming losses have continued to climb in most jurisdictions, along with concerns about gambling-related harms. The first part of this article discusses an emerging debate in Ontario Canada, that draws parallels between host responsibility in alcohol and gambling venues. In Canada, where government owns and operates the gaming industry, this debate prompts important questions on the role of the state, duty of care and regulation ‘in the public interest’ and on CSR, host responsibility and consumer protection. This prompts the question: Do governments owe a duty of care to gamblers? The article then discusses three domains of accumulating research evidence to inform questions raised in the Ontario debate: evidence that visible behavioural indicators can be used with high confidence to identify problem gamblers on-site in venues as they gamble; new systems using player tracking and loyalty data that can provide management with high precision identification of problem gamblers and associated risk (for protective interventions); and research on technological design features of new generation gaming products in interaction with players, that shows how EGM machines can be the site for monitoring/protecting players. We then canvass some leading international jurisdictions on gambling policy CSR and consumer protection. In light of this new research, we ask whether the risk of legal liability poses a tipping point for more interventionist public policy responses by both the state and industry. This includes a proactive role for the state in re-regulating the gambling industry/products; instituting new forms of gaming machine product control/protection; and reinforcing corporate social responsibility (CSR) and host responsibility obligations on gambling providers – beyond self-regulatory codes. We argue the ground is shifting, there is new evidence to inform public policy and government regulation and there are new pressures on gambling providers and regulators to avail themselves of the new technology – or risk litigation.