In order to achieve the goal of "carbon neutral" development, under the conditions of carbon quota trading policy, consumers' preference for fresh agricultural products and low-carbon preference, this paper discusses the equilibrium decision-making problem of a two-level fresh agricultural products supply chain. And the cost sharing contract and the two-part pricing contract are introduced to coordinate the supply chain. The results show that: the fresh-keeping and low-carbon efforts made by fresh produce suppliers are related to consumers' preferences, fresh-keeping costs, low-carbon costs, fresh-keeping carbon emission factors, and carbon reduction efficiency; under certain conditions, both the cost sharing contract and the two-part pricing contract can coordinate the supply chain of fresh agricultural products; given certain costs and carbon reduction efficiency, which contract retailers choose depends on consumers' consumption preferences and the size of the supplier's initial carbon emissions; when both contracts are valid, it is more advantageous for the retailer to choose two-part pricing contract; the higher the carbon trading price, the better the incentive effect on suppliers' fresh-keeping efforts and low-carbon efforts.

The quality of agri-foods in e-supply chains confronts more threats than that in the traditional agri-food supply chain. However, most of the existing studies focusing on the quality problems of fresh agri-products are mainly cases studies and statistical analyses, and they do not take into account the farmers’ willingness to comply with safe agri-food supply procedures. To solve the supply quality problems of fresh agri-foods and help participators make a better choice, the decision-making behavior on the supply quality of agri-foods in the e-supply chain was deeply studied in this paper using game theory. Some factors related to the decision behavior of the supply chain were analyzed, including the supervision intension of the government, the rights protection consciousness of consumers, and the intensity of punishment for poor-quality agri-foods. These factors have an important influence on the farmers’ willingness to provide high-quality products and e-business’ probability of inspection. Compared with three different decision models of agri-food e-supply chains, the results show that the decentralized decision model is better than the centralized model from the view of quality protection. The behavior of members of the supply chain is as follows: the farmers’ willingness to supply high-quality agri-foods increases with the increase in the consumers’ consciousness of their rights and the government’s supervision intensity. The “experience deviation” phenomenon also occurs when a new e-business makes a decision about its quality inspection behavior in this e-supply chain where the quality information is traceable. As such, e-business enterprises should reduce their quality inspection behavior based on the increase in the government’s supervision intensity. This happens to be opposite to the traditional experience where quality information is not traceable. This study not only extends the research framework of the novel electronic supply chain, but also provides a certain reference for the subsequent research and e-business practices of fresh produce in developing countries.

Based on the realistic concerns about the improvement of the quality of agricultural foods (agri-foods), the optimal supply quality and price subsidy strategies of producers and sellers for the two-level agricultural supply chain, composed of a producer and a seller, are studied. The differences in the quality safety, price, and market demand of agri-foods in the supply chain are compared and analyzed. The study found that the maximum profit of supply chain participants decreases with the increase of price elasticity of demand. When the quality of agri-foods is upgraded in a producer-led manner, the quality of agri-foods in the supply chain does not undergo substantial improvement, and the maximum profit of agri-foods operators is insensitive to the price elasticity of demand at this time. When the seller-led quality upgrading is launched, the maximum profit of the producer decreases with the increase of the quality elasticity of demand, the maximum profit of the seller increases with the increase of the quality elasticity of demand, and the total profit of the supply chain also increases with the increase of the quality elasticity of demand under the centralized decision situation. The quality and safety of agri-foods as well as the overall profit of the supply chain can be improved most effectively under the centralized control decision with the goal of maximizing the supply chain benefits. In terms of quality and price, quality improvement actions of agri-foods driven by supply-side producers are less effective than those driven by demand-side consumption. In addition, cost-sharing contracts can significantly improve the quality of agri-foods in the supply chain and make them more “high-quality and low-price” than before the adoption of cost-sharing contracts.

This study undertakes a comprehensive analysis of vegetable production efficiency in China using input–output data from 30 provinces spanning 2011 to 2017. By incorporating environmental pollution costs as undesirable outputs alongside vegetable output value, we employ Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) with the Banker, Charnes, and Cooper (BCC) model and the Malmquist index model. Our assessment reveals both annual and inter-period efficiency changes. The findings highlight a modest overall efficiency in China’s vegetable production and significant regional disparities. Technical progress emerges as a pivotal determinant of total factor productivity (TFP). Recognizing these dynamics, we propose policy recommendations that prioritize technical innovation, sustainable practices, rural infrastructure enhancement, and specialized cultivation methods. Implementing these recommendations could bolster China’s position in international trade negotiations due to increased exports and potentially drive broader environmental policy reforms. As vegetable production becomes more efficient and sustainable, there might be a shift in labor needs, potentially leading to migration patterns or changes in employment structures. These insights contribute to the sustainable development of China’s vegetable industry, offering a broader understanding of the dynamics of agricultural efficiency in the context of environmental sustainability.

The use of multi-compartment vehicles (MCVs) in urban logistics distribution is increasing. However, urban traffic congestion causes high carbon emissions in the logistics distribution, resulting in unsustainable development in urban transportation. In addition, the application of the mixed carbon policy has gradually become the first choice for energy conservation and emission reduction in some countries and regions. The transportation industry is a major carbon-emitting industry, which needs to be constrained by carbon emission reduction policies. In this context, the research on the multi-compartment vehicle routing problem (MCVRP) considering traffic congestion under the mixed carbon policy is carried out. Firstly, a mathematical model of MCVRP considering traffic congestion under the mixed carbon policy is constructed. Secondly, a two-stage variable neighborhood threshold acceptance algorithm (VNS-TA) is proposed to solve the above mathematical model. Thirdly, 14 adapted standard examples of the MCVRP are used to verify the effectiveness and optimization ability of the two-stage VNS-TA algorithm. A simulation example of the MCVRP considering traffic congestion under the mixed carbon policy is used to conduct sensitivity analyses for different scenarios. Finally, the following conclusions are drawn: (1) the two-stage VNS-TA algorithm is effective and has strong optimization ability in solving the basic MCVRP, and (2) the two-stage VNS-TA algorithm can solve and optimize the MCVRP considering traffic congestion under the mixed carbon policy, which has the effects of cost saving and energy conservation and emission reduction.

Considering the carbon emissions caused by the fresh-keeping of fresh agricultural products, this paper studied the rules of fresh-keeping decision-making in the two-echelon fresh agricultural product supply chain led by suppliers under the carbon cap-and-trade policy. In addition, we designed two contracts, cost-sharing contract and two-part pricing contract, to coordinate the supplier’s fresh-keeping decision and the supply chain’s revenue. The results show that: whether the carbon cap-and-trade policy is implemented or not, the higher the consumer’s preference for freshness and the lower the price sensitivity coefficient of consumers, the more favorable it is for suppliers to improve their fresh-keeping efforts. Under the implementation of carbon cap-and-trade policy, suppliers’ fresh-keeping efforts are only related to the carbon transaction price, not the carbon cap; the higher the carbon transaction price, the less the supplier’s fresh-keeping efforts, but the more the supplier’s income; the smaller the cost coefficient of carbon emission reduction and the larger the coefficient of carbon emission reduction, the more favorable it is for suppliers to increase their fresh-keeping efforts; both cost-sharing contract and two-part pricing contract can coordinate the supply chain of fresh agricultural products, but they have different application scope and coordination effect. These conclusions are of great significance to the operation and management of fresh agricultural products suppliers, the improvement of consumers’ quality of life and the protection of ecological environment under carbon cap-and-trade.