Shopping on a live-streaming e-commerce platform has become a popular way of consumption. In this article, we build models to study the decision-making of online celebrity retailers (OCRs), taking into consideration consumers’ anticipated regret behaviors. We explore the OCRs optimal pricing and quality decisions under the basic models and further examine the OCRs sales efforts in the extended model. We investigate the impact of consumers’ anticipated regret behaviors on the OCRs profit. After that, we examine when the supply chain with the OCR can achieve the win–win outcome. To assess the robustness of the results, we conduct extensive numerical studies of the basic and extended models. We derive a counterintuitive result that negative consumers’ anticipated regret does not necessarily hurt the OCRs profit and consumer surplus. In addition, a low consumers’ search cost may instead lead to higher profit for the OCR. If the channel construction cost of the live-streaming platform is low, the OCRs product quality and price will decline. The OCRs costs of handling returns and maintaining sales channels can help the supply chain achieve the win–win outcome for both the OCR and consumers.

Blockchain technology has been adopted to improve traceability and authenticity in wine supply chains (WSCs). However, whether through outsourcing or self-implementation of a blockchain-based wine traceability system (BTS), there are significant costs involved, as well as concerns regarding consumer privacy. Motivated by observations of real-world practice, we explore the value of blockchain in enhancing traceability and authenticity in WSCs through a Stackelberg game-theoretical analysis. By comparing the equilibrium solutions of the scenarios with and without blockchain, we uncover the value of blockchain in tracing wine products. Our findings show that blockchain adoption can increase WSC prices under certain conditions. We derive the threshold for a third-party BTS service fee that determines blockchain adoption for tracing wine products and reveal the moderating effect of consumer traceability preferences and privacy concerns. Furthermore, the investigation of who should lead the implementation of BTS finds that the equal cost sharing between the manufacturer and the retailer results in no difference in BTS implementation leadership. Otherwise, the manufacturer always benefits from taking the lead in the implementation of BTS, and the retailer should undertake a leadership role in BTS implementation if they need to bear higher costs.

Live e‐commerce is one of the important forms of digital transformation of supply chain, which has become increasingly popular in recent years as a powerful tool for internet advertising, interaction, and merchandising. We propose two pricing models to examine the strategies of information disclosure and pricing within the live‐streaming supply chain. One model revolves around the agency framework, wherein the manufacturer determines the price while the streamer decides the level of information disclosure. The other model pertains to a self‐implementing framework, wherein the manufacturer determines both the level of information disclosure and the price. To evaluate the robustness of our findings, we extend our models to encompass three significant scenarios: (i) the platform involvement model, where a live‐streaming support platform becomes part of the supply chain; (ii) the fixed price model, which externalizes the manufacturer's pricing decision; and (iii) the dual‐channel operations model. Our analysis reveals that the cost associated with information disclosure impacts the streamer's profits in a nonlinear manner within the agency model. Interestingly, expanding the revenue‐sharing parameter does not invariably favor the manufacturer. Moreover, we observe that none of the live‐streaming sales models exhibits a clear advantage over the others. Additionally, we demonstrate that the platform's involvement limits the manufacturer's ability to utilize the agency model for live‐streaming sales. In situations with fixed pricing, the manufacturer is advised to disclose more production information during live‐streaming sales.