The social arrangement of organizations determines the potential possibilities of all group of agents in several economic and Operations Research (OR) situations. In this paper, a class of cooperative games in which agents with potential individual possibilities are connected via a hierarchy within an organization is studied. The leader, the agent, and any intermediate agents in the specified hierarchy constitute an important group refering to a peer group and form peer group situations. We consider uncertanty in payoffs in peer group situations. In the sequel peer group settings with fuzzy uncertainty are proposed. Further the associated games are modeled and some game-theoretical solution concepts are provided Futhermore, an application related with an auction situation is given. Finally, we conclude with some remarks and future work.

In this paper, we will analyze the phenomenon of strategic cooperation between companies competing with each other so far. The analysis will concern the real situation of establishing a strategic alliance between companies. The analysis will consist in assessing the effects of cooperation for each of the companies, depending on whether and in what composition the companies would decide to cooperate. For the analysis, we will use a mathematical model of a cooperative game with fuzzy characteristic functions. Finally, we propose fuzzy interval solutions are a timely extension to classical game theoretic solutions.

This paper deals with cost allocation problems arising from connection situations where edge costs are closed intervals of real numbers. To solve such problems, we extend to the interval uncertainty setting the obligation rules from the theory of minimum cost spanning tree problems, and study their cost monotonicity and stability properties. We also present an application to a simulated ad hoc wireless network using a software implementation of an appealing obligation rule, the P-value.