Stefano Moretti

Dr. Stefano Moretti

LAMSADE, CNRS, Paris-Dauphine University, Université PSL, 75016 Paris, France

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

17Years (2010-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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25 March 2020 in IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking
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Journal Article
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FFFrancesca Fossati
Francesca Fossati
Stefano MorettiStefano Moretti
Stefano Moretti
PPPatrice Perny
Patrice Perny
SSStefano Secci
Stefano Secci
Among the novelties introduced by 5G networks, the formalization of the 'network slice' as a resource allocation unit is an important one. In legacy networks, resources such as link bandwidth, spectrum, computing capacity are allocated independently of each other. In 5G environments, a network slice is meant to directly serve end-to-end services, or verticals: behind a network slice demand, a tenant expresses the need to access a precise service type, under a fully qualified set of computing and network requirements. The resource allocation decision encompasses, therefore, a combination of different resources. In this paper, we address the problem of fairly sharing multiple resources between slices, in the critical situation in which the network does not have enough resources to fully satisfy slice demands. We model the problem as a multi-resource allocation problem, proposing a versatile optimization framework based on the Ordered Weighted Average (OWA) operator, that takes into account different fairness approaches. We show how, adapting the OWA utility function, our framework can generalize classical single-resource allocation methods, existing multi-resource allocation solutions at the state of the art, and implement novel multi-resource allocation solutions. We compare analytically and by extensive simulations the different methods in terms of fairness and system efficiency.

3 September 2010 in Bioinformatics
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Stefano MorettiStefano Moretti
Stefano Moretti
VFVito Fragnelli
Vito Fragnelli
FPFioravante Patrone
Fioravante Patrone
Stefano BonassiStefano Bonassi
Stefano Bonassi
Motivation: The interpretation of gene interaction in biological networks generates the need for a meaningful ranking of network elements. Classical centrality analysis ranks network elements according to their importance but may fail to reflect the power of each gene in interaction with the others. Results: We introduce a new approach using coalitional games to evaluate the centrality of genes in networks keeping into account genes' interactions. The Shapley value for coalitional games is used to express the power of each gene in interaction with the others and to stress the centrality of certain hub genes in the regulation of biological pathways of interest. The main improvement of this contribution, with respect to previous applications of game theory to gene expression analysis, consists in a finer resolution of the gene interaction investigated in the model, which is based on pairwise relationships of genes in the network. In addition, the new approach allows for the integration of a priori knowledge about genes playing a key function on a certain biological process. An approximation method for practical computation on large biological networks, together with a comparison with other centrality measures, is also presented. Contact:stefano.moretti@dauphine.fr

12 October 2011 in Pediatric Blood & Cancer
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PSPaola Scaruffi
Paola Scaruffi
FMFabio Morandi
Fabio Morandi
FGFabio Gallo
Fabio Gallo
SSSara Stigliani
Sara Stigliani
SPStefano Parodi
Stefano Parodi
Maria Valeria CorriasMaria Valeria Corrias
Maria Valeria Corrias

7 June 2021 in Social Choice and Welfare
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Encarnación AlgabaEncarnación Algaba
Encarnación Algaba
Stefano MorettiStefano Moretti
Stefano Moretti
EREric Rémila
Eric Rémila
PSPhilippe Solal
Philippe Solal

16 February 2011 in Computers & Operations Research
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Stefano MorettiStefano Moretti
Stefano Moretti
SASirma Zeynep Alparslan-Gok
Sirma Zeynep Alparslan-Gok
RBRodica Branzei
Rodica Branzei
STStef Tijs
Stef Tijs
This paper deals with cost allocation problems arising from connection situations where edge costs are closed intervals of real numbers. To solve such problems, we extend to the interval uncertainty setting the obligation rules from the theory of minimum cost spanning tree problems, and study their cost monotonicity and stability properties. We also present an application to a simulated ad hoc wireless network using a software implementation of an appealing obligation rule, the P-value.

9 November 2018 in IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking
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Journal Article
Open access
FFFrancesca Fossati
Francesca Fossati
SHSahar Hoteit
Sahar Hoteit
Stefano MorettiStefano Moretti
Stefano Moretti
SSStefano Secci
Stefano Secci
In networking and computing, resource allocation is typically addressed using classical resource allocation protocols as the proportional rule, the max-min fair allocation, or solutions inspired by cooperative game theory. In this paper, we argue that, under awareness about the available resource and other users demands, a cooperative setting has to be considered in order to revisit and adapt the concept of fairness. Such a complete information sharing setting is expected to happen in 5G environments, where resource sharing among tenants (slices) need to be made acceptable by users and applications, which therefore need to be better informed about the system status via ad-hoc (northbound) interfaces than in legacy environments. We identify in the individual satisfaction rates the key aspect of the challenge of defining a new notion of fairness in systems with complete information sharing, consequently, a more appropriate resource allocation algorithm. We generalize the concept of user satisfaction considering the set of admissible solutions for bankruptcy games and we adapt to it the fairness indices. Accordingly, we propose a new allocation rule we call mood value: for each user, it equalizes our novel game-theoretic definition of user satisfaction with respect to a distribution of the resource. We test the mood value and a new fairness index through extensive simulations about the cellular frequency scheduling use-case, showing how they better support the fairness analysis. We complete the paper with further analysis on the behavior of the mood value in the presence of multiple competing providers and with cheating users.