Nowadays, Indonesian palm oil faces agrarian, environmental, and social issues and has been subject to sharp criticism from the international community for many years. To answer this problem, the Indonesian government implemented a strategy through certification which ensured the achievement of sustainability standards, especially on the upstream side of the palm oil supply chain. The implementation of Indonesian Sustainable Palm Oil (ISPO) was an ultimate instrument that applied in particular to smallholders oriented towards managing land legal issues, plantation business licenses, plant seeds, and environmental management and to farmer organizations at the local level. However, this process faced quite complex challenges in the form of structural barriers that are very constraining. This study revealed the occurrence of the phenomenon of hollow governance when regulations are absent or collide with each other. The study also revealed institutional power and multi-level governance that made the governance process ineffective or counterproductive. With a qualitative approach to research conducted in three important palm oil provinces of Indonesia, this article aims to look at the issues of oil palm governance a bit more comprehensively. The study conceptualized what was referred to as low-functioning governance to describe how weak the institutions, organizations, actors, and resources are that support ISPO implementation, especially at the regional and local levels. This paper suggests improving and strengthening the ISPO oil palm governance if Indonesian palm oil companies and smallholders want to gain better credibility on sustainability abroad.

The Indonesian Sustainable Palm Oil (ISPO) is a mandatory certification for palm oil plantations based on compliance with Indonesia’s regulations. Its implementation has been slow, particularly for independent smallholders that face problems of complicated requirements, limited capacity, and limited funding. Meanwhile, limited incentives are in place, either in the form of premium prices, ease of regulation, or funding. This article aims to elaborate on the role of incentives and their options in supporting the acceleration of ISPO implementation to ensure and improve the market access of smallholders. It identifies ways to develop incentives to facilitate the acceleration of ISPO certification and alternative financing sources available to support this. The method of this research is based on qualitative methodology using a literature review, policy document analysis, and in-depth interviews with informants from the government and smallholders. The analysis of this article shows that incentives are needed in the form of funding, regulatory measures, technical assistance, promotion, and rewards for good practices to provide better facilitation and financial support for the regulatory compliance in the legal, managerial and financial aspects of the ISPO. These incentives target government and smallholders. Implications for enabling these incentives include the improvement of government coordination, improved understanding of challenges faced by smallholders, and adoption of innovative approaches to manage financial resources, which are crucial to facilitate smallholders’ capacity and organizational improvement.

Sustainable palm oil certification has become a global demand, particularly in the market. However, the implementation of both Roundtable of Sustainable Palm Oli (RSPO) and Indonesian Sustainable Palm Oil (ISPO) certification schemes is relatively slow. This study aims to analyze to what extent incentives can accelerate sustainable palm oil certification, from what sources those incentives can be arranged, and types of incentives are appropriate for palm oil smallholders. The research uses quantitative and qualitative methods based on literature reviews, in-depth interviews with key stakeholders, and a survey of 455 farmers in two Indonesian provinces (Riau and West Kalimantan). Based on quantitative analysis, the reasons behind more progressive certification achievements in Riau remain unrevealed while in West Kalimantan, Fresh Fruit Bunches (FFB) price, easiness to obtaining loans with low interest, and easiness of selling FFB have a significant influence on accelerating certification. Using a qualitative approach, smallholders show their expectation of having incentives. In Riau, incentives expected are higher FFB prices and a simpler procedure to get the Environmental Management Statement (SPPL) document. In West Kalimantan, higher FFB prices and availability of low interest loans are expected to become incentives. These incentives can be mobilized from intergovernmental fiscal transfer mechanisms such as revenue-sharing mechanisms, export levies, and environmental funds. Smallholders also expect clarity of incentives generated from ISPO certification, particularly in price and market access, which requires the government’s initiative to develop synergy with various stakeholders. To be practical, incentives were not only for smallholders but also for the government officials at the province, district, and village levels, as the position of the local government is very important in preparing, encouraging, and mobilizing farmers, as well as in strengthening institutions for improving palm oil governance. In the implementation of RSPO certification, the collaboration between the Indonesian government (through the Ministry of Cooperatives and Small and Medium Enterprises) and the RSPO becomes clear evidence of central government support. At the sub-national level, the Riau and West Kalimantan Provinces have developed the Regional Action Plans (RAD) for sustainable palm oil as a policy commitment to accelerate both RSPO and ISPO certification.

The introduction of the European Union Green Deal in Southeast Asian countries represents international norm diffusion across interregional entities. While the normative idea is to address common sustainability challenges, the process encounters the complex political economic settings in Southeast Asian countries. The state of such a diffusion, furthermore, must be examined in terms of the deeper structural relations connecting the European Union (EU) and Southeast Asian countries, which are highly dependent on the international commodity production network. This chapter learns from how the European Union Deforestation-free Regulation, as part of the EU Green Deal, is encountering the historical production structure that is foundational to the emergence of palm oil commodification in Southeast Asian countries. Juxtaposing Amitav Acharya’s concept of constitutive localization and Robert Cox’s historical structure analysis, it identifies the micro, mezzo, and macro structure of palm oil as a strategic material base of the Southeast Asian countries that produce palm oil. These three layers of production structure are constitutive to the norm diffusion grounded in EU-Southeast Asian countries relations.