Jorgen Weibull

Dr. Jorgen Weibull


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

20Years (2007-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 January 2013 in Econometrica
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IAIngela Alger
Ingela Alger
JWJorgen Weibull
Jorgen Weibull
What preferences will prevail in a society of rational individuals when preference evolution is driven by the resulting payoffs? We show that when individuals' preferences are their private information, a convex combination of selfishness and morality stands out as evolutionarily stable. We call individuals with such preferences homo moralis. At one end of the spectrum is homo oeconomicus, who acts so as to maximize his or her own payoff. At the opposite end is homo kantiensis, who does what would be “the right thing to do,” in terms of payoffs, if all others would do likewise. We show that the stable degree of morality—the weight placed on the moral goal—is determined by the degree of assortativity in the process whereby individuals are matched to interact

22 June 2022 in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
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ZQZirou Qiu
Zirou Qiu
BEBaltazar Espinoza
Baltazar Espinoza
VVVitor V. Vasconcelos
Vitor V. Vasconcelos
CCChen Chen
Chen Chen
SCSara M. Constantino
Sara M. Constantino
MMMadhav V. Marathe
Madhav V. Marathe
Nonpharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) such as mask wearing can be effective in mitigating the spread of infectious diseases. Therefore, understanding the behavioral dynamics of NPIs is critical for characterizing the dynamics of disease spread. Nevertheless, standard infection models tend to focus only on disease states, overlooking the dynamics of “beneficial contagions,” e.g., compliance with NPIs. In this work, we investigate the concurrent spread of disease and mask-wearing behavior over multiplex networks. Our proposed framework captures both the competing and complementary relationships between the dueling contagion processes. Further, the model accounts for various behavioral mechanisms that influence mask wearing, such as peer pressure and fear of infection. Our results reveal that under the coupled disease–behavior dynamics, the attack rate of a disease—as a function of transition probability—exhibits a critical transition. Specifically, as the transmission probability exceeds a critical threshold, the attack rate decreases abruptly due to sustained mask-wearing responses. We empirically explore the causes of the critical transition and demonstrate the robustness of the observed phenomena. Our results highlight that without proper enforcement of NPIs, reductions in the disease transmission probability via other interventions may not be sufficient to reduce the final epidemic size.

11 March 2022 in Journal of Mathematical Economics
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LMLaurent Miclo
Laurent Miclo
DSDaniel Spiro
Daniel Spiro
JWJorgen Weibull
Jorgen Weibull

9 May 2008 in Economic Theory
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NVNicolas Vieille
Nicolas Vieille
JWJorgen Weibull
Jorgen Weibull

1 May 2015 in Econometrica
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RMRoger Myerson
Roger Myerson
JWJorgen Weibull
Jorgen Weibull

11 September 2017 in Games
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Journal Article
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IAIngela Alger
Ingela Alger
JWJorgen Weibull
Jorgen Weibull
Does altruism and morality lead to socially better outcomes in strategic interactions than selfishness? We shed some light on this complex and non-trivial issue by examining a few canonical strategic interactions played by egoists, altruists and moralists. By altruists, we mean people who do not only care about their own material payoffs but also about those to others, and, by a moralist, we mean someone who cares about own material payoff and also about what would be his or her material payoff if others were to act like himself or herself. It turns out that both altruism and morality may improve or worsen equilibrium outcomes, depending on the nature of the game. Not surprisingly, both altruism and morality improve the outcomes in standard public goods games. In infinitely repeated games, however, both altruism and morality may diminish the prospects of cooperation, and to different degrees. In coordination games, morality can eliminate socially inefficient equilibria while altruism cannot.