What preferences will prevail in a society of rational individuals when preference evolution is driven by the resulting payoffs? We show that when individuals' preferences are their private information, a convex combination of selfishness and morality stands out as evolutionarily stable. We call individuals with such preferences homo moralis. At one end of the spectrum is homo oeconomicus, who acts so as to maximize his or her own payoff. At the opposite end is homo kantiensis, who does what would be “the right thing to do,” in terms of payoffs, if all others would do likewise. We show that the stable degree of morality—the weight placed on the moral goal—is determined by the degree of assortativity in the process whereby individuals are matched to interact
15 June 2013 in Review of Economics of the Household
Paternal provisioning among humans is puzzling because it is rare among primates and absent in nonhuman apes and because emergent provisioning would have been subject to paternity theft. A provisioning “dad” loses fitness at the hands of nonprovisioning, mate-seeking “cads.” Recent models require exacting interplay between male provisioning and female choice to overcome this social dilemma. We instead posit that ecological change favored widespread improvements in male provisioning incentives, and we show theoretically how social obstacles to male provisioning can be overcome. Greater availability of energetically rich, difficult-to-acquire foods enhances female–male and male–male complementarities, thus altering the fitness of dads versus cads. We identify a tipping point where gains from provisioning overcome costs from paternity uncertainty and the dad strategy becomes viable. Stable polymorphic states are possible, meaning that dads need not necessarily eliminate cads. Our simulations suggest that with sufficient complementarities, dads can emerge even in the face of high paternity uncertainty. Our theoretical focus on ecological change as a primary factor affecting the trade-off between male mating and parenting effort suggests different possibilities for using paleo-climatic, archaeological, and genomic evidence to establish the timing of and conditions associated with emergence of paternal provisioning in the hominin lineage.
20 March 2023 in Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
The 50-year old concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy provided a key tool for theorists to model ultimate drivers of behaviour in social interactions. For decades, economists ignored ultimate drivers and used models in which individuals choose strategies based on their preferences—a proximate mechanism for behaviour—and the distribution of preferences in the population was taken to be fixed and given. This article summarizes some key findings in the literature on evolutionarily stable preferences, which in the past three decades has proposed models that combine the two approaches: individuals inherit their preferences, the preferences determine their strategy choices, which in turn determine evolutionary success. One objective is to highlight complementarities and potential avenues for future collaboration between biologists and economists. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Half a century of evolutionary games: a synthesis of theory, application and future directions’.
Does altruism and morality lead to socially better outcomes in strategic interactions than selfishness? We shed some light on this complex and non-trivial issue by examining a few canonical strategic interactions played by egoists, altruists and moralists. By altruists, we mean people who do not only care about their own material payoffs but also about those to others, and, by a moralist, we mean someone who cares about own material payoff and also about what would be his or her material payoff if others were to act like himself or herself. It turns out that both altruism and morality may improve or worsen equilibrium outcomes, depending on the nature of the game. Not surprisingly, both altruism and morality improve the outcomes in standard public goods games. In infinitely repeated games, however, both altruism and morality may diminish the prospects of cooperation, and to different degrees. In coordination games, morality can eliminate socially inefficient equilibria while altruism cannot.
13 June 2023 in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
How did humans evolve from individualistic to collective foraging with sex differences in production and widespread sharing of plant and animal foods? While current evolutionary scenarios focus on meat, cooking, or grandparental subsidies, considerations of the economics of foraging for extracted plant foods (e.g., roots, tubers), inferred to be important for early hominins (∼6 to 2.5 mya), suggest that early hominins shared such foods with offspring and others. Here, we present a conceptual and mathematical model of early hominin food production and sharing, prior to the emergence of frequent hunting, cooking, and increased lifespan. We hypothesize that extracted plant foods were vulnerable to theft, and that male mate guarding protected females from food theft. We identify conditions favoring extractive foraging and food sharing across mating systems (i.e., monogamy, polygyny, promiscuity), and we assess which system maximizes female fitness with changes in the profitability of extractive foraging. Females extract foods and share them with males only when: i) extracting rather than collecting plant foods pays off energetically; and ii) males guard females. Males extract foods when they are sufficiently high in value, but share with females only under promiscuous mating and/or no mate guarding. These results suggest that if early hominins had mating systems with pair-bonds (monogamous or polygynous), then food sharing by adult females with unrelated adult males occurred before hunting, cooking, and extensive grandparenting. Such cooperation may have enabled early hominins to expand into more open, seasonal habitats, and provided a foundation for the subsequent evolution of human life histories.