Luyi Qiu

Dr. Luyi Qiu

orcid

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

5Years (2022-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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19 October 2022 in Journal of the Knowledge Economy
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
XWXuhui Wang
Xuhui Wang
SZShengtai Zhang
Shengtai Zhang
LQLuyi Qiu
Luyi Qiu
GZGuoquan Zhang
Guoquan Zhang
NLNa Liu
Na Liu

10 April 2023 in Sustainable Development
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
KNKunying Niu
Kunying Niu
WHWei He
Wei He
LQLuyi Qiu
Luyi Qiu

24 February 2025 in Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
YDYing Dong
Ying Dong
SZSun Zhongyuan
Sun Zhongyuan
LQLuyi Qiu
Luyi Qiu
The tripartite evolutionary game model focuses on the strategic choices and evolutionary laws of three parties in dynamic interaction. By constructing a tripartite evolutionary game model involving the government, Enterprise A, and Enterprise B, this paper analyzes the strategic choices of enterprise data sharing from the perspective of government regulation and uses the simulation method to assign and simulate the parameters of the model. Furthermore, the evolutionary trends of the behavioral strategies of the three parties are analyzed under the changes of factors such as the government’s regulation costs, government penalties, government rewards, and the compensation fees for enterprises to obtain shared data. The findings indicate that when the benefits obtained by enterprises from data sharing are relatively high, and the compensation fees incurred by enterprises to obtain the other party’s data are sufficient to compensate for the losses caused by the other party’s data sharing, enterprises will tend to choose “data-sharing”. At this time, the combined strategy of “no-regulation, data-sharing, data-sharing” reaches an equilibrium point. In this combination strategy, the initial willingness of the government and enterprises will not affect the final evolutionary result. The government’s regulation costs, government penalties, and government rewards will not affect the final behavioral strategy evolutionary result for the government and enterprises. However, the compensation fees for enterprises to obtain shared data will affect the final evolutionary direction of the three parties. When the compensation fees for enterprises to obtain shared data are low, enterprises are more inclined toward “no-data-sharing”.

20 July 2023 in Sustainability
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Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
LQLuyi Qiu
Luyi Qiu
KNKunying Niu
Kunying Niu
WHWei He
Wei He
YHYaqi Hu
Yaqi Hu
Carbon neutrality attracts worldwide attention due to its significance and urgency. Anthropogenic emission reduction and terrestrial ecosystem carbon sinks are the two main paths to achieve the goal of carbon neutrality. However, in current studies, both are usually regarded as independent systems to conduct separate carbon function research. It is necessary to compare their contributions across sectors within the same emission reduction framework. Therefore, the paper takes Chongqing, China as an example and applies the carbon coefficient method to compare terrestrial ecosystem carbon sinks with anthropogenic carbon emissions in the same land structure and carbon sectors. Then, the scenario assumption is adopted to assess their contribution and impact in 2030 and 2060 to achieve carbon neutrality. Several conclusions are drawn: (1) Terrestrial ecosystem carbon sinks offset 3.45% of anthropogenic emissions in 2018, of which forest ecosystems contributed significantly. (2) Construction land played a decisive role in carbon emissions, which are constantly consolidated and deepened. Fossil energy is the main carbon source. (3) All scenarios can reduce emissions. The effect of energy structure transformation is the most prominent, but the benefits of expanding forest area and reducing waste disposal are small.

1 April 2026 in Journal of Water Resources Planning and Management
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
KNKunying Niu
Kunying Niu
WHWei He
Wei He
XZXin Zhang
Xin Zhang
LQLuyi Qiu
Luyi Qiu