As the core driving force of the new generation of industrial revolution, artificial intelligence technology has brought new opportunities for empowering enterprise innovation and advancing sustainability. Focusing on Chinese A-share listed enterprises and based on the unbalanced panel data from 2011 to 2023, this study systematically examines the relationship mechanism between artificial intelligence (AI) application and enterprise breakthrough innovation, and further explores the mediating effect of knowledge recombination and the moderating role of market competition. The empirical results show that AI application has a significant promoting effect on the enterprise breakthrough innovation. Knowledge recombination creation and knowledge recombination reuse play mediating roles in the relationship between the AI application and enterprise breakthrough innovation, forming the key transmission path for empowering breakthrough innovation with AI. In addition, market competition positively moderates the relationship between knowledge recombination and enterprise breakthrough innovation and strengthens the driving effect of knowledge recombination on innovation output, thus fostering more sustainable competitive advantages.
The tripartite evolutionary game model focuses on the strategic choices and evolutionary laws of three parties in dynamic interaction. By constructing a tripartite evolutionary game model involving the government, Enterprise A, and Enterprise B, this paper analyzes the strategic choices of enterprise data sharing from the perspective of government regulation and uses the simulation method to assign and simulate the parameters of the model. Furthermore, the evolutionary trends of the behavioral strategies of the three parties are analyzed under the changes of factors such as the government’s regulation costs, government penalties, government rewards, and the compensation fees for enterprises to obtain shared data. The findings indicate that when the benefits obtained by enterprises from data sharing are relatively high, and the compensation fees incurred by enterprises to obtain the other party’s data are sufficient to compensate for the losses caused by the other party’s data sharing, enterprises will tend to choose “data-sharing”. At this time, the combined strategy of “no-regulation, data-sharing, data-sharing” reaches an equilibrium point. In this combination strategy, the initial willingness of the government and enterprises will not affect the final evolutionary result. The government’s regulation costs, government penalties, and government rewards will not affect the final behavioral strategy evolutionary result for the government and enterprises. However, the compensation fees for enterprises to obtain shared data will affect the final evolutionary direction of the three parties. When the compensation fees for enterprises to obtain shared data are low, enterprises are more inclined toward “no-data-sharing”.