Document embargo till 13/10/2016.This paper reviews the state of the art in cyber security risk assessment of Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems. We select and in-detail examine twenty-four risk assessment methods developed for or applied in the context of a SCADA system. We describe the essence of the methods and then analyse them in terms of aim; application domain; the stages of risk management addressed; key risk management concepts covered; impact measurement; sources of probabilistic data; evaluation and tool support. Based on the analysis, we suggest an intuitive scheme for the categorisation of cyber security risk assessment methods for SCADA systems. We also outline five research challenges facing the domain and point out the approaches that might be taken.authorsversionPeer reviewe
Information Assurance & Security (IAS) is a dynamic domain which changes continuously in response to the evolution of society, business needs and technology. This paper proposes a Reference Model of Information Assurance & Security (RMIAS), which endeavours to address the recent trends in the IAS evolution, namely diversification and deperimetrisation. The model incorporates four dimensions: Information System Security Life Cycle, Information Taxonomy, Security Goals and Security Countermeasures. In addition to the descriptive knowledge, the RMIAS embeds the methodological knowledge. A case study demonstrate show the RMIAS assists with the development and revision of an Information Security Policy Document.
A key purpose of a Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system is to enable either an on-site or remote supervisory control and monitoring of physical processes of various natures. In order for a SCADA system to operate safely and securely, a wide range of experts with diverse backgrounds must work in close rapport. It is critical to have an overall view of an entire system at a high level of abstraction which is accessible to all experts involved, and which assists with gauging and assessing risks to the system. Furthermore, a SCADA system is composed of a large number of interconnected technical and non-technical sub-elements, and it is crucial to capture the dependencies between these sub-elements for a comprehensive and rigorous risk assessment. In this paper, we present a generic configurable dependency model of a SCADA system which captures complex dependencies within a system and facilitates goal-oriented risk assessment. The model was developed by collecting and analysing the understanding of the dependencies within a SCADA system from 36 domain experts. We describe a methodology followed for developing the dependency model, present an illustrative example where the generic dependency model is configured for a SCADA system controlling water distribution, and outline an exemplary risk assessment process based on it.
This paper investigates the use of gamification and game-based learning in the field of cybersecurity education. Due to their technical complexity and lack of coherence, traditional pedagogical methods, such as lectures, may fail to engage and inspire students, especially those from non-cyber backgrounds. To address this issue, we devised two distinct cybersecurity frameworks/games based on traditional Capture The Flag (CTF) competitions; an open-ended CTF event and a story-based CTF. Such games have demonstrated potential across multiple disciplines, including computer science, physics, mathematics, and engineering, as well as across multiple levels of study including undergraduate and postgraduate students. The positive feedback and significant increase in the interest to pursue a postgraduate course in cybersecurity, especially among non-cybersecurity students, attest to the success of this gamification strategy. As such, this paper provides valuable insights for enhancing the attractiveness and efficacy of cybersecurity education, thereby encouraging a broader spectrum of non-technical and non-cybersecurity students to pursue this crucial field.