Despite increasing interest, a lack of comprehensive knowledge regarding the efficient design and implementation of carbon farming schemes remains. These schemes must efficiently achieve higher carbon sequestration, incentivize farmers, and increase farmers' participation in global carbon markets. Our study systematically reviews, describes, and maps available evidence related to carbon farming contracts to assess different incentive mechanisms for carbon farming. We conduct a systematic mapping review of articles extracted from various databases employing the Collaboration for Environmental Evidence method. We shortlist 52 articles and analyze about 40 global case studies, identifying three main incentive mechanisms of carbon farming contracts, namely, result-based, action-based, and hybrid payments. We examine how these incentive mechanisms are designed, in addition to associated payment types, monitoring approaches, and barriers to implementation. Result-based payments include stringent monitoring and can be implemented through auctions, carbon credits, product labels or certificates. Action-based payments are found to be simpler, with lower monitoring requirements for farmers and can be paid upfront or after contract implementation. Hybrid payments combine both techniques, offering low-risk and guaranteed payments for farmers and definite environmental mitigation impacts. Result-based and hybrid payments motivate farmers to innovate to meet environmental objectives while also connecting them to carbon markets. The major challenges to developing a successful carbon farming project include lack of permanence, non-additionality, and the absence of stringent monitoring, reporting, and verification standards, all of which affect farmers' incentives. This study determines that carbon farming contract design and efficiency can be improved by analyzing the lessons learned from previous experiences. By examining and improving the attributes that define different incentive mechanisms, farmers can be better motivated to enroll in carbon farming schemes and benefit from increased access to carbon markets to potentially transform agriculture into a viable tool for climate action.

Agri-environmental policies and planning influence agricultural landscape management, and thus the capacity to deliver landscape services and to contribute to rural viability. Numerous models and frameworks have been developed to improve comprehension of the mechanisms and interrelationships between policies, landscape and socio-economic values and benefits. As social-ecological systems, landscapes are closely depending from the socio-institutional and territorial context of the specific rural locality. The paper proposes an enhanced framework for assessing these mechanisms by acknowledging the critical role of the regional macro-environment. A literature review and the revisiting of evidence from eight European case studies are applied to establish a comprehensive understanding and exemplification of the links between the policies, landscape, ecosystem services and value flows. Results highlight the need for integrative, inter- and transdisciplinary research approaches. Efficient landscape policies require enhanced regional embeddedness and targeting, acknowledgement of user demands and the capability of regional community and governance structures for policy implementation and natural capital valorisation

Contract attributes are strong motivators for eliciting farmers’ preferences for a particular agri-environmental scheme. Our study aims to conduct a systematic literature review to highlight the attributes used in choice experiment studies of agri-environmental schemes using the PRISMA framework. We obtained 34 studies for an in-depth review, through which we extracted 32 attributes that were classified into five typologies: ‘monetary’ (7 attributes), ‘general’ (4 attributes), ‘flexibility’ (6 attributes), ‘prescription’ (12 attributes), and ‘purpose’ (3 attributes). Though monetary attributes should theoretically define farmers’ choices; general design and flexibility attributes are more critical for farmers’ participation and willingness to accept. The study also discusses the lesser-used attributes that could be potentially explored in future studies. Thus, our review can be used as a reference by future AES studies to select their bundle of choice attributes and test with a broader range of attributes in their choice experiments.

A large share of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is allocated to agri-environmental schemes (AESs), whose goal is to foster the provision of a wide range of environmental public goods. Despite this effort, little is known on the actual environmental and economic impact of the AESs, due to the non-experimental conditions of the assessment exercise and several data availability issues. The main objective of the paper is to explore the feasibility of combining the non-parametric statistical matching (SM) method and propensity score matching (PSM) counterfactual approach analysis and to test its usefulness and practicability on a case study represented by selected impacts of the AESs in Emilia-Romagna. The work hints at the potentialities of the combined use of SM and PSM as well as of the systematic collection of additional information to be included in EU-financed project surveys in order to enrich and complete data collected in the official statistics. The results show that the combination of the two methods enables us to enlarge and deepen the scope of counterfactual analysis applied to AESs. In a specific case study, AESs seem to reduce the amount of rent-in land and decrease the crop mix diversity.

A growing body of literature shows that full-cooperation among farmers to manage productive ecosystem services would yield gains with respect to uncoordinated approaches. The public good feature of these ecosystem services may, however, hinder the emergence of a cooperative solution at the landscape scale. In this paper, we introduce in a coalition formation game a spatially-explicit bioeconomic model of fruit pollination, where pollinaton depends on the distance to the choosen location of natural habitats. We analyse: (i) which coalitions are stable; (ii) what benefits they provide; (iii) how cooperation depends on the initial landscape structure; and (iv) how policy instruments affect cooperation. The theoretical model presents the rationality of cooperation but, due to the detailed heterogeneity and complex spatial interactions among farms, we use a numerical example to determine the stable coalitions. We find that only small coalitions are stable and that the benefits of cooperation decrease when the spatial autocorrelation of fruit tree covers increase. Policy instruments can increase the interest for cooperation but per-hectare payments and minimum participation rules may reduce the habitat area at the margin (by decreasing the stability of coalitions). Price premium for the coalition members increase the habitat area but its budget-effectiveness decreases as the spatial autocorrelation of fruit tree covers increase.