In his search for the ‘essence’ of continuity, Richard Dedekind (1872) discovered the notion of cut. Epistemologically speaking, a cut produces a separation of a simply infinite system into two parts (Stücke) such that all the elements of one part are screened off all the elements of the other. The distinct continuity of a two-state quantum system is encapsulated in the notion of qubit, the basic ‘unit’ of quantum information. A qubit secures an infinite amount of information, which, however, appears to be only penetrable through ‘sections’ of classical bits. Whereas Dedekind’s cuts dwell on the discrete of number theory, the theory of nature is primarily concerned with continuous transformations. In contrast with Dedekind’s line of thought, could the notion of information be derived from a ‘principle’ of continuity?
Despite its extraordinary predictive power, quantum mechanics has been hailed as a paradoxical, self-contradictory theory of nature. How does it question the intelligibility of physical worldview? The wave-particle dualism, the incompatibility of physical quantities, the complementarity between the space-time description and the causal description of phenomena question key-notions of the traditional metaphysics, such as substance and cause, but they also call attention to the vital dialectical contrast between the continuous and the discrete, the infinite and the finite, consciousness and matter, and to the essential relational character of measuring, seeing, and knowing. Does quantum physics also question the Western way of thinking? The aim of this article is to show how quantum monadology not only breathes new life into Leibniz’s and Nicholas of Cusa’s monads, but also echoes Nishida’s ‘dialectical monadology’ and orients our gaze towards a metaphysics of universal harmony, i.e., a metaphysics of the dialectical universal or a metaphysics of indeterminacy.
The ambition to invent a machine for the “perfect imitation” of the mind appears to flow, by logical consequence, from the invention of machinery for the “perfect imitation” of nature. From perspective drawing to photography, the Western science of art has taken advantage of mechanical means, such as lenses and mirrors, to replicate our visual experience of nature. Its main concern has always been to capture the “magic” of nature into the “synthetic instant” of a picture. Indeed, the main achievement of visual art might be described as sight enhancing. In a similar way, the science of logic has taken outstanding advantage of computing machines to simulate our experience of thought, where the main goal appears to be nothing more than to recreate the nature of the mind in the form of a sort of artificial magic. How else might we pursue the simulation of human thought, and to what extent can the cognitive experience of information processing be regarded as thought enhancing?
One of Wittgenstein’s most quoted passages from his Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology concerns Turing’s “machines” and says verbatim: “These machines are humans who calculate. And one might express what he [Turing] says also in the form of games.” This passage not only captures the kernel of Turing’s conceptual argument for the adequacy of his definition of “computability”, as presented in his article On Computable Numbers (1936), but also helps clarify Turing’s idea of “mechanical intelligence.” Indeed, the notion of game provides an ideal means to focus on similarities and differences between Turing and Wittgenstein’s views of mechanical procedures, mathematical understanding, and thinking activity. The live encounter between Ludwig Wittgenstein and Alan Turing took place in Cambridge in 1939, when Wittgenstein’s Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics were regularly attended by Turing. Interestingly, during the conversations between the two, Turing seems to play the role of the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus, to allow the present Wittgenstein to reassess what he deplores as mistaken or misleading in his early work. As for Turing himself, his reflection on thinking machines from the late 1940s demonstrates the significance of his dialogue with Wittgenstein.