The behaviors of urban residents in terms of waste separation at source are crucial to achieve the reduction and recycling of waste in urban governance. In this study, the data were collected from 1008 respondents in Shaanxi province, the host of China’s 14th National Games; theoretical and empirical analyses were conducted to determine the factors influencing waste separation behaviors, and specific policy suggestions are proposed. The results show that the waste separation behaviors of urban residents are positively influenced by their cognition of waste pollution, ecological values, sense of social responsibility, perceived knowledge, and perceived utilities of waste separation. Moreover, the residents’ waste separation intentions partially mediate the relationships between their cognition of waste pollution, ecological values, perceived utilities, and waste separation behaviors, which almost totally mediate the relationship between their sense of social responsibility and waste separation behaviors. In addition, it was shown that the cost of waste separation can weaken the effect of waste separation intention on behavior, while waste separation facilities, social norms, and the publicity for China’s 14th National Games have the opposite effect. Finally, policy suggestions are proposed to encourage urban residents to adopt waste separation behaviors, contributing to transforming Shaanxi into a zero-waste province.

The relation between two most important players, enterprises and certification bodies, of quality certification market are analyzed by building two-person game second-hand car trade model with two prices in this paper. By introducing a virtual player, the incomplete information game can be transformed into the complete but imperfect information game. Then some conclusions are given: there have two methods to make market succeed absolutely, (1) to eliminate the information's imperfection; (2) to increase the counterfeit cost. And by introducing the double-price second-hand car model with refundment guarantee of enterprises and certification bodies further, the author thinks it will increase counterfeit cost greatly to oblige certification bodies make actual quality promises and take on related liability to some extent. This kind of expensive commitment will make market succeed absolutely; accordingly it can increase and improve the effectiveness of quality certification, and the authority, justness and objectivity will be guaranteed further.

Problems of collusion and collusion-proof equilibrium on the quality management system certification (QMSC) market in China are discussed in this paper. Firstly, three situations of producing collusion on QMSC market are given. The behavior and its harms of collusion are analyzed from four aspects. Then the intrinsic mechanism of collusion-formed is opened out by building a three-player principal-agent model of CNCA, certification bodies and enterprises. By the model, the game mechanism of forming collusion-proof equilibrium on QMSC market is given. Based on the model analysis, this paper gives four pieces of advice to prevent collusion: (1) to increase the expectation value of punishing collusion behaviors; (2) to decrease the expectation payoff in the condition of collusion; (3) to increase the expected payoff of certificating for certification bodies with good faith; (4) enterprises have nonparticipation with collusion. Finally, four conclusions are given out