In the context of the rapid development of new media such as network citizen journalism, it is of great theoretical and practical significance to use the online public opinion to supervise sewage discharge enterprises’ emission governance behaviors and improve the social opinion supervision mechanism. This paper considers the dynamic characteristics of the spread process of public opinion and the game process of social supervision on corporate pollution control; constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model of the local government, sewage discharge enterprises, and the public by coupling the susceptible–exposed–infected–removed (SEIR) model and the evolutionary game model; and discusses the influence laws of public opinion spread on the tripartite evolutionary game. The results show that (1) the public with higher influence or authority has a more significant restraint effect to restrain the pollution control behavior of the local government and pollutant companies by using online public opinion supervision. (2) Increasing the probability of transforming a latent person into a supervisor and the topic derivative rate or reducing the probability of a supervisor’s self-healing can increase the peak value of supervisors, expand the scope of social public opinion, and improve the effectiveness of public opinion supervision. (3) The relatively high authenticity of public opinion supervision makes public opinion supervision a substitute for local government supervision, but it has a relatively strong inhibitory effect on the over-standard pollutant discharge behavior of sewage discharge enterprises. These conclusions can provide a reference for improving the social supervision mechanism of pollution control in the era of network citizen journalism.

To achieve carbon peaking and carbon neutrality goals in China, green retrofitting of traditional residential buildings is the one of the important ways. Therefore, the dynamics process of the change of the resident group intention to retrofit and its impact on the behavior of the tripartite game between the government, investment retrofitting enterprises and residents needs to be analyzed. Firstly, a dissemination model of green retrofitting intentions among resident groups is constructed, and it is coupled with the tripartite game model. Then, through numerical simulation, the dissemination laws of intention for green retrofitting among resident groups and its influence on the evolution process of the tripartite game are analyzed. The results show that: (1) The rate at which the triad of government, investment retrofitting enterprises and residents reaches steady state is influenced by the impact of changes in the level of social climate on the rate of conversion of potential and participating residents to immune residents. When the rate of enterprises investment and residents participation increases, the rate of government choice of incentive strategies decreases; (2) greater government regulation and subsidies will increase the intention of residents and retrofitting enterprises to participate. The ideal steady state without government incentives can be achieved when the group size of participating residents is increased by improving the level of government publicity and education and the technology level of the enterprises; (3) the intention of enterprises to invest is closely related to the cognitive benefits and the level of risk perception of residents. The conclusions of the study can be used as a reference for the government to make green retrofitting policies for traditional residential buildings.

A river basin is a complex system of tributaries and a mainstream. It is vital to cooperatively manage the mainstream and the tributaries to alleviate water pollution and the ecological environment in the basin. On the other hand, existing research focuses primarily on upstream and downstream water pollution control mechanisms, ignoring coordinated control of the mainstream and tributaries, and does not consider the impacts of different environmental and economic conditions in each region on pollution control strategies. This study designed a differential game model for water pollution control in the Yellow River and two of its tributaries, taking regional differences into account and discussing the best pollution control strategies for each region under two scenarios: Nash noncooperative and cost-sharing mechanisms. Furthermore, the factors influencing regional differences in pollution control costs are analyzed, and their impacts on the cost-sharing mechanism of pollution control are discussed. The results show that: (1) The cost-sharing mechanism based on cooperative management can improve pollutant removal efficiency in the watershed and achieve Pareto improvement in environment and economy. (2) The greater the economic development pressure between the two tributaries, the fewer the effects of the cost-sharing mechanisms and the higher the proportion of pollution control costs paid by the mainstream government. (3) Industry water consumption, the proportion of the urban population to the total population at the end of the year, the value-added of secondary sectors as a percentage of regional GDP, the volume of industrial wastewater discharge, and granted patent applications all influence industrial wastewater pollution treatment investment. (4) The greater the coefficient of variation in pollution control costs between the two tributary areas, the less favorable the solution to water pollution management synergy. These findings can help governments in the basin regions negotiate cost-sharing arrangements.

Green retrofit PPP projects of traditional apartment complexes play an important role in promoting the green and low-carbon transformation of the construction industry and achieving China's "double carbon" goals. The integrated retrofit of apartment complexes presupposes that the resident groups agree to the retrofit. Therefore, it is necessary to study the evolutionary mechanism of residents' intention to green retrofit and the transformation process of their behavior, and to explore how to enhance residents' intention to participate. First, the dissemination model of residents' intention to green retrofit is constructed. Then, the strategic interaction among government, social capitals and residents under the PPP model is introduced into the dissemination model to define the state transformation probability of resident groups. Finally, the evolution laws of residents' intention to green retrofit are analyzed. The results show that: (1) the behavior of government regulation and social capitals' effort to retrofit can motivate the number of the resident agreeing to green retrofit to meet the proportional limit, (2) the faster the government chooses the strategy of regulation and the social capitals choose the strategy of effort to retrofit, the faster the number of residents agreeing to green retrofit reaches a steady state, (3) when the level of government publicity and education is too low, the cost of government regulation or the subsidy given to residents is too high, the green retrofit of traditional apartment complexes cannot be achieved. The research conclusions can provide a reference for the government to formulate green retrofit policies.

To achieve the goal of "emission peak and carbon neutrality", it is particularly important to accelerate the transformation of low-carbon production as the construction industry of China’s major carbon emission. Considering the national industrial management system, this paper constructs a stochastic game model of supplier group’s production strategy in construction supply chain based on Moran process, analyzes the conditions for low-carbon emission strategy to fixate in supplier populations and become an evolutionary stable strategy, then, carries out numerical analysis on fixation probability and fixation times, and the influence of various factors on the evolution process is discussed, such as the initial willingness of suppliers to choose low-carbon emission strategy, the cost subsidy coefficient of government to low carbon suppliers, the reward and punishment of government and the credibility of suppliers. The results show that on the basis of vigorously promoting environmental protection, the government should implement a differentiated treatment policy through the establishment of carbon emissions standards, cost subsidies, incentives and punishment measures, and information disclosure systems to guide supplier groups to transformation into low-carbon production.

The green transformation of construction enterprises (GTCEs) is an important way to develop green buildings and realize the goal of “double carbon”. The GTCEs is not only influenced by the internal characteristics of the group but also influenced by the governmental orientation and the pull of the consumer groups. This paper simultaneously considers the heterogeneity of consumer groups and construction enterprise groups, coupling the improved SIR dissemination model, complex network model, and evolutionary game model to describe the dynamic interaction process between construction enterprise groups, government, and consumer groups and to explore the evolution law of GTCEs. The results show that (1) Appropriately increase in green R&D investment by construction enterprises for higher returns, the government’s subsidy and penalty policies and a higher carbon trading price have a positive effect on the GTCEs; (2) a positive social climate, along with the government’s publicity and education, the higher technology level of construction enterprises, and the higher green cognition and lower risk perception level of consumers will strongly promote the GTCEs; and (3) a steady development of the GTCEs is guaranteed by the enterprises’ own inputs and the government’s joint measures on both the supply and demand sides. The conclusions of this study can be used as a reference for the government to formulate policies and for the green transformation and development of construction enterprises.