In the context of the rapid development of new media such as network citizen journalism, it is of great theoretical and practical significance to use the online public opinion to supervise sewage discharge enterprises’ emission governance behaviors and improve the social opinion supervision mechanism. This paper considers the dynamic characteristics of the spread process of public opinion and the game process of social supervision on corporate pollution control; constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model of the local government, sewage discharge enterprises, and the public by coupling the susceptible–exposed–infected–removed (SEIR) model and the evolutionary game model; and discusses the influence laws of public opinion spread on the tripartite evolutionary game. The results show that (1) the public with higher influence or authority has a more significant restraint effect to restrain the pollution control behavior of the local government and pollutant companies by using online public opinion supervision. (2) Increasing the probability of transforming a latent person into a supervisor and the topic derivative rate or reducing the probability of a supervisor’s self-healing can increase the peak value of supervisors, expand the scope of social public opinion, and improve the effectiveness of public opinion supervision. (3) The relatively high authenticity of public opinion supervision makes public opinion supervision a substitute for local government supervision, but it has a relatively strong inhibitory effect on the over-standard pollutant discharge behavior of sewage discharge enterprises. These conclusions can provide a reference for improving the social supervision mechanism of pollution control in the era of network citizen journalism.

A river basin is a complex system of tributaries and a mainstream. It is vital to cooperatively manage the mainstream and the tributaries to alleviate water pollution and the ecological environment in the basin. On the other hand, existing research focuses primarily on upstream and downstream water pollution control mechanisms, ignoring coordinated control of the mainstream and tributaries, and does not consider the impacts of different environmental and economic conditions in each region on pollution control strategies. This study designed a differential game model for water pollution control in the Yellow River and two of its tributaries, taking regional differences into account and discussing the best pollution control strategies for each region under two scenarios: Nash noncooperative and cost-sharing mechanisms. Furthermore, the factors influencing regional differences in pollution control costs are analyzed, and their impacts on the cost-sharing mechanism of pollution control are discussed. The results show that: (1) The cost-sharing mechanism based on cooperative management can improve pollutant removal efficiency in the watershed and achieve Pareto improvement in environment and economy. (2) The greater the economic development pressure between the two tributaries, the fewer the effects of the cost-sharing mechanisms and the higher the proportion of pollution control costs paid by the mainstream government. (3) Industry water consumption, the proportion of the urban population to the total population at the end of the year, the value-added of secondary sectors as a percentage of regional GDP, the volume of industrial wastewater discharge, and granted patent applications all influence industrial wastewater pollution treatment investment. (4) The greater the coefficient of variation in pollution control costs between the two tributary areas, the less favorable the solution to water pollution management synergy. These findings can help governments in the basin regions negotiate cost-sharing arrangements.

With the rapid development of mobile networks and citizen journalism, public opinion supervision has become an essential social supervision on engineering quality. They consider the dynamic characteristics of the spread process of public opinion and the game process of social supervision on engineering quality. The tripartite evolutionary game model of the government, contractors, and the public was constructed by coupling the Susceptible-Exposed-Infected-Removed (SEIR) model of public opinion spread and the evolutionary game model. Then, the influence laws of public opinion spread on the tripartite evolutionary game were analyzed and discussed through numerical simulation analysis. The results show that the public with more significant influence or authority is more able to restrain the quality behavior of government and contractors; increasing the probability of transforming ignorant into latent, the probability of converting latent into the communicator and topic derivation rate or reducing the direct immunization self-healing can improve the effectiveness of public opinion supervision; the true online public opinion can effectively restrain the quality behavior of contractors and urge the government to supervise actively. The research conclusions can provide a reference for improving the social supervision mechanism of engineering quality in the era of network citizen journalism.

In construction industry, the research and development (R&D) and application of green building technologies (GBTs) are crucial to promote the development of green buildings. From the perspective of supply-demand subject populations, this paper discusses the dynamic evolution process of strategy between individuals within construction enterprise populations and between construction enterprise populations and consumer populations. Firstly, based on Moran process, the stochastic evolutionary game model of construction enterprises adopting independent innovation strategy was constructed to obtain the conditions for the dominance of independent innovation strategy. Next, the bimatrix game model of construction enterprise populations and consumer populations was constructed to obtain the equilibrium frequency of the joint strategy. Then, the influence laws of the change of parameters on game were discussed through numerical simulations. The results show that (1) reducing the cost of independent R&D cost, reducing the spillover effect coefficient, increasing the loss of technology introduction, and increasing R&D subsidies for independent innovation construction enterprises are all conducive to IIS becoming an evolutionary stable strategy. (2) The marginal effect of IIS increases with the decrease in the spillover effect coefficient, the increase in the loss of technology introduction of construction enterprises, and the increase R&D subsidies. (3) The smaller the mutation rate is, the greater the cross-price sensitivity coefficient is, the greater the green sensitivity coefficient is, the greater the probability of government active encouragement is, and the more dominant (production of green buildings, purchase of green buildings) is. Finally, relevant measures and suggestions are proposed.