Christian Ewerhart

Dr. Christian Ewerhart


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

26Years (2001-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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22 August 2014 in Economic Theory
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CEChristian Ewerhart
Christian Ewerhart
Any symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium in a Tullock contest with intermediate values of the decisiveness parameter (“\(2<R<\infty \)”) has countably infinitely many mass points. All probability weight is concentrated on those mass points, which have the zero bid as their sole point of accumulation. With contestants randomizing over a non-convex set, there is a cost of being “halfhearted,” which is absent from both the lottery contest and the all-pay auction. Numerical bid distributions are generally negatively skewed and exhibit, for some parameter values, a higher probability of ex-post overdissipation than the all-pay auction.

23 May 2012 in Economic Theory
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CEChristian Ewerhart
Christian Ewerhart

9 July 2019 in Economic Theory
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CEChristian Ewerhart
Christian Ewerhart
FQFederico Quartieri
Federico Quartieri
Considered are imperfectly discriminating contests in which players may possess private information about the primitives of the game, such as the contest technology, valuations of the prize, cost functions, and budget constraints. We find general conditions under which a given contest of incomplete information admits a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. In particular, provided that all players have positive budgets in all states of the world, existence requires only the usual concavity and convexity assumptions. Information structures that satisfy our conditions for uniqueness include independent private valuations, correlated private values, pure common values, and examples of interdependent valuations. The results allow dealing with inactive types, asymmetric equilibria, population uncertainty, and the possibility of resale. It is also shown that any player that is active with positive probability ends up with a positive net rent.

1 August 2006 in SSRN Electronic Journal
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CEChristian Ewerhart
Christian Ewerhart
NCNuno Cassola
Nuno Cassola
NVNatacha Valla
Natacha Valla
It is argued that bidders in liquidity-providing central bank operations should typically possess declining marginal valuations. Based on this hypothesis, we construct equilibrium in central bank refinancing operations organised as variable rate tenders. In the case of the discriminatory pricing rule, bid shading does not disappear in large populations. The predictions of the model are shown to be consistent with the data for the euro area.

1 January 2006 in SSRN Electronic Journal
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CEChristian Ewerhart
Christian Ewerhart
NCNuno Cassola
Nuno Cassola
SESteen Ejerskov
Steen Ejerskov
NVNatacha Valla
Natacha Valla
Interest rate derivatives are among the most actively traded financial instruments in the main currency areas. With values of positions reacting immediately to the underlying index of daily interbank rates, manipulation has become an increasing challenge for the operational implementation of monetary policy. To address this issue, we study a microstructure model in which a commercial bank may have strategic recourse to central bank standing facilities. We characterise an equilibrium in which market rates will be manipulated with strictly positive probability. Our findings have an immediate bearing on recent developments in the Sterling and Euro money markets.

1 May 2004 in SSRN Electronic Journal
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CEChristian Ewerhart
Christian Ewerhart
PWPhilipp C. Wichardt
Philipp C. Wichardt
A global signaling game is a sender-receiver game in which the sender is only imperfectly informed about the receiver's preferences. The paper considers an economically relevant class of signaling games that possess more than one Perfect Bayesian equilibrium. For this class of games, it is shown that a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium is unaffected by a small perturbation of the information structure if and only if it is consistent with a criterion suggested by Cho and Kreps (1987). Moreover, the equilibrium in the global signaling game is essentially unique.