Considered are imperfectly discriminating contests in which players may possess private information about the primitives of the game, such as the contest technology, valuations of the prize, cost functions, and budget constraints. We find general conditions under which a given contest of incomplete information admits a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. In particular, provided that all players have positive budgets in all states of the world, existence requires only the usual concavity and convexity assumptions. Information structures that satisfy our conditions for uniqueness include independent private valuations, correlated private values, pure common values, and examples of interdependent valuations. The results allow dealing with inactive types, asymmetric equilibria, population uncertainty, and the possibility of resale. It is also shown that any player that is active with positive probability ends up with a positive net rent.
16 July 2022 in Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications
We obtain several characterizations of the existence of greatest elements of a total preorder. The characterizations pertain to the existence of unconstrained greatest elements of a total preorder and to the existence of constrained greatest elements of a total preorder on every nonempty compact subset of its ground set. The necessary and sufficient conditions are purely topological and, in the case of constrained greatest elements, are formulated by making use of a preorder relation on the set of all topologies that can be defined on the ground set of the objective relation. Observing that every function into a totally ordered set can be naturally conceived as a total preorder, we then reformulate the mentioned characterizations in the more restrictive case of an objective function with a totally ordered codomain. The reformulations are expressed in terms of upper semi- and pseudo-continuity by showing a topological connection between the two notions of generalized continuity.