Xide Zhu

Prof. Dr. Xide Zhu


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

14Years (2013-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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14 April 2016 in Optimization Methods and Software
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
XZXide Zhu
Xide Zhu
GLGuihua Lin
Guihua Lin
In this paper, we first consider a modified Levenberg–Marquardt method for solving nonlinear equations and show that the method converges superlinearly to a solution of the nonlinear equations under suitable conditions. Then, we reformulate the C-/M-/S-stationarity conditions of mathematical program with complementarity constraints as nonlinear equations so that we may employ the modified Levenberg–Marquardt method to solve these stationarity systems. Preliminary numerical experiments show that the new approach is promising.


24 August 2013 in Set-Valued and Variational Analysis
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
YLYan-Chao Liang
Yan-Chao Liang
XZXide Zhu
Xide Zhu
GLGuihua Lin
Guihua Lin


25 November 2022 in Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
GLGuihua Lin
Guihua Lin
XXXiong Xiaoli
Xiong Xiaoli
YLYuwei Li
Yuwei Li
XZXide Zhu
Xide Zhu
This paper considers a sales mode selection problem between resale and agency modes on e-commerce platforms for a manufacturer with traditional retail channel, direct selling channel, and e-commerce platform channel. By considering the factors price competition, market shares, and commission rate, we construct two leader-follower models with the manufacturer as a leader and traditional retailer and e-commerce platform as followers. To obtain optimal solutions, we discuss the conditions under which the upper and lower models are convex and then give optimal strategies for all members in the network. Through numerical experiments, we analyze the impact of price competition intensity, market shares, and commission rate on mode selection strategies and the changing trend of each member’s optimal pricing and profit under different sales modes. The numerical results reveal the following revelations: If the market share of the traditional retail channel is lower than the direct selling channel, the manufacturer should choose the agency mode when the market share of the direct selling channel and price competition are lower or when the market share of the direct selling channel together with the price competition and the commission rate is higher; otherwise, the manufacturer should choose the resale mode. If the market share of the direct selling channel is lower than the traditional retail channel, the manufacturer should choose the agency mode when the price competition is weak and choose the resale mode when the price competition is strong. Under certain conditions, a win–win situation can be achieved no matter how the manufacturer chooses.

1 May 2019 in Journal of Computational and Applied Mathematics
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
ZYZhen-Ping Yang
Zhen-Ping Yang
JZJin Zhang
Jin Zhang
XZXide Zhu
Xide Zhu
GLGui-Hua Lin
Gui-Hua Lin