This paper considers a sales mode selection problem between resale and agency modes on e-commerce platforms for a manufacturer with traditional retail channel, direct selling channel, and e-commerce platform channel. By considering the factors price competition, market shares, and commission rate, we construct two leader-follower models with the manufacturer as a leader and traditional retailer and e-commerce platform as followers. To obtain optimal solutions, we discuss the conditions under which the upper and lower models are convex and then give optimal strategies for all members in the network. Through numerical experiments, we analyze the impact of price competition intensity, market shares, and commission rate on mode selection strategies and the changing trend of each member’s optimal pricing and profit under different sales modes. The numerical results reveal the following revelations: If the market share of the traditional retail channel is lower than the direct selling channel, the manufacturer should choose the agency mode when the market share of the direct selling channel and price competition are lower or when the market share of the direct selling channel together with the price competition and the commission rate is higher; otherwise, the manufacturer should choose the resale mode. If the market share of the direct selling channel is lower than the traditional retail channel, the manufacturer should choose the agency mode when the price competition is weak and choose the resale mode when the price competition is strong. Under certain conditions, a win–win situation can be achieved no matter how the manufacturer chooses.
This paper focuses on developing effective algorithms for solving a bilevel program. The most popular approach is to replace the lower-level problem with its Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions to generate a mathematical program with complementarity constraints (MPCC). However, MPCC does not satisfy the Mangasarian-Fromovitz constraint qualification (MFCQ) at any feasible point. In this paper, inspired by a recent work using the lower-level Wolfe duality (WDP), we apply the lower-level Mond-Weir duality to present a new reformulation, called MDP, for bilevel program. It is shown that, under mild assumptions, they are equivalent in globally or locally optimal sense. An example is given to show that, different from MPCC, MDP may satisfy the MFCQ at its feasible points. Relations among MDP, WDP, and MPCC are investigated. On this basis, we extend the MDP reformulation to present another new reformulation (called eMDP), which has similar properties to MDP. Furthermore, to compare two new reformulations with the MPCC and WDP approaches, we design a procedure to generate 150 tested problems randomly and comprehensive numerical experiments show that MDP has quite evident advantages over MPCC and WDP in terms of feasibility to the original bilevel programs, success efficiency, and average CPU time, whereas eMDP is far superior to all other three reformulations. History: Accepted by Pascal Van Hentenryck, Area Editor for Computational Modeling: Methods & Analysis. Funding: This work was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China [Grants 12071280 and 11901380]. Supplemental Material: The software that supports the findings of this study is available within the paper and its Supplemental Information ( https://pubsonline.informs.org/doi/suppl/10.1287/ijoc.2023.0108 ) as well as from the IJOC GitHub software repository ( https://github.com/INFORMSJoC/2023.0108 ). The complete IJOC Software and Data Repository is available at https://informsjoc.github.io/ .
In order to solve the problem of separation between consumer purchase and product experience in online sales, live streaming e-commerce came into being. However, the interaction of streamers is easy to cause consumers’ impulse consumption, which leads to the soaring return rate. In this context, how to make reasonable return policies to avoid the loss is an important issue for brands. This paper studies return policy selection for brands. We mainly focus on MCN (multi-channel network) click farming and customer disappointment aversion in the situations that the return-freight insurances are paid by brands or consumers or brands and MCN jointly. Three leader-follower models with brands as leaders and platforms and MCN as followers are established. To solve the above bilevel models, we discuss the conditions under which the upper and lower models are both convex and, based on these theoretical results, we give the optimal strategies for all members. Then, through numerical experiments, we analyze the impacts of customer disappointment aversion level, MCN’s ability, commission rate, brand’s return-freight insurance purchasing ratio, and other factors on each member’s optimal decision. The results show that the return policy in the situation of return-freight insurance paid by brand is suitable for a market with the high level of customer disappointment aversion; the return policy in the situation of return-freight insurance paid by consumers is applicable to the case of low customer disappointment aversion and high commission rate; the return policy in the situation of return-freight insurance paid by brand and MCN jointly is suitable for the case of low MCN capability and can effectively restrain the click farming from MCN.
This paper focuses on the settlement selection strategic analysis for self-operated e-commerce platforms on hybrid e-commerce platforms under market competition. Taking factors such as the market share, price competition, commission, and customer loyalty into account, a multi-leader–follower game model with the platforms as leaders and the manufacturers as followers is established. Then, we solve the model with the help of some mathematical techniques and describe some numerical experiments to analyze settlement strategies for the self-operated platforms and their impact on other members in the network. The numerical results reveal the following revelations: a lower commission rate is more suitable for the self-operated platforms; once the commission rates are determined, the self-operated platforms prefer to settle in the hybrid platforms under lower medium price competition; when the price competition is fierce, as customer loyalty increases, the self-operated platforms should settle with a low market share; if the self-operated platforms settle in the hybrid platforms, then a higher price competition is advantageous for all members and can facilitate supply chain coordination.
This paper examines the impact of the reference price effect on pricing decisions in a risk-averse supply chain with a dual-sourcing procurement strategy, particularly during single-sourcing supply disruption. To analyze supply chain pricing decisions under non-disrupted and disrupted scenarios, we innovatively use semivariance as a risk measure to effectively avoid the limitations of the traditional variance approach and integrate it into Stackelberg game models. Based on these models, we analyze the impact of the reference price effect, risk aversion, and single-sourcing supply disruption on supply chain members’ pricing decisions. The main findings include the following: the single-sourcing supply disruption degree may increase the price of non-disrupted products and then increase the non-disrupted supplier’s utility; the strength of the reference price effect positively influences retailer utility but negatively impacts product pricing for supply chain members; the pricing decisions and utility of supply chain members are influenced by their risk aversion, and supply chain members with higher risk aversion adopt more conservative pricing strategies and consequently obtain lower utility; and equilibrium decisions generally demonstrate a degree of robustness. These insights may help supply chain managers respond rationally to supply disruptions and properly develop pricing strategies by taking into account the reference price effect.