With the frequent occurrence of world emergency events, the emergency management of government departments in various countries is facing great challenges. In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, the shortage of various emergency resources is prominent, and the emergency supplies reserve combined by governments and enterprises is an important guarantee for dealing with emergency management problems. This paper mainly studies the impact of a government sustainability-oriented innovation policy on the production capacity reserve of security emergency enterprises (SEEs), and constructs an evolutionary game model between the local government and SEEs. Then, it focuses on the impact of a reputation mechanism on the government enterprise cooperative reserve. According to the condition of a country, the central government’s punishment mechanism is introduced, and the evolutionary and stable strategies of the behavior choices of the local government and SEEs are compared and analyzed. Combined with the evolution degree of emergency events, the numerical simulation analysis is used to deduce and simulate the multi scenario of the example model. The results show that the reputation mechanism can effectively promote the evolution of government and enterprises to the ideal state under various scenarios. When the punishment intensity of the central government is higher than the total benefit of the implementation of the mere formality policy by the local government, it can effectively prevent the omission of the local government. This study provides a new idea for the government to formulate reasonable policies to promote SEEs to reserve production capacity, which is more conducive to government enterprise cooperation to deal with emergency events.
In this paper, we discuss the decision optimization of tourism projects in Hebei Province, China. To improve the process of analyzing tourism projects, we introduce a model that includes multiple decision makers as subjects based on a standard four-dimensional evaluation system. In order to improve the effectiveness of decision-making results, we will increase the number of decision makers to 40. A novel large-scale group decision-making (LSGDM) algorithm that incorporates the trust–distrust asymmetric relationships between decision makers is proposed. This model contains three main innovations: firstly, in the evaluation of decision makers’ social network relations, the trust–distrust value is introduced as a new carrier, and a weighted directed network and data integration operator are constructed based on the evaluation between decision makers; secondly, an extended Girvan-Newman (GN) algorithm is constructed to cluster the decision makers from this weighted network; thirdly, the interval-valued intuitionistic fuzzy number (IVIFN) is used to evaluate the alternatives, studying the IVIFN’s geometric significance by placing in a rectangular coordinate system. Finally, a new LSGDM model is proposed. Using the development of a cultural tourism project in a township as an example, the effectiveness of the proposed model is illustrated. By comparing the results of our method to those of a LSGDM algorithm that does not incorporate trust relationships, we assess the performance of the new model.