With the frequent occurrence of world emergency events, the emergency management of government departments in various countries is facing great challenges. In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, the shortage of various emergency resources is prominent, and the emergency supplies reserve combined by governments and enterprises is an important guarantee for dealing with emergency management problems. This paper mainly studies the impact of a government sustainability-oriented innovation policy on the production capacity reserve of security emergency enterprises (SEEs), and constructs an evolutionary game model between the local government and SEEs. Then, it focuses on the impact of a reputation mechanism on the government enterprise cooperative reserve. According to the condition of a country, the central government’s punishment mechanism is introduced, and the evolutionary and stable strategies of the behavior choices of the local government and SEEs are compared and analyzed. Combined with the evolution degree of emergency events, the numerical simulation analysis is used to deduce and simulate the multi scenario of the example model. The results show that the reputation mechanism can effectively promote the evolution of government and enterprises to the ideal state under various scenarios. When the punishment intensity of the central government is higher than the total benefit of the implementation of the mere formality policy by the local government, it can effectively prevent the omission of the local government. This study provides a new idea for the government to formulate reasonable policies to promote SEEs to reserve production capacity, which is more conducive to government enterprise cooperation to deal with emergency events.
Once an online public opinion emerges, the interweaving of information distortion and public panic makes it difficult for enterprises to accurately grasp the emotional turning point and formulate sustainable marketing strategies. Based on the perspective of information asymmetry, in this paper, we construct a four-agent evolutionary game model involving the central government, local governments, enterprises and netizens. It analyzes the balance of strategies used by different actors in public opinion crises and examines how these strategies drive public panic from three perspectives: content, users and emotions. Finally, the findings are verified through simulation calculations. Our research reveals that when panic sentiment is in the medium range, the central government’s strengthened supervision coexists with enterprises’ deceptive marketing, and the impact of the event is magnified. When panic breaks through the threshold, local governments shift from full disclosure to partial disclosure, while consumers maintain their purchasing confidence and are less likely to be swayed by rumors. Research shows that after a public opinion crisis occurs, only by replacing deception with transparent and genuine content and jointly creating green solutions with consumers can enterprises transform panic into sustainable brand assets and provide a decision-making basis for the long-term development of the enterprise.