Deception is a pervasive phenomenon that greatly influences dyadic, groupal and societal interactions. Behavioural, physiological and neural signatures of this phenomenon have imporant implications for theoretical and applied research, but, because it is difficult for a laboratory to replicate the natural context in which deception occurs, contemporary research is still struggling to find such signatures. In this study, we tracked the facial temperature of participants who decided whether or not to deceive another person, in situations where their reputation was at risk or not. We used a high-sensitivity infrared device to track temperature changes to check for unique patterns of autonomic reactivity. Using a region-of-interest based approach we found that prior to any response there was a minimal increase in periorbital temperature (which indexes sympathetic activation, together with reduced cheek temperature) for the self-gain lies in the reputation-risk condition. Crucially, we found a rise in nose temperature (which indexes parasympathetic activation) for self-gain lies in the reputation-risk condition, not only during response preparation but also after the choice was made. This finding suggests that the entire deception process may be tracked by the nose region. Furthermore, this nasal temperature modulation was negatively correlated with machiavellian traits, indicating that sympathetic/parasympathetic regulation is less important for manipulative individuals who may care less about the consequences of lie-related moral violations. Our results highlight a unique pattern of autonomic reactivity for spontaneous deception in ecological contexts.
Social preferences like interpersonal altruism, fairness, reciprocity and inequity aversion are inherently linked to departures from pure self-interest. During economic interactions, for example, defectors may be punished even if this implies a cost for the punishers. This violation of canonical assumptions in economics indicates that socially oriented decisions may predominate over self-centred stances. Here we explore whether the personal experience of pain changes the balance between self-gain and socially based choices. We used laser stimulation to induce pain or a warm sensation in subjects playing a modified version of the Ultimatum Game (UG) both in the role of responder and proposer. After each shot, responders evaluated the fairness of the offer. Moreover, responders and proposers rated the intensity and unpleasantness of the sensation evoked by the laser stimulation. Results show that suffering proposers decrease fair offers and suffering responders increase their acceptance rate irrespective of economic offer. Crucially, the intensity of painful stimulation has a predictive role on Moderately Unfair offers' acceptance rates. Thus the personal experience of pain may favour the emergence of a self-centered perspective aimed at maximizing self-gain. The results suggest that bodily states play a fundamental role in higher-order interpersonal negotiations and interactions.
Can non-human animals comprehend and employ symbols? The most convincing empirical evidence comes from language-trained apes, but little is known about this ability in monkeys. Tokens can be regarded as symbols since they are inherently non-valuable objects that acquire an arbitrarily assigned value upon exchange with an experimenter. Recent evidence suggested that capuchin monkeys, which diverged from the human lineage 35 million years ago, can estimate, represent and combine token quantities. A fundamental and open question is whether monkeys can reason about symbols in ways similar to how they reason about real objects. Here we examined this broad question in the context of economic choice behavior. Specifically, we assessed whether, in a symbolic context, capuchins' preferences satisfy transitivity - a fundamental trait of rational decision-making. Given three options A, B and C, transitivity holds true if A≥B, B≥C and A≥C (where ≥ indicates preference). In this study, we trained monkeys to exchange three types of tokens for three different foods. We then compared choices monkeys made between different types of tokens with choices monkeys made between the foods. Qualitatively, capuchins' preferences revealed by the way of tokens were similar to those measured with the actual foods. In particular, when choosing between tokens, monkeys displayed strict economic preferences and their choices satisfied transitivity. Quantitatively, however, values measured by the way of tokens differed systematically from those measured with the actual foods. In particular, for any pair of foods, the relative value of the preferred food increased when monkeys chose between the corresponding tokens. These results indicate that indeed capuchins are capable of treating tokens as symbols. However, as they do so, capuchins experience the cognitive burdens imposed by symbolic representation.
Imagery Rescripting (ImRs) is a therapeutic technique that aims to reduce the distress associated with negative memories of early aversive experiences. It consists of prompting patients to rescript the autobiographical memory in line with their unmet needs. In recent years, ImRs was found effective in reducing symptoms of disorders such as depression, social phobia, obsessive-compulsive disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, and personality disorders. However, the cognitive mechanisms underlying such broad effectiveness are currently an object of debate. Empirical evidence has shown that ImRs reduces the negative self-belief derived from aversive memories in different types of mental disorders. However, existing accounts are not very accurate in explaining how this change in self-belief occurs and therefore why ImRs is effective across psychopathologies. We propose that ImRs changes the semantic self-representation encapsulated in the aversive memory by reducing the meta-emotional problem (i.e., perceiving a negative emotion as problematic and unacceptable). Empirical evidence implicates the meta-emotional problem or “secondary problem” in the maintenance of different disorders and has shown that treating it leads to symptoms reduction. Here we hypothesize that: (i) ImRs as a stand-alone treatment may lead to a reduction of symptoms; negative self-belief and the meta-emotional problem; and (ii) the reduction of the meta-emotional problem might mediate the relation between symptoms and negative self-belief reduction. To test our hypothesis, we present an experimental procedure that could be used in future studies. We conclude discussing the existing theoretical frameworks that attempt to unravel the mechanisms that play a role in ImRs.
Although universal, lying is generally considered immoral behavior. Most neuroscience studies on lying sanction or instruct deceptive behaviors and thus might fail to acknowledge the significance of lie-related moral conflicts. By combining electroencephalogram (EEG) recordings with a novel paradigm in which participants decided freely whether to deceive another person, we have generated indices of the cognitive (reaction times and stimulus-locked event-related components) and moral (readiness potential and its correlations with deception-related personality traits) cost of spontaneous deception. Our data fail to support the consensus that deception is cognitively more demanding than truth telling, suggesting that spontaneous deception, as opposed to lying out of requirement, might not mandate additional cognitive workload. Interestingly, lying was associated with decreased motor readiness, an event-related potential (ERP) component that is linked to motor preparation of self-determined actions and modulated when we face moral dilemmas. Notably, this reduction was less extensive in manipulative participants and greater in those who cared highly about their impression management. Our study expands on previous findings on deception by associating a cortical marker of reduced preparation to act with individual differences in moral cognition.